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Transport, Economic Growth, 
And Market Integration
In 1776 the economist Adam Smith argued that human beings 
have a natural inclination to engage in trade, to move goods from 
one place to another for the purpose of barter or exchange. Since 
exchange was a human propensity, he reasoned, markets would 
develop naturally in places where transport was relatively easy, 
such as along rivers.’
More recently, Karl Polanyi pointed out that trade is 
actually a highly artificial activity. He studied primitive tribes in 
Central Australia and found that they did not have a propensity to 
transport goods for barter or exchange, but to hunt or loot other 
tribes to get what they needed. The "propensity" to trade did not 
appear until a truce had been struck between two tribes of equal 
strength.^
Far from occurring naturally, Polanyi wrote, 
long-distance trade required even more effort than local trade, 
given the problem of transporting goods. Addressing the problems 
of long-distance trade went beyond building roads and canals, and 
included removing arbitrary trade barriers set by local bullies or 
officials. Contrary to the laissez-faire policy advocated by 
classical economists in the wake of Adam Smith, Polanyi 
suggested that long-distance trade was hardly possible without 
some form of state intervention. ^ As we shall see, in 
eighteenth-century China the state was instrumental in 
developing inter-regional, long-distance trade.
In the study of Chinese history, the significance of 
long-distance trade was not a focal point until the 1980s. In the 
sixteenth-century discussion of the "sprouts of capitalism", many
' Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776; repr., London: Penguin 
Group, 1997), pp. 117-26.
^ Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 
p. 59.
^ Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 60-3.
1
Introduction
writers were interested in such subjects as: the presence of 
wage-labour relations in agriculture and handicraft industries;'* 
the prevalence of partnership and shareholding in coal mine 
management;^ the emergence of managerial landlords;** and the 
negative impact of the lineage on the development of capitalism/ 
But long-distance trade was mentioned only occasionally, and 
only as an adjunct to local trade/ It was not until the work of Wu 
Chengming in the early 1980s that long-distance trade was 
perceived as indispensable to economic growth.
According to Wu there were many levels of commodity 
exchange, not all of which developed into eapitalism. Exehange in
'* Shang Yue, “Zhongguo ziben zhuyi shengchan yinsu de mengya jiqi 
zengzhang,” in Zhongguo ziben zhuyi guanxi fashengji yanbian de 
chubu yanjiu (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1956), pp. 1-72. For a brief 
summary of his arguments, see Du Zhen, “Guanyu Zhongguo ziben 
zhuyi mengya wenti de taolun,” Lishiyanjiu 1956, no. 7; repr. in 
Zhongguo ziben zhuyi mengya wenti taolunji (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 
1957), pp. 1092-102.
^ Deng Tuo, “Cong Wanli dao Qianlong: guanyu Zhongguo ziben zhuyi 
mengya shiqi de yige lunzheng,” Lishi yanjiu 1956, no. 10; repr. in 
Zhongguo ziben zhuyi mengya wenti taolunji xubian (Beijing: Sanlian 
shudian, 1960), pp. 133-82. A critical comment on Deng‘s article is 
provided in Tang Mingsui, Li Longqian and Zhang Weixiong, “Dui 
Deng Tuo tongzhi ‘Cong Wanli dao Qianlong’ yiwen de shangque he 
buchong: bing shilun chuli he yunyong shidi diaocha cailiao de fangfa,” 
Lishi yanjiu 1958, no. 1; repr. in Zhongguo ziben zhuyi mengya wenti 
taolunji xubian, pp. 183-217.
^ Jing Su and Luo Lun, Qingdai Shandong jingying dizhu de shehui 
xingzhi (Shandong: Renmin chubanshe, 1959); Endymion Wilkinson, 
Landlord and Labor in Late Imperial China: Case Studies from 
Shandong (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University, 1978); and Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and 
Social Change in North China (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 
1985).
’’ Fu Yiling, Ming-Qing shehui jingjishi lunwen ji (Beijing: Remin 
chubanshe, 1982).
* Shang Yue, “Zhongguo ziben zhuyi shengchan yinsu de mengya jiqi 
zengzhang,” and Han Dacheng, “Mingdai shangpin jingji de fazhan yu 
ziben zhuyi de mengya,” in Ming-Qing shehui jingji xintai de yanjiu 
(Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1957), pp. 1-102.
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local markets, for instance, where money circulated within such 
small scopes that hardly enough of it was accumulated to form 
capital, could not produce capitalism. Capital was formed only in 
long-distance trade, as between the powerful Huizhou and Shanxi 
merchants who traded across provinces in the Ming and Qing 
periods. ^ Wu shifted the eentre of the discussion on the 
beginnings of capitalism to long-distance trade.
Transportation difficulties and costs must be taken into 
account in any discussion of long-distance trade. In the literature 
on economic development in China, transport costs were first 
mentioned by G. William Skinner in his discussion of the 
nineteenth century. Dividing China into eight macro-regions 
(north China, northwest China, upper Yangzi, middle Yangzi, 
lower Yangzi, southeast coast, Lingnan, and Yungui), Skinner 
showed that transactions between distant regions were impeded 
by the high cost of unmechanized transport. Natural barriers 
effectively divided one region from another, so that each 
macro-region was connected only tenuously to its neighbours.'”
The result was a national economy comprised of 
fragmentary regional markets. Since each regional market 
operated independently, commodity prices between them were 
not correlated, or had no clear relationship to each other, not even 
for the same product. Market integration, or the law of one price, 
is the reverse of this. In an integrated market, price changes at any 
point are reflected by other points in the same market."
” Wu Chengming, Zhongguo ziben zhuyiyu guonei shichang (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985). For detailed studies of the 
Huizhou and Shanxi merchants in the Ming and the Qing periods, see 
Fujii Hiroshi, “Shin’an sh5nin no kenkyu,” Tdyd gakuhd 36, no. 1-4 
(1953-4): 1-45, 180-208, 335-88, 533-63; and Terada Takanobu, Sansei 
shonin no kenkyu: Min-dai ni okeru shonin oyobi shogyd shihon (Kyoto: 
Tbydshi kenkyukai, 1972).
G. William Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 211-7.
’' An introduction to the concept of market integration can be found in 
Wu Chengming, “Liyong liangjia biandong yanjiu Qingdai de shichang 
zhenghe,” Zhongguo shehui jingjishiyanjiu 2 (1996): 88-94; Thomas G. 
Rawski and Lillian M. Li, “Introduction: Chinese history in economic 
perspective,” in Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li, ed., Chinese
3
Introduction
To Barbara Sands and Ramon Myers, Skinner’s work 
seemed to suggest the prevalence of macro-regional economic 
independence in the nineteenth century. Sands and Myers took 
issue with such a suggestion: the literature was clear that 
inter-regional trade in rice, salt, copper, and cotton cloth was 
common even in the eighteenth century. (They also cited the work 
of Loren Brandt to show that grain prices were highly correlated 
between the middle and lower Yangzi by the early twentieth 
century, evidence for an integrated market along the Yangzi.'^) 
Daniel Little and Joseph W. Esherick, on the other hand, 
defended Skiimer's macro-regions theory, arguing that it did not 
rule out inter-regional trade, but implied that such trade occurred 
only between the high-level, central locations in each 
macro-region.'^ This was indeed the way that Skiimer described 
inter-regional trade networks in late imperial China, with 
"centrality" determined by proximity to the Grand Canal and the 
Yangzi River:
Because of the overwhelming importance of water 
transport in inter-regional trade, its spatial structure 
was dominated by the great sideways T that tied 
together five of China's eight regions. The Lower 
Yangtze [Yangzi] was the cross of the T whose leg to 
the west was the Yangtze [Yangzi], whose arm to the 
north was the Grand Canal, and whose arm to the 
south was the sea route to the major ports of the
History in Economic Perspective (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992), pp. 13-5.
Barbara Sands and Ramon Myers, “The spatial approach to Chinese 
history; a test,” Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 4 (1986); 721-6; Loren 
L. Brandt, “Chinese agriculture and the international economy,
1870s-1930s: a Reassessment,” Explorations in Economic History 22 
(1985): 168-93.
Daniel Little and Joseph W. Esherick, “Testing the testers: a reply to 
Barbara Sands and Ramon Myers’s critique of G. William Skinner’s 




Southeast Coast and Lingnan. Along these routes
flowed the bulk of China’s inter-regional trade.*'*
Along the waterway T formed by the Yangzi River and 
the Grand Canal, the most important trade route in Ming and Qing 
China, eities grew and flourished, linked by the junk trade. (See 
Map 1.)
Market Integration And The Rice Trade
During the Qing empire rice, at least in central and southern China, 
was the most important long-distance commodity. Han-sheng 
Chuan and Richard A. Kraus showed that every year in the early 
eighteenth century a sizable volume of rice was shipped down the 
Yangzi into Suzhou prefecture and then distributed in southern 
Jiangsu province through river networks, and to Zhejiang 
province and Fujian province via the coast. The prosperity of the 
rice trade protected these provinces from sudden food shortages. 
When a province faced famine, the high price of its rice 
immediately attracted merchants with rice to sell from other 
provinces, until price levels in these provinces became similar, 
with differences reflecting only transport costs. In such a market, 
which is usually called a self-regulating or integrated market, 
prices in different places were correlated. Therefore, correlated 
prices may be taken as a sign of a self-regulating or integrated 
market. In their study, Chuan and Kraus postulated that the prices 
of rice in these central and southern China provinces were 
self-regulating, and that the provinces in this vast territory formed 
a self-regulating market.*^
Chuan and Kraus's work was extended by Yeh-chien 
Wang, who applied the Pearson correlation coefficient of prices to 
examine trade links. A commonly employed measure of market 
integration, the correlation coefficient of prices is used to compare
*'* Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China, p. 234.
Han-sheng Chuan and Richard A. Kraus, Mid-Ch ’ing Rice Markets 
and Trade: An Essay in Price History (Cambridge: Harvard University 
East Asian Monographs, 1975). Their analysis was based on 




the price series in different places. (A price series being a 
sequence of prices for a particular commodity over a period of 
time.) The higher the correlation coefficient between two price 
series, the better integrated two markets are. Wang found that the 
major prefectural cities in central and southern China, including 
Hanyang, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Quanzhou, and Huaian (see also 
Map 1), all had the relatively high correlation coefficient of 0.6.'® 
Chuan and Kraus’s theory of a self-regulating market was thus 
further supported.
In another essay, Wang included north China in this 
integrated rice market, stressing that the rice consumed in north 
China came from the Yangzi delta: North China produced little 
rice, and most people there ate wheat, millet, and kaoliang 
Igaoliang or sorghum] instead. Almost all of the rice that the 
well-to-do consumed in the North was shipped from the South.
Wang argued that as a result of the long-distance rice 
trade, rice prices in different regions along the Grand Canal 
merged gradually into one another, making an integrated 
market.*^ However, he did not support his argument with an 
analysis of correlation coefficients along the canal; and, as we 
shall see later, he did not consider the effects of the grain tribute 
on the northern rice market.
Although built to transport tribute tax grain from the 
Yangzi delta to Beijing in the north, the Grand Canal facilitated 
transport for all goods, greatly reduced transport costs between 
north and central China, and prompted the growth of 
long-distance trade between Hangzhou on the southeast coast and 
Beijing in the North China Plain. The prosperity of the canal trade 
has been corroborated by many studies. According to Kosaka 
Masanori 32 percent of the customs duties in 1753, a whopping
'® Yeh-chien Wang, “Food supply and grain prices in the Yangzi delta in 
the eighteenth century,” in Second Conference on Modern Chinese 
Economic History (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 
1989), pp. 444-51.
Yeh-chien Wang, “Secular trends of rice prices in the Yangzi delta, 
1638-1935,” in Rawski and Li, ed., Chinese History in Economic 
Perspective, pp. 38, 52.
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1.37 million taels, came from the canal trade. The prosperity of 
the canal trade was also reflected in the economic growth of cities 
along the canal. Fu Chonglan showed that cities such as Tianjin in 
Zhili, Linqing in Shandong, and Huaian in Jiangsu, grew and 
flourished from the Yuan to the Qing.'^
Some scholars argued that long-distance trade flourished 
on the canal because the state played a major role. Nakahara Teruo, 
Xu Tan, and Zhang Zhaodong pointed out that the canal trade was 
in fact subsidized by the Qing state. In the first place, the 
government had built the Grand Canal to deliver the grain tribute. 
During the eighteenth century, 4.5 million shi^^ of grain tax were 
transported to the capital as salaries for metropolitan officials and 
soldiers. Secondly, in order to transport this massive amount of 
grain, the government recruited thousands of transport soldiers, 
known as bannermen (qiding), to man about 7,000 government 
grain boats. Bannermen received salaries, but also a free shipment 
allowance for goods carried on the grain boats. Goods 
transported as part of the bannermen's allowance were not charged 
the usual transit duties; for this reason, as Nakahara, Xu, and 
Zhang have shown, it was common for bannermen to sell their
Kosaka Masanori, “Shindai ni okeru daiunga no bushi ryutsu: Kenryu 
nenkan Waiankan o chushin to shite,” Tdhoku gakuin daigaku ronshu: 
rekishigaku, chirigaku 15 (1985): 9.
Fu Chonglan, Zhongguo yunhe chengshifazhanshi (Sichuan: Sichuan 
renmin chubanshe, 1985).
A shi equaled 103.55 liters. Note that shi (bushel) is now read as dan 
(picul), but they were two different measuring units in 
eighteenth-century China. While dan represented a weight, shi was 
actually a measure of volume. See Han-sheng Chuan and Richard A. 
Kraus, Mid-Ch ’ing Rice Markets and Trade: An Essay in Price History 
(Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Monographs, 1975), pp. 
79-98.
For a detailed introduction of the grain tribute transport in the Qing, 
see Harold C. Hinton, The Grain Tribute System of China, 1845-1911 
(Cambridge: Chinese Economic and Political Studies, Harvard 
University, 1956); Hoshi Ayao, Mindai sdun no kenkyu (Tokyo: Nihon 
gakujustu shinkokai, 1963), pp. 401-52; and Li Wenzhi and Jiang Taixin, 
Qingdai caoyun (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995).
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shipment allowance to merchants.^^ Takino Shijiro showed that 
the practice was so rampant that the amount of duty-free goods 
thus transported far exceeded the allowances, with the result that 
the Huaian Customs often lost revenue.Since the court was 
aware of the situation, this amounted to a further subsidy of the 
grain tribute. These studies clearly show that state intervention 
was a factor in eighteenth-century economic growth.
When I began my research on the rice trade, building on 
the work of Yeh-chien Wang, I thought it might be worthwhile to 
discover whether or not transport of the government grain tax on 
the canal was related to market integration. As Beijing, the capital, 
was a great consumer of grain, I assumed that bannermen would 
take advantage of their shipping allowance to transport rice from 
the south to sell in Beijing. As expected, I came across many 
contemporary scholarly writings and government documents de­
tailing malpractices in the grain tribute transport; I found that the 
bannermen had transported many southern products, including 
timber, silk cloth, and cotton cloth, to the north on government 
grain boats. Yet I could not find any sign that rice, even in small 
amounts, had been taken to be privately sold in the capital. The 
reason became obvious when I found that the price of rice in 
Beijing was surprisingly low, even lower than in Suzhou at the 
southernmost tip of the canal, which was much closer to where the 
rice was grown. The reason merchants didn't send rice from the 
lower Yangzi to Beijing was because they couldn't sell it for a 
profit there.
As I shall show in Chapter One, the grain market in 
Beijing was heavily subsidized by the state, and this kept prices 
low. Every year the Qing court distributed millions of shi of 
Yangzi rice, collected as the grain tribute tax, and used it to pay 
officials and soldiers in Beijing their wages. These same officials
Nakahara Teruo, “Shindai sosen ni yoru shohin ryutsu ni tsuite,” 
Shigaku kenkyii 72 (1959); 67-81; Xu Tan, “Ming-Qing shiqi yunhe de 
shangpin liutong,” Lishi yanjiu 1992, no. 1: 80-5; and Zhang Zhaodong, 
“Qingdai caoyun yu nanbei wuzhi jiaoliu,” Qingshiyanjiu 1992, no. 3: 
67-73.
Takino Shojiro, “Shindai Waiankan no kosei to kino ni tsuite,” 
Kyushu daigaku toyoshi ronshu 14 (1985): 116-56.
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and soldiers sold much of their rice on the Beijing market, in 
return for money to buy other goods. Because its price in the 
market did not reflect either production or transport costs, having 
been given to the soldiers and officials as wages, this rice was 
much cheaper in Beijing than in the Yangzi delta, where it was 
grown.
While the sale of "rice wages" in Beijing inhibited the 
growth of an integrated market along the Grand Canal, the grain 
tribute strengthened Qing dynasty government finances, a subject 
that I discuss in Chapter Two. As an in-kind tax, the grain tribute 
was free from the price fluctuations of a monetary tax. 
Furthermore, reserves from the tribute, and the tribute itself, could 
be diverted to or retained in provinces suffering from famine, to 
"feed the people" and maintain social stability.
Chapters Three to Five will investigate the rice trade 
along the Yangzi river for signs of an integrated market in the 
south, unaffected by rice wages in the capital. Thanks to the work 
by Kishimoto Mio, Han-sheng Chuan, and Yeh-chien Wang, we 
now have a clear picture of rice prices in the early Qing. 
Kishimoto showed that prices slumped during the late seventeenth 
century due to the imperial sea blockade against Ming loyalists in 
Taiwan.^'* Chuan argued that after the blockade, Qing China took 
in large quantities of foreign silver through its export trade, 
experiencing a sharp rise in commodity prices by the eighteenth 
century. Taking the price of rice in Suzhou as an example for the 
whole century, the inflation rate seemed to be about 400 per 
cent.^^ Chuan's argument prevailed until recent work by Wang,
Nakayama Mio, “Shindai zenki Konan no beika doko,” Shigaku 
zasshi 87, no. 9 (1978): 1-33; Kishimoto-Nakayama Mio, “Koki nenkan 
no kolusen ni tsuite: Shinsho keizai shiso no ichi sokumen,” Tdyo bunka 
kensyujo kiyd 89 (1982): 251-306.
Chuan Han-sheng, “Meizhou baiyin yu shiba shiji Zhongguo wujia 
gemin de guanxi,” 1956; repr. Chuan Han-sheng, Zhongguo jingjishi 
luncong, Vol. 2 (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo, 1972), pp. 475-508. 
Chuan's theory of a high inflation rate in eighteenth-century China was 
supported by Yeh-chien Wang and others. See Yeh-chien Wang, “The 
secular trend of prices during the Ch’ing Period (1644-191 Journal 
of Chinese Studies 5, no. 2 (1972): 347-68; Nakayama Mio, “Shindai 
zenki Konan no beika doko,” pp. 1-33; Jiang Jianping, Qingdai qianqi
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working from a more substantial collection of price data, proved 
that for most of the eighteenth century rice prices increased by 
only 25 per cent.^* But a new problem arose from Wang’s data: 
after following an upward trend for more than eighty years 
(1700-1787), rice prices decreased suddenly and drastically in the 
last decade of the century. This price drop was difficult to explain. 
Wang attributed it to the unreliability of price reports for those 
years, and speculated that a satisfactory explanation would be 
impossible without as-yet-undiscovered data.^’
In Chapter Three, then, I re-examine the arguments of 
Kishimoto, Chuan, and Wang by examining the connection 
between the inflow of foreign silver and the secular trend of rice 
prices. 1 show that when China’s relationship to the world 
economy is taken into account, the drastic decline in prices at the 
end of the century is explicable.
When working on this area, 1 had to confront the popular 
view in the literature that demand from the growing population 
was outstripping supply, and that China was becoming 
over-populated. Ping-ti Ho argued that when the population in the 
Qing empire rose from 150 million in 1700 to 313 million in 1794, 
diminishing returns in agriculture occurred, and the country began 
to become impoverished. While massive migration to the 
frontier alleviated the population pressure in agricultural regions, 
Dwight H. Perkins stressed that that was not enough to counter the 
effects of overpopulation.^’
migu maoyiyanjiu (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1992); and Lin 
Man-houng, “Shijie jingji yu jindai Zhongguo nongye: Qingren Wang 
Huizu yiduan Qianlong liangjia jishu zhi jiexi,” 'm Jindai Zhongguo 
nongcun Jingjishi yanjiuhui lunwenji (Taipei: Zhongyan yanjiuyuan 
jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1989), pp. 291-325.
Yeh-chien Wang, “Food supply and grain prices in the Yangzi delta,’’ 
p. 433. Wang collected the data from contemporary price memorials 
held at the First Historical Archives in Beijing and the National Palace 
Museum in Taipei.
Yeh-chien Wang, “Secular trends of rice prices in the Yangzi delta, 
1638-1935,” p. 49.
28 Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 257-78.
Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968
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The imbalance between population and resources in the 
Yangzi delta before the mid-nineteenth century was the basis of 
Mark Elvin's argument that China’s economy had fallen into a 
"high-level equilibrium trap", in which the abundance of cheap 
labour prevented any need for technological advances in 
agriculture and industry.^” Although Kenneth Pomeranz did not 
believe that the stagnation and decline of industrial development 
in the Yangzi delta was due to population pressure, he agreed that 
the population was so dense that the delta had to import copious 
amounts of rice from its upstream provinces every year during the 
eighteenth century/' The demand for rice in the Yangzi delta, 
according to Chuan and Kraus, was a consequence of the rapid 
growth of urban populations in the surge of eighteenth century 
commercialization, when cities became too large to subsist on 
local rice production/^
Although the growth of urban populations in the Yangzi 
delta undoubtedly led to greater rice consumption, I found that the 
volume of the delta's rice import was determined by other factors 
as well. In Chapter Four, by examining the rice harvests in the 
Yangzi delta, I challenge the theory that there was not enough rice 
in the delta to feed its own population. When analysing this 
problem, it became clear to me that the literature overstated the 
degree to which the rice market was integrated. The idea of market 
integration, as supported by comparing price series, did not take 
into account the flow of trade. In this chapter, I describe market
(Chicago; Aldine Pub. Co., 1969), pp. 26-9, 184-6.
Mark Elvin, TTje Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic 
Interpretation (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1973), 
pp. 285-319.
Kenneth Pomeranz argued that the Yangzi delta imported 15-22 per 
cent of all its food from other provinces in the mid-eighteenth century; 
but in later decades such long-distance trade declined. According to 
Pomeranz this was not because the delta no longer needed the food, but 
because rice-exporting provinces like Hunan had developed their own 
handicraft industries and therefore needed fewer industrial goods from 
the delta. See Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China 
and the Making of the Modem World Economy (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 246-51, 289-90.
Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch 'ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 58-65.
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integration as "sporadic" and argue that it is a better description of 
the market at that stage.
Certainly another factor affecting the rice trade on the 
Yangzi was the government. In this respect, many scholars have 
emphasized the impact of official shipment, storage, and sale of 
grain on the free operation of the market: Chuan and Kraus 
discussed how the Qing government used the rice tribute, storage 
of the tribute (the granary system), and direct official purchase 
and movement of grain between provinces to stabilize prices;^^ 
Pierre-Etienne Will showed how these institutions functioned to 
relieve famines in Zhili province in 1743 and 1744;^'' and R. Bin 
Wong investigated the spatial and temporal impact of granaries.^^ 
Other studies have explored the role of local officials in the 
commercial grain flow. For example, Yamamoto Susumu and 
Norimatsu Akifumi’s study showed that when rice prices were 
high, provincial governors in the middle Yangzi usually 
prohibited rice exports,^® while Kishimoto Mio's study showed 
that during times of price increase some provincial governors 
advocated a non-interventionist policy in the grain trade, 
arguing that a free inter-regional grain flow was the best way to 
assure price stabilization and achieve the goal of social stability. 
Helen Dunstan even suggested that a rudimentary form of 
economic liberalism operated in eighteenth-century China.^**
” ibid., pp. 28-37.
Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century 
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
R. Bin Wong, “Chinese traditions of grain storage,” and “Part I: 
Development and decline,” in Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong 
with James Lee, ed.. Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary 
System in China, 1650-1850 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 
University of Michigan, 1991), pp. 1-98.
Yamamoto Susumu, “Shindai zenki no heiseri seisaku: saibai, 
shokucho seisaku suii,” Shirin 71, no. 5 (1988): 38-70, Norimatsu 
Akifumi, “Shin dai ni okem [kyo] to ryutsu-shokuryo mondai no 
hitokoma,” Kyushu daigaku toydshironshii 20 (1992): 1-15.
Kishimoto-Nakayama Mio, “Shicho chuki keizai seisaku no kicho: 
1740 nendai no shokuryo mondai o chushin ni,” Chikaki ni arite: 
Kin-Gendai Chugoku o meguru toron no hiroba 11 (May 1987): 17-35.
Helen Dunstan, Conflicting Counsels to Confuse the Age: A
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Building on all of these studies, in the last chapter I 
demonstrate that though the imperial government inhibited the 
growth of the rice trade in the capital, it disallowed provincial 
officials, especially in rice-exporting provinces, from erecting 
artificial barriers to the outflow of grain, and thus played a 
decisive role in maintaining a free inter-provincial grain flow 
outside Beijing. In the eighteenth century the long-distance rice 
trade prospered in China, especially along the Yangzi River, 
owing to positive interventions from the imperial government. 
Furthermore, the transport of the grain tribute, through the 
bannermen's allowances of duty-free goods, stimulated the 
long-distance trade of other goods between Beijing in the north 
and the Yangzi provinces.
This book investigates the grain tax, canal transportation, 
and market integration, to give a complete picture of the 
long-distance rice trade in China during the eighteenth century.
Documentary Study of Political Economy in Qing China, 1644-1840 
(Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1996).
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Chapter One:
Canal Transport And The 
Scope Of Market Integration
In 1686, after three centuries of continuous construction, the 
Grand Canal was completed. The 1,700-kilometer canal ran 
through four provinces, linking Hangzhou in the south to the 
imperial capital at Beijing in the north.' The Ming Yongle 
emperor (r. 1403-1424) had begun the canal after moving the 
capital from Nanjing to Beijing, to supply his new capital with 
grain from the Yangzi delta via inland waterways.
When Ming collapsed in 1644, the Qing government 
continued work on the Grand Canal until its completion. Jane 
Kate Leonard noted that the Qing emperors took even greater 
responsibility than the Ming emperors for managing and 
maintaining the canal. By then the empire of Greater China had 
vastly expanded; Qing emperors saw the canal as a way to connect 
the borderlands to China proper. As a result, canal management 
carried much greater strategic weight than had been the case in the 
previous dynasty. The Grand Canal served as the major transport 
route between northern and central China until the gradual shift of 
the Yellow River in its bed caused the ecological degradation of 
the canal system in the nineteenth century.^
Construction of the Grand Canal substantially reduced 
transport costs between northern and central China, but even in 
the eighteenth century canal transportation remained risky and 
difficult. Qingkou, where the Huai River, the eanal, and the 
Yellow River met, was especially hazardous, while north of
' For more detail on the canal construction, see Cen Zhongmian, Huang- 
he bianqian shi (Beijing; Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1957); Tani 
Mitsutaka, Mindai kakoshi kenkyu (Kyoto-shi: D6h5sha, 1991); and Cai 
Taibin, Mingdai caohe zhi zhengzhiyu guanli (Taipei; Shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1992).
^ Jane Kate Leonard, Controlling From Afar: The Daoguang Emperor’s 
Management of the Grand Canal Crisis, 1824-1826 (Ann Arbor; Center 
for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1996), p. 2.
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Qingkou the canal ran through uneven terrain, which made the 
canal expensive to maintain as well as to travel on. To guarantee 
water deep enough to float the grain boats the government had 
installed locks; to get through these locks, boatmen had to hire 
trackers to pull their boats upstream. When the water level in the 
canal fell during a drought, boatmen had to transfer their goods to 
small boats called lighters, which could carry one hundred shi of 
grain and navigate in the shallower water. The government 
allowed each large grain boat from Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi to 
be accompanied by a small lighter in case it was needed.^
Because of the high cost, local official Lan Dingyuan 
(1680-1733) opposed transporting the grain tribute by way of the 
canal. In a memorial to the Yongzheng emperor, he wrote:
According to your servant’s observation, along the 
Canal in Shandong and Zhili, as water is insufficient,
[grain] transport is difficult. [Because of the shallow 
water, transport soldiers] have to pay fees for 
transhipment and spend time at grain depots. They 
have their boats hauled for a whole day, but can only 
travel a few dozen That requires a lot of labour and 
incurs financial expense. Generally speaking, the 
delivery of a shi [of grain tribute] to the capital costs 
more than ten shi of grain.^
Since canal transport was expensive, and the difficulties were 
many, the question arises as to why merchants bothered to use it to 
transport their goods. What made the Grand Canal the major 
long-distance trade route in the eighteenth century was not 
convenience (relative, for instance, to coastal shipping), but other 
factors. A major factor in canal use was its subsidy from the state.
^ Caoyun quanshu (1736; repr., Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 
1987), pp. 167, 872.
One li equalled approximately 558 metres. See Liang Fangzhong, 
Zhongguo lidai hukou tiandi tianfu tongji (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 
1980), pp. 526, 542.
* Lan Dingyuan, “Caoliang jianzi haiyun shu”(n.d.; in Qingjingshi 
wenbian, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992; repr. from He Changling, ed., 
Huangchao jingshi wenbian, 1886, first printed in 1827), 48/19a-21b.
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The Role Of The State In The Canal Trade 
The grain tribute tax, levied in the provinces of Henan, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan, was used 
mainly to pay the wages of officials and Eight Banners soldiers 
{baqif in the metropolitan areas. By the early eighteenth century, 
the annual grain tribute tax (to the Capital Granaries and the 
Tongzhou Granaries) totalled 3.2 million shi of grain. With the 
addition of “wastage grain” (haomi), which was extra grain, 
collected to replace whatever might spoil or be lost in transit, the 
total annual grain tribute amounted to 4.5 million shi. (See Table 
1.1.) About 7,000 boats were used to ship the grain from various 
water depots along the Grand Canal to Tongzhou, twenty-eight 
kilometres southeast of Beijing.’ These boats were manned by 
transport soldiers called “bannermen” (qiding), selected from 
military households.^ As well as being paid a small salary to 
transport the grain tribute, bannermen were permitted to carry an 
allowance of private goods for trade on their journey, and these 
goods were exempt from customs duties. In effect, the Qing 
government sponsored the bannermen’s trading activities.’
* The Eight Banners was a multiethnic institution, composed of Manchu, 
Mongols, and Hanjun (frontier Han Chinese). For a detailed analysis of 
the formation and evolution of the Eight Banners in the Qing dynasty, 
see Mark C. Elliot, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic 
Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001).
’ A quota of 7,120 grain tribute boats was set by the Qing government in 
1726. See Caoyun quanshu, p. 115.
* These bannermen were not soldiers of the Eight Banners in the Qing 
dynasty. The word “banner” (qi) to refer to a company of soldiers was in 
use by the Ming dynasty. (See Mingshi [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974], 
p. 2193.) The bannerman {qiding) who transported the grain tribute was 
simply a soldier.
’ The duty-free allowance began in the early Ming, as documented by 
Hoshi Ayao. In 1502, the Ming government set a maximum quota of 10 
shi of duty-free private goods that could be carried by each grain boat on 
each journey. The quota increased in the Ming period, to 40 shi in 1571, 
and to 60 shi in 1603. This increase gave transport soldiers more income, 
and according to Hoshi, that accounted for their willingness to continue
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Although the imperial favour of a duty-free allowance of 
private goods was granted to bannermen in principle, in practice 
these men were too poor to engage in long-distance trade 
themselves. Many of them privately sold their benefit to 
merchants, who could then send their cargo duty-free. As a 
consequence, bannermen earned porterage fees, while nearly all 
of the private cargoes carried on the grain tribute boats belonged 
to merchants.'®
The merchants’ involvement was illegal but connived at 
by the Qing government. The Qianlong emperor made this quite 
clear in an edict of 1785. In that year, fearing that the grain 
transport would be behind schedule. Director-general of Grain 
Transport Yuqi ordered baimermen to reduce the weight of their 
grain boats by unloading timber and other bulky goods at Huaian 
before moving northward. But the Qianlong emperor did not 
appreciate this dutiful measure, and replied:
The bannermen of each fleet are mostly poor, how can 
they have the capital to purchase goods? These local 
products carried by them are probably entrusted to 
them by the merchants. The bannermen can only share 
a little profit [from the merchants in the form of] 
porterage fees. If now [the goods] are sold on the way, 
the merchants will lose both their capital and interest; 
and the bannermen will find no way to seek 
compensation. How can they earn money from it to 
pay for the transhipment [of grain from large grain 
boats to small lighters in shallow water]?"
Furthermore, the private trade tagged onto the grain 
transport affected commodity prices in Beijing. The Qianlong 
emperor said in the same edict:
the grain transport, despite the meager salary. See Hoshi, Mindai sdun 
nokenkyii,pp. 195-200.
Nakahara, “Shindai sdsen ni yoru shohin ryutsu nitsuite.”
" Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi (Qianlong Emperor) shilu (repr. 
Taipei: Hualian Chubanshe, 1964), 1233/16b (QL 50.6) (hereafter cited 
as Gaozong shilu).
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If the goods are sold on the route [and thus] cannot be 
taken to the north, when the merchants [in the capital] 
hear this news, they will hoard goods and raise prices.
[As a consequence of] the order of unloading all 
merchandise [from grain boats], the merchants have to 
rent boats again [for their goods] to Beijing. As this 
multiplies the [original] transport cost, how can the 
prices of the goods in the capital not gradually become 
higher?'^
From the above, it is clear that the Qianlong emperor 
understood how important private cargoes were for financing his 
grain transport, as well as for bringing other goods to the capital, 
and keeping down their costs.
Throughout the eighteenth century, although the legal 
limit of private goods on the grain boats was maintained at 60 shi 
on the southbound journey, it was expanded three times for the 
northbound journey: to 100 shi in 1729, to 126 shi in 1730, and to 
150 shi in 1799.'^ The tacit approval of the state made the grain 
tribute boats a means whereby merchants could transport goods 
cheaply between central and northern China. Contemporaries 
knew this well. Wang Qisim (1755-1817), a Jiangsu scholar who 
worked as a private teacher in Beijing for many years, noted: “The 
capital relies on the grain tribute boats to bring in a hundred kinds 
of goods.”'"* A similar remark was made by another notable 
scholar, Bao Shichen (1775-1855):
Besides the grain tribute, all sorts of daily necessities 
consumed by the people in the capital depend on 
supplies from the southeast. Eight or nine out of ten of
Gaozong shilu, 1233/16b (QL 50.6).
QindingDa Qing huidian shili (1899; repr. Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe), 207/2b; Da Qing Renzong Ruihuangdi (Jiaqing Emperor) 
shilu (repr., Taipei: hualian chubanshe, 1964), 56/6b-7b (JQ 4.11) 
(hereafter cited as Renzong shilu). See also Xu, “Ming-Qing shiqi yunhe 
de shangpin liutong”; and Zhang, “Qingdai caoyun yu nanbei wuzhi 
jiaoliu.”
Wang Qisun, “Zhuanban siyi” (n.d.; in Qingjingshi wenbian, 47/19b).
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[these southern products] are carried by grain tribute 
boats.
In short, thanks to the grain transport, Beijing was 
supplied with southern products at a lower price than what they 
would have cost had the transport route and the boats not been 
paid for by the state, either directly or indirectly. In this regard, 
state intervention was a positive factor in the development of 
long-distance trade. At the same time, state intervention distorted 
prices, therefore the development of long-distance trade on the 
Grand Canal did not necessarily lead to the emergence of a single 
market serving northern and central China.
Market Integration Of Rice
As a consequence of a de facto state subsidy, southern products 
could be transported via the canal to the north at a relatively low 
cost. These southern products, according to a study by Nakahara 
Teruo, included tea, timber, cloth, copper coins, millet, and rice.*^ 
Rice, as Wu Chengming and other historians have pointed 
out, was the most important long-distance trade commodity in 
south China during the eighteenth century.Its destinations are
Bao Shichen, Zhongqu yishao (1825), 3/23b; in Bao Shichen, Anwu 
sizhong [xu dated 1844, 1872]; repr. Zhongguo jindai shiliao congkan 
(Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1968), vol. 294, no. 1.
Nakahara, “Shindai s5sen ni yom shohin ryutsu nitsuite,” pp. 74-7.
Wu suggested that grain, raw cotton, cotton cloth, raw silk, silk cloth, 
tea, and salt were the seven chief commodities, in both local and 
long-distance trade in China by the mid-nineteenth century. He 
estimated that the total market value of these products amounted to 350 
million taels of silver. Among them, grain, which amounted to 139 
million taels and accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the total market 
value, was the most important commodity. (See Wu Chengming, 
Zhongguo ziben zhuyi de mengya [Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 
1985], pp. 282-4.) Other scholars, like Guo Songyi and Abe Takeo, 
stress that among the different kinds of grain in the trade, rice from south 
China occupied a major role. See Guo Songyi, “Qingdai de liangshi 
maoyi,” Pingzhun xuekan, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo shangye 
chubanshe, 1985), pp. 293-314; Abe Takeo, “Beikoku jukyu no kenkyu: 
‘Yoseishi’ no issho to shite mita,” in Abe Takeo, Shindaishi no kenkyu
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quite clear, and they are often referred to in official documents. 
For example, in 1724, the Yongzheng emperor stated: “I observe 
that the food supply in Jiangsu and Zhejiang relies on Huguang 
[i.e., Hunan and Hubei], and also that Huguang relies on 
Sichuan.”’* In 1726, a military official also noted:
The rice [consumed] in Fujian is supplied by Taiwan; 
the rice [consumed] in Zhejiang and Guangdong is 
supplied by Guangxi, Jiangxi and Huguang; and the 
rice [consumed] in Jiangsu and Zhejiang is entirely 
supplied by Jiangxi and Huguang.’®
One might think that wherever rice was shipped, it would 
have been part of an integrated market. Scholars give the 
impression that a market in rice extended from the Yangzi to the 
north, as if the rice shipment to the north was being undertaken 
partly as grain tribute and partly as trade.^” But what impact would 
a substantial shipment of tribute grain have had on the rice trade 
between the Yangzi provinces and north China? How integrated 
the rice market was between the Yangzi delta and the north 
depends very much on the answer to this question, which no one 
has asked yet.
Because market conditions and government involvement 
differed in each of the northern provinces of Henan, Shandong, 
and Zhili, their trade relationships with the lower Yangzi will be 
examined separately.
1. Henan Province
In the eighteenth century most of Henan province produced wheat, 
millet, and sorghum. Only the people in Guangzhou prefecture in 
southernmost Henan grew and ate rice. Throughout the century, 
Guangzhou was the only prefecture in Henan that listed rice prices
(Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1971), pp. 411-531.
’* Gongzong dang Yongzhengchao zouzhe (Taipei: Gugong bowuyuan, 
ed., 1977-80), vol. 3, p. 399 (YZ 2.11.2) (hereafter cited as GZD-YZ).
’® [Yongzheng] Zhupiyuzhi (n.p., 1738), 8/31b (YZ 4.7.20).
See Wang, “Secular trends of rice prices in the Yangzi delta, 
1638-1935,” pp. 38, 52.
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in its monthly grain reports to the imperial government. In 1724, 
when the lower Yangzi had had a bad harvest, the Henan governor 
purchased rice from Gushi county, Guangzhou prefecture, and 
transported it, even to the normally rice-rich Jiangsu.^' (See Map 
2.) In 1755, after another bad harvest in the lower Yangzi, the 
Jiangsu Governor Zhuang Yougong complained to the throne that 
the Governor-general of the Grand Canal was obstructing the flow 
of commercial rice from Henan to Jiangsu:
On the 15 th day of the eleventh lunar month, I reached 
Shaobo market town in Yangzhou prefecture. Hearsay 
circulated extensively there to the effect that some 
brokers in that town had rented boats to trade rice from 
Guangzhou and Gushi in the Southern River [i.e.,
Huai River] region with Yangzhou. Unexpectedly, the 
Governor-general of the Grand Canal hindered [the 
transport]. He ordered that the rice be sold in 
Qingjiang [i.e., Qinghe county] and was not to pass 
Huaian [for transporting down the canal to Shaobo].
No rice had been transported to the market town for 
half a month.
This memorial shows that the market in Shaobo relied 
heavily on Guangzhou for rice. As Zhuang Yougong stated in the 
same memorial about the rice supply in Jiangsu province, “The 
region south of the Yangzi River depends on Jiangxi, Hunan and 
Hubei, while the region north of the Yangzi River obtains its 
supply from Henan.”^^ For the prefectures in northern Jiangsu, 
rice was imported from Henan province and shipped on the Huai 
River.^^ The rice boats from Henan province first paid their duty
Zhupi zouzhe (microfilm, Beijing: Number One Historical Archives), 
reel no. 54, pp. 2320-2 (QL 3.9.5). This 1738 memorial recalled the 
administrative measure for famine relief in 1724.
Gongzhong dang Qianlongchao zouzhe (Taipei: Gugong bowuyuan, 
ed., 1982-89), vol. 13, p. 152 (QL 20.12.3), (hereafter cited as GZD-QL.
A 1768 report from the Fengyang customs in northern Anhui province 
confirms that the Huai was the transport route between Guangzhou and 
Yangzhou. See GZD-QL, vol. 29, pp. 249-50 (QL 33.1.3).
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at the Fengyang customs house in Zhengyang town, then travelled 
downstream to Hongze Lake, and then on to Shaobo.^'*
This account of the trade relationship between Yangzhou 
and Guangzhou is supported by a comparison of their price data. 
As Figure 1.1 shows, rice prices in Yangzhou, though higher, 
coincide with those in Guangzhou from 1751 to 1800. A Pearson 
correlation analysis gives a high coefficient (0.69) between the 
two price series, demonstrating a high degree of association 
between the two prefectures, evidence that Guangzhou was a rice 
supplier to Yangzhou and that it was integrated in the lower 
Yangzi rice market.
In short, in the eighteenth century, rice was often sold 
from Guangzhou in Henan to Yangzhou in Jiangsu. The flow of 
rice from Henan to Yangzhou, however, was of a relatively small 
amount. Throughout the century, Jiangsu imported much more 
rice from the middle Yangzi provinces, a subject which will be 
dealt with in Chapter Four.
2. Shandong Province
Rice was not a principal staple in Shandong, any more than it was 
in Henan. But since Shandong was just north of Jiangsu, it seemed 
likely that merchants would trade rice between the two provinces. 
To investigate this possibility I compared the prices of rice in 
Suzhou, the largest rice market in Jiangsu, and in Jining and 
Linqing, the largest grain markets in Shandong.^^ If there was a 
rice trade from Jiangsu to Shandong one would expect to see: first, 
that the movements of the three price trends were synchronic; and 
second, that prices were lowest in Suzhou, higher in Jining in 
southern Shandong, and highest in Linqing in northern Shandong.
I found that Linqing did not import rice from Suzhou. As 
shown in Figure 1.2, the price trends in the two cities were not 
parallel. The Pearson coefficient of correlation is only 0.44,
^Ubid.
The following contemporary official documents demonstrate the 
status of Jining and Linqing as the two major grain markets in Shandong: 
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 54, pp. 1709-12 (QL 2.9.18); Gaozong 
shilu, 5/lb-2b (QL 3.3); Lufu zouzhe (microfilm, Beijing: Zhongguo diyi 
lishi dang’anguan), reel no. 49, pp. 1028-32 (QL 3.4.4).
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indicating a low level of market integration. The correlation 
coefficient between Linqing and lining is similarly low (0.44), 
which is shown also in the lack of parallel movements in the price 
trends of the two Shandong cities in the figure. In other words, 
rice did not move from Suzhou to Linqing, nor was there an 
integrated rice market within Shandong province.
However, merchants did transport rice to lining from 
Suzhou. Again in Figure 1.2, except for a short period between 
1785 and 1787, the trend of rice prices in lining is about one tael 
(0.95 tael on average) per shi higher, but moves synchronically 
with that in Suzhou. The correlation coefficient is 0.85, which is 
high enough to demonstrate a close market relationship.
The problem is that the degree of market integration, no 
matter how high, does not reflect the actual trade volume.^*’ In the 
Qing documents I found only one case in the whole eighteenth 
century that showed a significant amount of rice trade between 
Shandong and Jiangsu. It occurred in 1703, when the harvest 
failed in Shandong and grain prices rose. Then Shandong 
merchants purchased rice in Jiangsu where a bumper crop assured 
them of far lower prices.^’ In the fourth lunar month of 1704, Cao 
Yin, the Director of the Jiangning Imperial Silk Manufacturing 
(Jiangning Zhizao Langzhong), reported on this to the Kangxi 
emperor: “... recently, many Shandong people have come [to the 
lower Yangzi] to buy rice.”^* Transport soldiers (bannermen) also 
participated in this northbound trade. In the fourth lunar month of 
1704, both the Director-general of Grain Transport and the 
Director-general of the Grand Canal suspected that the bannermen 
had stolen a large quantity of tribute grain and had sold it illegally 
along the Grand Canal north of Huaian.^^
Carol H. Shiue, “Transport costs and the geography of arbitrage in 
eighteenth-century China,” The American Economic Review, 92, no. 5 
(Dec. 2002), p. 1408.
Da Qing Shengzu Renhuangdi (Kangxi Emperor) shilu (repr. Taipei; 
Hualian chubanshe, 1964), 212/26b (KX 41.9) (hereafter cited as 
Shengzu shilu)', and Kangxichao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian (Beijing; 
Dang’an chubanshe, 1984-85), vol. l,p. 109 (KX 43.4.1).
Kangxichao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian, vol. 1, p. 109 (KX 43.4.1). 
Caoyun quanshu, pp. 918-9.
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But the 1704 sale of Yangzi rice to Shandong was a rare 
event. Kosaka Masanori’s study of customs duties, based on 
reports from Huaian customs (on the canal between Suzhou and 
Jining), showed that the major southern commodities shipped 
along the Grand Canal were silk, cloth, sugar, and paper; rice was 
seldom included.^® The rarity of rice in the trade record implies 
that, though the rice markets of Suzhou and Jining were highly 
integrated, the volume of trade was insignificant. Merchants did 
not transport much rice from Jiangsu to Shandong unless the latter 
suffered an extremely poor harvest.
The major obstacle to inter-regional trade between 
Jiangsu and Shandong was certainly high transport costs, but the 
marketability of southern rice in Shandong was also affected by 
local harvest conditions. Few historians notice that Shandong 
produced rice, even though rice was so widely grown that local 
officials in Jining and Linqing had to submit monthly reports of 
rice prices to the court. In the early eighteenth century the 
province’s heavy use of water for rice irrigation even threatened 
navigability on the Grand Canal. In 1721 the Kangxi emperor 
noted that:
The Grand Canal in Shandong relies [for its water] 
mostly on the lakes such as Weishan, where several 
streams meet and make possible [the water for] tribute 
grain transport. Nowadays, more paddy rice has been 
grown in Shandong, and the upstream currents are 
used for irrigation. As the upstream [water supply] is 
blocked, the lakes have become shallow. How can 
they still be used to provide water for the tribute grain 
transport?^'
Since Shandong was a rice producer, its local price 
determined whether or not southern rice would be imported. 
Southern rice was cheap in the Yangzi, but after travelling via the 
Grand Canal to Shandong, it became so expensive that much of its
Kosaka Masanori, “Shindai ni okeru daiunga no bushi ryutsu: Kenryu 
nenkan Waiankan o chushin to shite,” Tohdku gakuin daigaku ronshu: 
rekishigaku, chirigaku 15 (1985): 1-64.
Shengzu shilu, 292/6a (KX 60.5)
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market was lost in the competition with local rice. We have no 
information to indicate the transport costs from Suzhou to lining, 
but it appears that the additional one tael of silver per shi, which 
was roughly the difference between the two price trends shown in 
Figure 1.2, was mostly due to transportation costs.
We may conclude that merchants would not carry rice 
from Suzhou to lining and adjacent southern Shandong cities 
unless there was a price difference greater than one tael. That was 
the case in 1704, a famine year in Shandong. It would also explain 
why, when the lower Yangzi experienced crop failure (between 
1785 and 1787), lining remained unaffected by price fluctuations 
in Suzhou. The rice markets between Suzhou and lining were 
integrated, but this integration was actually weak.
On the canal north of fining, increasing transport costs 
diminished the marketability of Yangzi rice down to nothing. 
Both the absence of trade records and the unparallel trends 
between Linqing and Suzhou show that northern Shandong cities 
did not import rice from the Yangzi delta.
Farther north on the Grand Canal, in Zhili province and 
Beijing, the situation was different.
3. Zhili Province And Beijing
Like Shandong, Zhili grew its own rice. Xu Daling has shown that 
the early development of rice cultivation in Zhili resulted from the 
imperial decision to move the capital from Nanjing in the lower 
Yangzi, north to Beijing in Zhili in the early fifteenth century. The 
Yongle emperor, attempting to increase the grain supply in the 
new capital, encouraged officials to take the lead in opening rice 
fields around Beijing.^^ Though it is difficult to tell how many 
paddies were opened, it appears that, especially where water was 
available for irrigation, farmers did plant rice. Timothy Brook, 
quoting a Ming official, stated that rice cultivation in Zhili spread 
on a large scale during the later half of the sixteenth century.^^
Xu Daling, “Mingdai Beijing de jingji shenghuo,” Beijing Daxue 
xuebao 1959.4, p. 50.
Timothy Brook, “The spread of rice cultivation and rice technology 
into the Hebei region in the Ming and Qing,” in Explorations in the 
History of Science and Technology in China, ed. Guohao Li, Mengwen
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In the mid-seventeenth century a Zhejiang scholar named 
Tan Qian (1594-1658), while travelling to Beijing, noted the 
following:
In the metropolitan area [of Beijing], there are rice 
fields scattered about and the price of rice is twice that 
in the south... The lunch and dinner of northern 
people consist mainly of cakes and cooked millet 
made of broken wheat, millet, buckwheat, and beans.
Except when they invite guests for a meal they do not 
cook rice. They purchase it only in small amounts of 
dou and sheng?* The price is very high.^^
Tan Qian’s account showed that in the seventeenth century there 
was rice production in Zhili, and that rice was a luxuiy food.
As Timothy Brook has pointed out, rice cultivation in 
Zhili was not easy. Climatic factors like temperature and 
precipitation imposed physical conditions that had to be 
accommodated for paddy to grow. The minimum average 
temperature throughout the life of the rice plant should not go 
below 20°C. (68°F.), yet in the northern half of Zhili the average 
temperature stayed above 20°C. only in June, July, and August, 
shortening the growing season. Even if rice farmers introduced an 
early-ripening variety, they encountered a second obstacle in the 
insufficiency of rainfall. In a normal year Zhili did not get more 
than ten days a month of rain until June, and no heavy rains until 
July and August. Thus the early-ripening rice was dependent on 
irrigation, and irrigation required a great deal of capital 
investment.^*
Zhang and Tianqin Cao (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1982), p. 659.
Dou and sheng were small measures. Ten sheng equaled one dou, and 
ten dou equalled one shi. (See “Table of Weights and Measures”.) It was 
then common to use dou and sheng as synonymous with a "handful" of 
rice.
In 1642, Tan Qian (1594-1658) went to Beijing as a high official’s 
private secretary. He stayed there for thirteen years, recording what he 
saw. See Tan Qian, Beiyou lu (n.d., repr. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
1960), p. 314.
Brook, “The spread of rice cultivation,” pp. 662-3.
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Despite the difficulties of growing rice in Zhili, from the 
Ming dynasty onwards the imperial government never stopped 
encouraging farmers to do so. The motive was a strategic one. 
Food production in the unfavourable climate had been too little to 
support a court that included not only officials but huge numbers 
of soldiers. The Grand Canal was a lifeline, bringing additional 
grain from the Yangzi provinces, but its length made it vulnerable: 
if enemies blocked the canal, the court would disintegrate. 
Converting the barren land around Beijing into rice fields was a 
backup plan on the part of the Ming and Qing governments. 
Officials and landlords from the Yangzi provinces supported the 
plan as well, hoping that rice production in Zhili finally would 
reduce their tribute grain tax.^’
Owing to vigorous support from the Kangxi and 
Yongzheng emperors, more paddy fields were opened in Zhili in 
the early Qing. In 1704, with approval from the Kangxi emperor. 
Nan Li, the Regional Commander of Tianjin, recruited 200 
farmers from Fujian in the south to come to Tianjin in Zhili, to 
open 10,000 mu of rice paddies. These southern farmers were 
given land, subsidies to buy cows and seeds, and exempted from 
taxes for six years. In 1725, the Yongzheng emperor even 
approved a grand project of water control and paddy construction 
in Zhili, and appointed his beloved brother Yinxiang, or Prince Yi, 
to supervise it. The work began on a small experimental scale in 
1726, but expanded dramatically in 1727 with the establishment 
of the Paddy Construction and Water Control Department 
(Yingtian Shuili Fu). Because of the close relationship between 
Prince Yi and the emperor, the Paddy Construction and Water 
Control Department obtained state revenues and land, mostly at 
riverside and seaside, for the project. The Department improved 
the water supply to this land and then rented out the land to local 
farmers for rice farming. In one sense the program seemed to be 
extremely successful; contemporary records estimated that the
For details, see Zhang Fang, “Qingdai Yongzheng nianjian jifli diqu 
de shuili yingtian,” in Zhongguo shiyanjiu 1993.2, pp. 72-80; T5 
Takehiko, “Min Shin kiho suiri-ron no is5,” Toy5 Bunka kenkyujo kiyo, 
125 (1994), p. 123-76; Morita Akira, Shindai suiri shakaishi no kenkyu 
(Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1990), pp. 321-53.
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total paddy acreage from the project was from over 6,000 to over 
7,000 qing^^ between 1727 and 1729.^’
We lack information on the development of Nan Li’s 
paddy conversion scheme, but the success of the Paddy 
Construction and Water Control Department was certainly an 
illusion. To construct 7,000 qing of paddies between 1727 and 
1729, the Paddy Construction and Water Control Department 
spent over a million taels of state revenue, but this huge input of 
capital did not produce any good result. For fear that northerners, 
who were not used to eating rice, would not buy it, and that its 
sudden over-production would harm the rice farmers, the 
Yongzheng emperor allotted revenue to buy all the rice grown by 
the Paddy Construction and Water Control Department on the 
three consecutive years, after every autumn harvest. Because of 
this special favour, “the farmers made a great profit” {minhuo 
houli).'*° In essence, however, the Paddy Construction and Water 
Control Department was operating outside the market. When it 
obtained state financial support, it operated well and could even 
enlarge its operating scale. But such support was built solely on 
the relationship between Prince Yi and the emperor, and the death 
of Prince Yi in 1730 was a heavy blow to the department. Morita 
Akira noted that Prince Yi's absence left a hole in management. In 
addition to the problem of rice farmers blocking rivers in order to 
have more water for their own fields, he noted that many of the 
new rice paddies became barren land again soon after the prince's 
death."*'
The failure of the paddy conversion project did not imply 
an absence of private rice paddies in Zhili. Tan Qian’s travelling 
account (cited earlier) proved that rice fields existed in Zhili in the 
seventeenth century. Recently, Lillian M. Li used the 
contemporary reports of price data stored in the Number One 
Archive Library in Beijing to show that, in the Qing, among the
Each qing equalled 100 mu (one mu was about 0.15 acre). See the 
“Table of Weights and Measures”.
Brook, “The spread of rice cultivation,” p. 674; see also Morita, 
Shindai suiri shakaishi no kenkyu, pp. 332-4.
See Morita, Shindai suiri shakaishi no kenkyu, pp. 335.
"" ibid., pp. 335-6.
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major three food staples in Zhili the price of wheat was highest, 
followed by millet and then sorghum.'*^ If we add the price data for 
rice from the same official reports to her figure, taking Tianjin 
prefecture and Baoding prefecture between 1739 and 1748 as an 
example, it is clear that rice was even more expensive than wheat. 
(See Figures 1.3 and 1.4.)
In the Qing dynasty Zhili people called their local rice 
jingmi (capital rice), but scholars studying the grain market there 
found puzzling notations in the official documents for laomi (old 
rice), suomi (shuttle rice), and cangmi (granary rice). 
Pierre-Etienne Will was mystified by the term suomi, which 
official documents used to refer to all the tribute grain from the 
middle-Yangzi provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi.'*^ Lillian 
Li and Alison Dray-Novey suggested that tribute rice from the 
lower Yangzi was divided into four grades, which were, from high 
quality to low, baimi (white rice), gengmi, xianmi, and suomi.^
I'd like to suggest that laomi (old rice), suomi (shuttle 
rice), and cangmi (granary rice) were actually different names for 
gengmi (lower-Yangzi rice), xianmi (mid-Yangzi rice), and millet 
respectively. My argument is based on the following evidence.
We know that the Qing government collected two major 
grains for the tribute tax, millet and rice; and levied the rice tax 
from provinces in the lower and the middle Yangzi. (See Table 
1.1.) We also know that at this time the strain of rice grown in the 
lower Yangzi was called gengmi, while rice from the middle 
Yangzi was called xianmi.Since laomi, suomi, and cangmi were 
names for tribute grain, they exist in the official documents. But 
these documents sometimes cite gengmi, xianmi, and millet in
Lillian M. Li, “Grain prices in Zhili province, 1736-1911: a prelim­
inary study,” in Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li ed., Chinese 
History in Economic Perspective, pp. 66-99.
Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China, p. 153, 
n. 7.
Lillian M. Li and Alison Dray-Novey, “Guarding Beijing’s Food 
Security in the Qing Dynasty: State, Market and Police,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 58, no. 4 (Nov. 1999): 997.
‘'^Norimatsu Akifumi, “Yozeiki ni okeru beikiku ryutsu to beika hendo: 
Soshu to Fukken no kanren o chushin to shite,” Kyushu daigaku 
toyoshironshu 14(1985): 160-1.
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their stead. Gengmi darkened in colour with age,'*® making it look 
"old"; xianmi was an early-ripening strain of rice that was shaped 
like a shuttle, long and pointed at both ends. On this basis, and 
after cross-examining other Qing documents, I suggest that laomi 
(old rice) was gengmi (the lower Yangzi rice that darkened with 
age); that suomi (shuttle rice) and xianmi (middle Yangzi rice that 
was shaped like a shuttle) were the same strain of rice; and that 
cangmi (granary rice) was another term for millet.'*^
It is not clear why Beijing officials invented such terms 
for the tribute grain. Presumably they hoped to differentiate the 
tribute grain, at least in official records, from grain grown locally 
or transported (and sold in Beijing) by merchants from other 
regions. When the tribute grain flowed from metropolitan 
granaries to local grain markets, the official designations of laomi, 
suomi, and cangmi came with it, and were used in the Beijing 
marketplace as well.
As we have seen, the grain tribute made its way into 
Beijing’s grain market when the Eight Banners soldiers sold their 
rice salaries to local grain merchants. Both metropolitan officials 
and soldiers were paid in tribute grain. The grain that went to 
officials was called “stipend grain” (fengmi), with each official 
receiving grain in proportion to his rank'** from the Tongzhou 
Granaries (Tongcang) in Tongzhou. The total payment to
^ See Qi Rushan, Beijing sanbai liushi hang{\9A\ \ repr. Beijing: 
Baowentang shudian, 1989), p. 68.
In 1737, an imperial decree on the grain salary for Banner soldiers 
stated: “Calculating the whole amount of grain salary in ten shares, 
gengmi was to be 5 shares, suomi was to be 3.5 shares, and millet was to 
be 1.5 shares.” (Qinding Hubu caoyun quanshu, 1766 edition; repr. 
Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969, 60/6a.) In this decree gengmi was 
used to denote laomi and millet to denote cangmi. The remaining suomi 
would then refer to xianmi.
In the Qing dynasty, each official in the metropolitan area received an 
annual salary of 16.5 to 90 shi of husked grain. See Li and Jiang, 
Qingdai caoyun, pp. 70-1.
When the stipend grain was issued, each metropolitan official was 
given a certificate to present at assigned granaries at Tongzhou to collect 
his grain. The stipend was distributed twice a year, in spring and in 
autumn: Caoyun quanshu, p. 416.
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officials was small compared to the amount that went to soldiers - 
over 92 per cent of the aimual salary payment in the metropolitan 
area^” - and this portion was ealled “armour grain” (Jiami). The 
Capital Granaries (Jingcang) in Beijing took charge of this 
payment. Each Eight Banners soldier could collect 20 shi of grain, 
composed of laomi, suomi, and cangmi, as his annual stipend.^’ 
When armour grain was distributed, company commanders 
(zuoling) in the Eight Baimers were given certifieates to exehange 
for grain in particular granaries; the eompany commanders then 
distributed the grain to their soldiers.^^
Many soldiers sold their riee salaries as soon as they 
received them, although the practiee was illegal.^^ The prevalence 
of this praetiee was not due to the northern preference for staples 
like wheat, millet, and sorghum over rice.^"* If northern indif­
ference to rice had been the deeiding faetor, there would have 
been no market for the soldiers’ rice in Beijing, and there was a 
great demand for it. Throughout the eighteenth eentury, soldiers 
were always able to sell their armour grain, and its cost was not 
cheap. Aeeording to a 1760 memorial of grain prices in Beijing, 
the retailing price of laomi, though it had been stored for years, 
fetched 1.68 taels per shi, whieh was more expensive than loeal 
millet, whieh cost 1.5 taels, and wheat, which cost 1.45 taels.^^
According to a memorial in the Yongzheng reign (1723-35), the Qing 
government distributed 2,440,000 shi of grain annually to the metro­
politan Eight Banner soldiers while only 190,000 shi went to the 
metropolitan officials. See GZD-YZ, vol. 27, pp. 725-6 (n.d.).
Shengzu shilu, l/6b (KX 24). In the early Qing, the amount of armour 
grain was divided in half and paid out twice a year. In 1723, a three-term 
system of payment was introduced, but the actual amount of the payment 
did not change. (See Caoyun quanshu, p. 416.) In 1737, the annual 
distribution of armour grain was divided into four terms. The aim of the 
new system was to prevent the metropolitan soldiers from selling the 
portion of their stipends which was not urgently needed. See Qinding 
Hubu caoyun quanshu (1766), 60/6a.
Caoyun quanshu, p. 417.
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 49, pp. 1016-9 (QL 3.3.19), 1024-26 
(JQ 4.6.24).
See Li and Dray-Novey, “Guarding Beijing’s food security,” p. 1007.
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, p. 1926 (QL 25.10.16).
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The high price of the tribute grain reflected a voracious demand 
for rice in Beijing. The reason the Eight Banners soldiers sold 
their armour grain was simple: they needed money. Unlike the 
metropolitan officials who received part of their salary in money, 
these soldiers were paid exclusively in grain. They had to sell a 
portion of their armour grain to buy other daily necessities. How 
much armour grain they sold depended on the amount of money 
they needed that year. Soldiers who needed money urgently 
would sell their entire portion of rice, and use a small amount of 
the proceeds to buy some coarser and cheaper grain for their own 
consumption. Since there were over 125,000 Eight Banners 
soldiers in the metropolitan area in the eighteenth century,^^ an 
enormous amount of rice flowed from Capital Granaries through 
the hands of the soldiers and into the market of Beijing every year. 
Since each soldier received 20 shi of grain armually, if they all 
sold half of their armour grain, of which about 2/3 were either 
laomi or suomi, more than 750,000 shi of rice would enter the 
Beijing market per year. As a censor mentioned in a 1738 
memorial, many people in the metropolitan area were fed by the 
rice sold by soldiers.”
The distinguishing characteristic of the grain tribute 
market in Beijing was that the selling price did not include 
transportation costs. The bannermen had no need to consider such 
costs, which had been paid by the government. Also, no matter 
how much rice was harvested in the lower Yangzi in a given year, 
the Eight Baimers soldiers received the same amount every year. 
Therefore, when soldiers sold their rice to the market, they based 
the price upon the grain supply and demand within the 
metropolitan areas, and could ignore production, transport, and
Edward Rhoads estimates that the total strength of the Metropolitan 
Banners ranged between 125,000 and 150,000 soldiers and officials. See 
Edward J. M. Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political 
Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928 (Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 2000), p. 27.
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 49, pp. 1016-9 (QL 3.3.19). In 
Tongzhou, the situation was similar. For example, in 1769, an official 
recorded that in each season, the Tongzhou granaries dispensed several 
hundred thousand shi of grain in salary, but half of it ended up for sale in 
the local grain market. See Gaozong shilu, 827/9b (QL 34.1).
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transaction costs. This assured a very low market price for Yangzi 
rice in the metropolitan areas. In 1743, for instance, the local 
Beijing rice, or “capital rice” (jingmi), sold for 1.78 taels of silver 
per shi, while laomi (tribute rice from the middle Yangzi) and 
suomi (tribute rice from the lower Yangzi) went for only 1.37 taels 
and 1.2 taels per shi.^^ In the tenth lunar month of 1761, capital 
rice sold for 2.6 taels of silver per shi in the market, while laomi 
cost only 1.68 taels and suomi was even cheaper, at 1.2 taels.^^
The Yangzi rice sold in Beijing was not only cheaper than 
local rice, but cheaper than rice for sale in the Yangzi region itself 
Again taking 1743 as an example, the price of second-grade rice in 
Suzhou was 1.6 taels of silver per shi, which was 0.23 tael more 
than the same variety of laomi sold in Beijing.^® (More examples 
are cited in Table 1.2.) The price of laomi in Beijing appears to 
have been free of produetion and transaction costs, as they had 
been paid by the government. Consequently, private merchants 
would not have transported southern rice to sell in the eapital. 
Aecording to the 1941 reminiscences of a Beijing resident, Yangzi 
merchants brought no rice to Beijing until the fall of the Qing 
dynasty.^'
Although there was no private trade in rice between the 
Yangzi valley and Beijing, merchants occasionally exported 
laomi from the imperial granaries in Beijing and Tongzhou to 
other parts of Zhili provinee, and even south to Shandong along 
the Grand Canal, even though sueh trade was illegal. According to 
an official in the late seventeenth century, boatmen travelling 
south on the canal would buy rice at Tongzhou, where the tribute 
rice was stored, because of its low price.®^ Then around 1800, 
merchants suddenly established more than ten riee shops near the
Gongzhong liangjiadan (microfilm, Beijing: Zhongguo diyi lishi 
dang’anguan), Zhili province, reel no. 1; Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel 
no. 55, pp. 1672-5 (QL 8.6.10).
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, p. 1926 (QL 26.10.16).
“ With regard to the prices of the second-grade rice in Suzhou, see 
Wang, “Secular trends of rice prices in the Yangzi delta, 1638-1935,” 
Table 1.1.
Qi, Beijing sanbai liushi hang, pp. 122-3.
“ Yao Wenran, “Zhouxing riji” (n.d.; in Qingjingshi wenbian, 47/la).
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imperial granaries in Beijing. At the same time, rumours 
circulated about “shipping back the grain tribute” {huicao) when 
the grain tribute boats reached Beijing. The Vice Minister of the 
Capital Granaries (Cangchang Shilang) recorded that these rice 
shops might be using the grain tribute boats, smuggling the tribute 
grain back from the capital to sell in the southern regions where 
grain prices were higher.*^
In sum, the rice trade originating in the Yangzi region had 
little impact on prices in Beijing. Government interference, in the 
form of tribute grain used as soldiers’ wages that found its way 
into the Beijing market, obstructed the rice trade between the 
lower Yangzi and Beijing, preventing the development of an 
integrated market.
Conclusion
In the eighteenth century, completion of the Grand Canal reduced 
transport costs between the Yangzi valley and north China, and 
stimulated trade between the two regions.
Despite this, the Yangzi valley and north China did not 
merge into one economic unit in terms of the rice trade. Being 
narrow, shallow, and constructed on mostly uneven terrain, the 
canal was neither a convenient nor an inexpensive way to 
transport rice, the most important commodity in local and 
long-distance trade in China. People in some canal cities in 
southern Shandong, like lining, did import southern rice, but the 
volume was so small as to be unnoticeable except during a severe 
famine. Farther north on the canal in a city like Linqing, it was 
hard to find any Yangzi rice in local markets. While rice was a 
common staple food in southern China, the population north of the 
Huai continued to eat more wheat, millet, and sorghum. The cost 
of transport between the two regions was too high to affect this 
proclivity. In the eighteenth century, therefore, China was divided 
in half in terms of the culture of food consumption.
Along with transportation costs, state policy also impeded 
the expansion of the southern rice market to the north, especially 
in Beijing. Although Beijing with its thousands of officials and 
soldiers presented a huge demand for grain, the Qing government.
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 49, pp. 1068-70 (JQ 5.10.25).
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instead of relying on the market, solved the food problem with the 
grain tribute tax. Every year the court distributed millions of shi of 
tribute rice from the Yangzi provinces to the metropolitan soldiers. 
To pay for daily necessities the soldiers sold their rice, flooding 
local markets with Yangzi rice, which was cheaper than local rice, 
and even than rice sold in the Yangzi. Thus, merchants could not 
profit from selling Yangzi rice in Beijing. The Qing government 
had guaranteed the food supply in Beijing, but segregated the 
capital from the rice market in the Yangzi delta.
Chapter Two:
The Grain Tribute And The 
Imperial Budget
From 1500 onwards, as the market developed and the use of silver 
became more common, many taxes that previously had been 
collected in kind were collected in silver. This reform, known as 
the Single Whip Method of tax collection, was implemented in 
stages through the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth 
centuries. It had the effect not only of commuting all taxes to 
silver, but of simplifying taxes: a household’s multiple tax 
burdens became a single, all-encompassing item. By the Qing 
dynasty, most taxes were paid in silver.
But because the grain tribute was needed to guarantee a 
basic food supply for officials and soldiers in the capital, the Qing 
government continued to collect this particular tax in kind. 
William Rowe’s study on Hu Linyi’s fiscal administration in 
Hubei province was evidence that, at least until the great rebellion 
in the mid-nineteenth century, the court was able to insist on the 
grain tribute.' During a time of rapid market development, the 
court intended to protect this critical sector from market 
fluctuations.
The Qing government’s insistence on the grain tribute, 
and the shipment of substantial amounts of it along the canal route, 
resulted in the particular development of the grain trade discussed 
in Chapter One. In this chapter we will see that the central 
government used the excess grain amassed in Beijing and 
Tongzhou as a tool for stabilizing grain prices. Lillian Li and
' In 1853 the Taiping rebels cut river transport lines to the north. The 
court had to suspend grain shipments from the Yangzi provinces and 
accept fully commuted payments in their stead. After suppressing the 
rebellion, in the late 1860s, the court sought to return to payment in grain, 
but provincial governments (like Hubei, which had benefited financially 
from its commutation rate) opposed the reversion, and were powerful 
enough to insist on the new policy. See William T. Rowe, “Hu Lin-i’s 
reform of the Grain Tribute System in Hupeh, 1855-1858,” Ch ’ing-Shih 
Wen-T’i, 4, No. 10 (December 1983), pp. 33-86.
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Alison Dray-Novey showed that through reduced-price sales, and 
the distribution of grain salaries and free grain soup, the Qing 
government was able to keep the price of grain in Beijing very low 
throughout the century.^ The wealth of stored grain was also used 
for famine relief to the provinces.
Bureaucratic Administration for the Grain Tribute 
To secure a continuous grain supply for officials and soldiers in 
the capital, an effective bureaucratic administration was 
necessary.^ To aid its administration, the government set up a 
transport schedule, stating the times by which the grain boats had 
to leave their riverside depots (shuici) in order to reach the 
granaries at Tongzhou, 50 // (28 kilometers) south of Beijing. (See 
Table 2.1.) Regulations also stated how the grain should be 
transported. First, local officials transferred the grain to 
bannermen at riverside depots, then bannermen took it up the 
canal to Tongzhou, where they handed it over to officials from the 
Capital Granaries (Cangchang). Approximately 16 per cent of the 
grain was stored in the imperial granaries in Tongzhou, and the 
rest sent on to Beijing in small lighters on the shallow Tonghui 
Canal between Tongzhou and Beijing. Brokers (jingji) appointed 
by the Capital Granaries were responsible for the haulage on this 
last leg of the journey.'' The transport schedule, if adhered to, 
guaranteed that all the grain boats would reach Tongzhou and 
Beijing in time to pay the wages of soldiers and officials.
^Lillian M. Li and Alison Dray-Novey, “Guarding Beijing’s food 
security,” pp. 992-1027. For more information on the food supply in 
Beijing in the Qing, see Wu Jianyong, “Qingdai Beijing de liangshi 
gongying,” in Beijing lishiyu xianshiyanjiu (Beijing: Beijing Yanshan 
chubanshe, 1989), pp. 167-86.
^ For a detailed description of the regional managers of the Grand Canal 
as well as the grain transport system, see Jane Kate Leonard, Controlling 
from Afar, pp. 86-108.
The grain tribute tax quota in 1735 was 4,458,000 shi of husked grain 
including wastage. Of this amount, 679,000 shi was stored at Tongzhou. 
See Table 2.1. With regard to the reference of lighters (bochuan) and 
brokers ijingji), see Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 404.
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This delivery schedule was made effective by a “journey 
certificate” (xiandan),^ designed to prevent grain boats from 
lingering too long in one place. Once a bannerman had loaded the 
grain onto his boat, the local magistrate would give him a 
certificate with his departure date on it. Along the way, the 
bannerman had to present this journey certificate to magistrates in 
every county he passed through, so they could record the dates of 
his arrival and departure on it. When the bannerman reached 
Tongzhou, he had to submit this certificate to the Capital 
Granaries.^
High officials at different points on the Grand Canal kept 
close watch on the quantity and quality of the grain tribute. At 
Huaian, the midpoint of the Grand Canal, the Director-general of 
Grain Transport made an initial inspection of the grain tribute 
from the Yangzi provinces. He checked the total amount of grain 
to be sure it tallied, and withdrew one shi of rice from each boat to 
sample for quality. If the grain tribute on the boat ran short or was 
of inferior quality, the Director-general allowed the boat to 
continue only if one of the bannerman’s assistants remained at 
Huaian to buy enough grain to replace it. Then the assistant had to 
rent a boat and catch up to his own grain tribute boat.’
From Huaian on to Tongzhou, checkpoints were set up 
along the canal to report on the number of grain boats and the 
amount of grain they carried. The Director-general of Grain 
Transport was in charge of the checkpoints between Huaian and 
Dezhou,*  while the Director-general of Capital Granaries was in 
charge between Tianjin and Tongzhou. The officials of the Capital 
Granaries had to submit these reports every five days.®
^ The “journey certificate” was introduced in 1711. See Caoyun quanshu 
(1736), p. 260.
* ibid.
’ ibid, pp. 256-7.
* See, for example, the reports in 1754, in GZD-QL, vol. 7, pp. 615-6 
(QL 19.2.19), pp. 831-2 (QL 19.3.26); vol. 8, p. 134 (QL 19.4.27), p. 
342 (QL 19.4*.23), pp. 413-4 (QL 19.5.3), pp. 486-7 (QL 19.5.13), p. 
674 (QL 19.6.4), pp. 744-5 (QL 19.6.10).
® See Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 403. Scattered reports from the Capital 
Granaries can be found in the year of 1766 (QL 31) recorded in 
Ming-Qing dang’an (Taipei: Institute for History and Phonology,
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At Tongzhou, the Capital Granaries carried out a 
thorough inspection of all the grain tribute as the bannermen 
brought it in and unloaded it.'“ The Capital Granaries could refuse 
to accept inferior-quality grain, or punish bannermen for a grain 
tribute that was below quota. Bannermen were flogged and fined 
for a discrepancy of less than 10 per cent. If the grain on a boat 
was under quota by 60 per cent or more, the bannerman was 
beheaded and his property, including his wives, confiscated."
With the above measures, the Qing government ensured 
that the grain tribute, including the extra portion collected to cover 
losses in transit and called "wastage grain", arrived at the 
metropolitan granaries. In the eighteenth century this method of 
administration was so successful that the government was able to 
store more grain than it needed.
Surplus Grain
In 1719, the grain surplus was so substantial that the Kangxi 
emperor worried about it. He noted: “The grain tribute from the 
provinces has not fallen into arrears and is now piled up in the 
granaries. I am afraid that it will be rotten.”" According to a 1722 
investigation, the Beijing granaries had accumulated 3,690,000 
shi of grain and the Tongzhou granaries 5,130,000 shi}^
Jiang Tingxi, the Vice Minister of the Board of Revenue 
in the Yongzheng period (1723-35), pointed out that the surplus 
was structural, in that each year the quota of tax grain for Beijing 
was 2,760,000 shi, while disbursement was only 2,440,000 shi', 
and the Tongzhou granaries quota was 540,000 shi, but 
disbursement only 190,000 shi. Thus after the annual payment.
Academia Sinica, 1986-95), A205-90 (QL 31.3.16), A205-92 (QL 
31.3.21), A205-94 (QL 31.4.19), A205-95 (QL 31.4.26), A.205-97 (QL 
31.4.29), A205-98 (QL 31.4.29), A205-100 (QL 31.4.29), A205-103 
(QL 31.6.15), A205-104 (QL 31.6.20), A205-105 (QL 31.6.20), 
A205-106 (QL 31.6.20), A205-110 (QL 31.8.4), A205-185 (QL 31).
Shengzu shilu, 229/20-22 (KX 46), 243/13-14 (KX 49); Gaozong 
shilu, 203/14a-b (QL8.10).
" Caoyun Quanshu (1736), pp. 823-4.
" Shengzu shilu, 283/6a-7a (KX 58.1).
" Shengzu shilu, 299/13a-16a (KX 61), 300/lb-3b (KX 61.11).
i
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the metropolitan granaries had a surplus of 670,000 shi of grain.*'* 
This surplus did not even include the wastage grain. In another 
memorial, Jiang claimed that with the wastage rice accounted for, 
the metropolitan granaries had a grain surplus of more than
1,000,000 shi a year.'^
An annual excess of 1,000,000 shi of grain posed a 
serious storage problem. In 1731, the imperial grain reserves had 
reached 13,500,000 shi. According to Jiang, even if the grain 
tribute was suspended, the excess would pay for the stipends of 
metropolitan officials and soldiers for more than four years. He 
warned that all the granaries in Beijing and Tongzhou were full. 
Unless alternative arrangements were made, future surplus would 
have to be stored in the open. He suggested that the Board of 
Revenue sell part of the reserves to provide storage space for new 
grain.
Acting on Jiang's suggestion, the Board of Revenue sold
1,000,000 shi of grain for silver on the local markets (880,000 shi 
and 120,000 shi of grain from the granaries in Beijing and 
Tongzhou respectively). Forty per cent of this grain was old rice 
(laomi), 40 per cent shuttle rice (suomi), and 20 per cent millet 
(cangmi). Old rice was sold for 1 tael of silver per shi, shuttle rice 
0.8 tael per shi, and millet 0.6 tael per shi. From this measure the 
Board of Revenue received 840,000 taels of silver, but even more 
importantly, the storage problem in Beijing and Tongzhou was 
eased.
Two years later, in response to a request from Xu 
Tianxiang, the Superintendent of the Capital Granaries (Zongdu 
Cangchang), the imperial court arranged for another grain sale of
1,000,000 shi at Beijing and Tongzhou. According to Xu, old rice 
and shuttle rice had been accumulating in Tongzhou, to a total of 
3,700,000 shi, much of which had been stored for over ten years 
and was rotting. To avoid further deterioration, he suggested that
GZD-YZ, vol. 27, pp. 725-6 (n.d.). This memorial was presented by 
Jiang Tingxi between 1726 and 1732 when he was serving in the Board 
of Revenue.
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the Board of Revenue withdraw 1,000,000 shi of riee from the 
granaries in Tongzhou for sale as had been done in 1731.*’ In this 
ease, the sale of imperial grain was aimed not only at providing 
more storage space, but at releasing decade-old grain before it 
became unfit to eat.
The sale of grain in the 1730s was prompted by an 
excessive surplus, but sometimes grain reserves were sold to 
stabilize prices. In the early Qing, whenever grain prices increased 
in the capital, the imperial government released some of the grain 
tribute to sell below market price. In the fourth lunar month of 
1737, for instance, to counter a general rise in grain prices in 
Beijing due to drought, the government permitted a grain sale of
10.000 shi}^
Providing famine or price relief in Beijing alone did not 
alleviate the surplus of grain; even during a famine the grain 
tribute arrived, and the granaries were full. As shown earlier, the 
imperial court paid soldiers in the Eight Banners in Beijing
2.440.000 shi of grain a year, to be portioned out four times a year. 
Thus 610,000 shi of grain arrived in Beijing every three months 
for the soldiers’ wages. The grain tribute made Beijing immune to 
the famines. Table 2.2, compiled from the Caoyun quanshu 
(Complete Record of the Grain Tribute Transport) and from 
memorials, lists the amounts taken from the imperial granaries for 
relief in Beijing. While the list is incomplete, it probably includes 
all the major instances of famine relief in Beijing in the eighteenth 
century. In each case, the amount of surplus grain sold to the 
Beijing population rarely exceeded 80,000 shi.
Another way to reduce the grain surplus was to distribute 
grain to famine victims outside of Beijing. In this way the grain 
tribute became the major element of social stabilization during 
famines.
Financial Aid To Provincial Governments 
Because of the excessive amount of grain stored at Tongzhou and 
Beijing, the central government was able to be generous when 
providing aid for famines in the provinces. In general, the practice
*’ ibid., p. 548.
Gaozong shilu, 40/3a-4a (QL 2.4).
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known as “jieliu” (to stop and retain) was observed during famine 
in the provinces: the central government either diverted grain to, 
or allowed its retention in the famine provinces. This portion of 
the grain tribute, along with government grain stored in local 
granaries, was sold to famine victims at a reduced price. The local 
government returned the proceeds of the sale to the Board of 
Revenue in Beijing.'® During famines, large amounts of the grain 
tribute remained in the provinces, as can be seen in Table 2.3.^° As 
well, many provinces were able to obtain additional grain, ranging 
from 100,000 to 400,000 shi.
Such substantial amounts of grain meant that local 
governments could rely on the grain tribute in times of famine. 
Table 2.4, compiled from the data in Table 2.3, ranks the 
provinces according to the total amount of grain tribute diverted 
or retained, and shows that Zhili province received the most grain 
in times of famine. The fact certainly reflects the relatively poor 
agricultural development of Zhili, but it also indicates its 
geographical proximity to the court at Beijing. As Pierre-Etienne 
Will has shown, during the drought in 1743-44 central and local 
governments provided about 1,400,000 shi of grain to 
drought-stricken counties in Zhili for reduced-price sales. Part of 
this grain was wheat, millet, and sorghum that the Zhili provincial 
government had purchased from Shandong, Henan, and even 
Fengtian, but most of it, amounting to 800,000 shi, was the grain 
tribute, 640,000 shi of millet and rice directly taken from the 
reserve at the Tongzhou granaries, and 160,000 shi of grain tribute 
(millet) diverted from Henan and Shandong.^'
As Table 2.4 shows, Jiangsu province was second in the 
total amount of grain tribute retained or diverted for famine relief. 
Northern Jiangsu was in the ecologically unstable Yellow 
River-Huai River basin area, where famines were frequent. It is
'® Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 421.
The table is not exhaustive, but is compiled from various important 
contemporary sources, and includes all the major cases of the diversion 
to or retention of grain in the famine-ridden provinces.
Will, Bureaucracy and Famine, pp. 153-70. Will lists ten 
famine-relief operations undertaken by the Qing government. The first, 
sixth, and seventh allocations were those in which the famine-relief 
grain was allotted from the grain tribute tax.
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also likely that southern Jiangsu, which included the most 
urbanized parts of China, was very sensitive to grain price 
changes from food shortages and the presence of famine victims 
from the north. But the high priority of Zhili and Jiangsu for 
famine relief was as much a statement of their political importance 
as of their vulnerability to famine.
In any case, throughout the eighteenth century the 
amounts of tribute grain retained in the provinces were not only 
large, but increased yearly. A 1758 memorial from Jiqing, the 
Vice Minister of the Board of Revenue, drew attention to this 
through a comparison of the total amounts of grain retained in the 
provinces in the Kangxi reign, the Yongzheng reign, and the 
Qianlong reign. According to him, the Kangxi emperor allowed 
only 2,140,000 shi of the grain tribute to be retained in the 61 
years of his reign, while the Yongzheng emperor permitted
2.900.000 shi of grain to be retained in the (relatively brief) 13 
years of his reign. But in the first 23 years of his reign, from 1736 
to 1758, the Qianlong emperor allowed 13,200,000 shi of the 
grain tribute to remain in the provinces.^^ On average, the annual 
amount of grain tribute retained was 35,000 shi during the Kangxi 
reign, rising to 223,000 shi during the Yongzheng reign, and
573.000 shi from 1736 to 1758 in the Qianlong reign.
The increase in retained grain tribute did not reflect a 
parallel increase in famine. In a 1748 memorial, Shulu, the 
Provincial Administration Commissioner of Anhui, criticized the 
Lower Yangzi region for relying too heavily on the central 
government for grain. He wrote:
Now, the relief for famine is the most sizable in 
Jiangnan, followed by Zhejiang, Shandong, Henan, 
and then Hunan and Hubei, and finally Yunnan and 
Guizhou. Would it be tme that those [latter] provinces
Yang Xifu, Caoyun zeli zuan (1769; repr. Yangzhou: Jiangsu 
Guangling guji keyin she, 1990), 18/80b-81b. Yang Xifii was the 
Governor-general of Grain Transport between 1757 and 1768. He 
compiled the Caoyun zeli zuan one year after he had left the post. The 
book is a compendium of rules and regulations on grain tribute transport, 
but gives a detailed account of the grain tribute diversion and retention 
allowed before that year.
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do not have poor harvests? The fact is that they are not 
accustomed to [bountiful crops] and therefore dare not 
request [relief]. However, in Jiangnan, people are 
accustomed to bountiful crops [chengshu], 
[Therefore,] whenever there is flood or drought, they 
immediately beg for relief.
Shulu was condemning Jiangnan^^(and other provinces) 
for requesting grain tribute relief for any shortfalls in the harvest, 
whether or not famine had resulted. He went on to suggest that the 
central government be less generous in granting grain-tribute 
relief to them.^"*
In response to Jiqing’s 1758 memorial concerning the 
amount of tribute grain retained in the provinees as compared to 
earlier reigns (see above), the Qianlong emperor commented: 
“When I discover people starving to death in natural calamities, I 
cannot help [ordering the diversion and retention of the grain 
tribute].Although the emperor saw this as a sign of his own 
benevolence, it must be noted that provinces receiving famine 
relief ultimately paid for the diverted grain. As noted previously, 
when local officials received grain diverted from the tribute they 
organized reduced-price sales, after which they were required by 
law to return the proceeds to the Board of Revenue in Beijing.^^ 
In short, the grain tribute provided a source of govern­
ment revenue that was collected in kind, and therefore was free 
from price fluctuations. The diversion and retention of the grain 
tribute helped provincial governments, tiding them over in times
Jiangnan, literally meaning southern districts of the Yangzi River, 
commonly referred to the Yangzi delta (or the lower Yangzi) or Lake Tai 
basin. Bozhong Li considered Jiangnan to be comprised of the 
prefectures of Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Jiangning 
in southern Jiangsu, and Hangzhou, Jiaxing and Huzhou in western 
Zhejiang. See Bozhong Li, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 
1620-1850 (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), p. 3.
Gaozong shilu, 31 l/28a-29a (QL 13.3).
Yang, Caoyun zeli zuan, 18/80b-81b.
The regulation does not specify a deadline for returning the proceeds, 
but it is reasonable to assume that officials were required to do so 
immediately after the reduced-price sales. For a detailed discussion of 
reduced-price sales, see Chapter Five.
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of famine. Although local officials ultimately had to send the 
proceeds of its sale to the Board of Revenue, the grain tribute 
acted as a short-term loan during natural calamities.
The benefits of the grain tribute to the imperial 
government were substantial but were realized at a cost: the 
expense involved in the maintenance of the Grand Canal, and, as 
Chapter One shows, the bannermen’s allowance of duty-free 
goods on grain boats. As well as these direct costs, there were 
hidden costs that often have gone unnoticed in conjunction with 
the grain tribute. In the following section I shall investigate the 
state revenue lost in customs duties, and in salt in particular, and 
show how they were related to the grain tribute.
Hidden Costs: Customs Duty And The Salt Revenue 
As has been mentioned, grain tribute boats were allowed to carry 
private goods for sale in the capital. By the eighteenth century, the 
amount of private goods shipped on imperial grain boats far 
exceeded the quota granted, especially on boats from Hubei, 
Hunan, and Jiangxi. According to a 1709 memorial from the 
Supervisor of the Wuhu Customs, grain boats from those 
provinces smuggled goods from the middle to the lower Yangzi in 
three ways: they illegally enlarged the small boats (lighters) that 
traveled with them; they allowed private boats into their 
grain-transport fleets; and they tied wooden rafts to their boats, 
smuggling the timber the rafts were made of
Bannermen were able to smuggle goods so openly 
because their grain boats were free from customs inspection on the 
Yangzi. No one, not even the supervisors of customs houses, was 
allowed to obstruct boats carrying the imperial grain tribute. In 
1709, the Wuhu Customs, which received its revenue mostly from 
the long-distance trade on the Yangzi, attempted to change the 
rule, wanting to stop the grain boats, search them, and collect 
duties. The imperial court rejected the request, as that would slow
In times of drought, when the canal became too shallow for the larger 
grain boats, the grain tribute was transferred to lighters; the government 
allowed each grain boat from Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi to travel with a 
lighter with a hundred shi of capacity. See Chapter One.
Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 872.
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the grain transportation.^^ In 1711, the Wuhu Customs asked the 
imperial court to allow its clerks to patrol the lower Yangzi and 
levy duties on the goods unloaded by the middle Yangzi grain 
boats. This would prevent the drain on customs revenue without 
slowing down the grain transport. This proposal was rejected as it 
violated the rule that a customs station could only collect duties 
within its own jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the Wuhu 
Customs was confined to the middle Yangzi.^”
As there was no way to alleviate it, smuggling continued 
to be rampant on the Yangzi River. In 1719, the Supervisor of the 
Wuhu Customs presented the following report:
The tax arrears of the Wuhu Customs are due to the 
following fact. Every year, more than 2,000 grain 
boats from the provinces of Jiangxi, Hunan, and 
Hubei go past the customs house. The bannermen load 
the goods fully [on their boats] at their discretion.
They tie rafts of timber to the back of the boats and 
refuse an inspection [for tax].^'
Thus by using the protection of the grain boats, merchants could 
smuggle even bulky goods like timber without paying duties.
Smuggling caused heavy losses in customs revenues. 
While the revenue quota of the Wuhu Customs was set at 227,000 
taels annually, in reality the customs rarely collected this 
amount.^^ In 1721, for instance, after three seasons, the customs 
reported that it had collected only a little more than half of this 
quota. In reply, the Board of Revenue ordered the Customs 
Supervisor to make up for the shortage, and reminded local 
officials to fight against grain boat smuggling, reflecting that the 
deficit was caused, at least in part, by this.^^ But the Board of 
Revenue had no suggestions for how to go about such an 
undertaking.
ibid., p. 379.
Caoyun quanshu (1736), pp. 872-3. 
Shengzu shilu, 285/6a (KX 58.7). 
Caoyun quanshu (1736), pp. 872-3. 
” ibid., pp. 874-5.
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Most goods carried on the grain boats were unloaded and 
sold in the Yangzi delta, but smuggling continued on the Grand 
Canal. In 1731 the Director-general of the Grand Canal, who had 
the authority to search the grain boats passing by Huaian, 
discovered two fleets of boats carrying goods over the legal quota 
of 126 shi per boat. A Raining fleet from Zhejiang, which 
consisted of 46 boats and was allowed a maximum of 5,796 shi of 
private goods, exceeded this amount by 398 shi. A Xuanzhou fleet 
of 45 boats from Jiangnan also exceeded its transport volume, by 
488 shi. The Director-general of the Grand Canal ordered both 
fleets to unload all of their illegal cargoes locally.^'*
In the above report, boats coming from the Yangzi 
smuggled barely 10 per cent more than their quota. This amount 
was trivial compared to what they carried legally on their return 
journey, when, having completed their delivery, they no longer 
were free from customs inspection or customs duties. As K5saka 
Masanori documented, on this journey government grain boats 
participated in the flourishing bean-cake trade from north China to 
the south. From this trade the Huaian Customs made a 
considerable annual income. In 1753, the customs office collected 
330,000 taels, mostly from the bean-cake on the grain boats.^^ 
What income the government derived from the bean-cake trade, 
though, did not make up for what was lost through salt smuggling.
In the Qing the salt trade operated under a state monopoly. 
The government granted salt-trading rights to merchant 
syndicates under strict regulations: the salt bought in a producing 
region had to be sold in a designated consuming region. On their 
return from the north, grain boats passed through two 
salt-producing regions on the Grand Canal: the Changlu salt 
district near Tianjin and the Liang-Huai salt district near Huaian. 
Salt from the Changlu district was supposed to be sold in Zhili and
ibid., pp. 881-2.
Bean-cake was the residue of soybeans after the oil was extracted. It 
was a nitrogenous fertilizer for the booming cotton cultivation in the 
Yangzi delta. See Kato Shigeru, Shina keizai shi kosho (Tokyo: Toyo 
bunko, 1953), pp. 694-8.
Kosaka Masanori, “Shindai ni okeru daiunga no bushi ryutsu,” p. 9. 
For more on the Huaian customs in the Qing, see Takino Shojiro, 
“Shindai Waiankan no kosei to kino nitsuite”.
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a part of Henan, while salt from the Liang-Huai region was 
supposed to be sold in the Yangzi valley. This profitable 
monopoly was disrupted by smuggling across designated 
consumption regions, and the illegal trade in salt was connected to 
the grain boats.
Court memorials show that many grain boats returning 
down the canal from Tongzhou bought illegal Changlu salt at 
Tianjin, Cangzhou, or Sangyuan (a town at the northern border of 
Shandong).^** The salt must have been sold in Jiangsu, in the 
southernmost section of the Grand Canal, for the northern salt was 
rarely transported along the Yangzi River. A 1729 memorial 
shows that many grain boats, having disposed of their Changlu 
salt, then bought and loaded salt in the Huai river region to sell on 
their return journey to the middle Yangzi:
Powerful rogues called “wind merchants”(/engA:e), 
rely on their connections with grain boats for the 
transport of their goods. The goods are transported to 
Huaian and Yangzhou and entrusted to the local evil 
people, who purchase salt [on the wind merchants’ 
behalf] after selling the goods. The salt is stored at the 
riverside depots in advance. When the grain boats 
return to the south, the salt is loaded onto them and 
transported on the same route along the Yangzi River.
The profit derived from the sale of salt is shared 
between wind merchant and bannermen, helmsmen, 
and sailors at a ratio of 30 to 70. The grain boats are 
greedy for the little benefit given by the wind 
merchants; the wind merchants rely on grain boats as a 
sort of protective talisman {hufu). As a consequence, 
substantial amounts [of the illegal salt] are smuggled 
to Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei.^®
For a detailed description of the salt administration in the Qing, see 
Saeki Tomi, Shindai ensei no kenkyu (Kyoto: Toyoshi kenkyukai, 1956).
Caoyun quanshu (1736), pp. 865, 873-5; Da Qing Shizong 
Xianhuangdi (Yongzheng Emperor) shilu (repr. Taipei: Hualian 
Chubanshe, 1964), 9/15a-b (YZ 1), (hereafter cited as Shizong shilu)-, 
GZD-QL, vol. 26, pp. 248-51 (QL 30.10.4).
Shizong shilu, 81/22a-24a (YZ 7). See also Caoyun quanshu {1136), p. 
881.
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This memorial shows that Liang-Huai salt played an 
important role in the bilateral trade between the middle and lower 
Yangzi conducted by grain tribute boats. Merchants sent their 
goods from the middle Yangzi to the delta and on to Beijing on the 
grain boats, and evaded customs duties. On the grain boats’ return 
journey, at the delta, the same merchants loaded the salt they had 
bought nearby onto the grain boats for the trip back to the middle 
Yangzi.
The extent of the illegal salt trade is shown in a 1765 
memorial. Yang Xifu, the Director-general of the Grain Transport, 
listed the places where bannermen could buy illegal Huai salt 
easily:
Although Qinghe and Shanyang [Huaian] in the north­
ern Huai region of Jiangnan are not salt-producing 
areas, they are the major market centres of illegal 
salt...
In the south of the Huai River, such places as 
Baoying, Gaoyou, Ganquan, and Jiangdu [Yangzhou] 
are also places where illegal salt is sold...
Yizheng is the place where illegal salt leaves the 
[Yangzi] River [for the up-river region]...
Guazhou is the place where illegal salt is taken 
south of the [Yangzi] River.
Map 3 shows these centers of the illegal salt trade. That 
these markets were widely dispersed between the lower Huai 
River and the lower Yangzi River made it even more difficult for 
the government to eontrol salt smuggling; even though grain boats 
were subject to search on their return journey, enough salt 
remained hidden to erode the salt monopoly and weaken state 
finances. The above memorial from Yang Xifu was aetually in 
response to a glut in government salt in the Yangzi valley in the 
previous year, when much of the legal Huai salt could not be sold. 
The Supervisor of the Liang-Huai Salt District claimed that the
GZD-QL, vol. 26, pp. 248-51 (QL 30.10.4).
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salt smuggling on grain boats was the major reason for the 
problem.'”
Conclusion
Throughout the eighteenth century, the abundance of grain in the 
capital allowed the Qing government flexibility in dealing with 
grain prices in the capital, and in giving aid to the provinces in 
times of famine. The bureaucratic administration collected the 
grain tribute so successfully that each year the central government 
had a surplus of about 1,000,000 shi of grain. To reduce these 
reserves, which were in danger of rotting, and to stabilize prices 
during famines, the central government allowed a portion of the 
stored grain to be sold below market rate in Beijing. As well, the 
government allowed the grain tribute to be retained by or diverted 
to provinces suffering from famine. By retaining a portion of its 
taxation in kind, as with the grain tribute, the Qing government 
protected its finances from fluctuating prices, as well as aiding 
provincial governments in times of need.
The costs for these benefits were substantial. Quite apart 
from the price of building and maintaining both the Grand Canal 
and the bureaucracy that administered the grain tribute, the central 
government provided bannermen with an allowance for the 
duty-free transportation of private goods, giving them an edge 
over regular, non-govemment transport. Along with the 
allowance went freedom from official interference. Taking 
advantage of this, grain boats carried more goods than the 
bannermen’s quota allowed, depriving the government of customs 
duties. On their return journey, bannermen collaborated with wind 
merchants to smuggle salt back down the Yangzi river, 
undercutting the government's salt monopoly. In consequence, the 
government sacrificed much of its revenue on both duty collection 
and salt revenue, as indirect costs of the grain tribute.
See GZD-QL, vol. 22, p. 422 (QL 29.8.16).
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Chapter Three:
The Question Of 
Eighteenth-Century Inflation
To make an accurate report on the long-distance grain trade in the 
eighteenth century, it is necessary to study permutations in money, 
and therefore in the market worth of grain, during that time. Grain 
prices are not merely a matter of supply and demand; they also are 
affected by fluctuations in the value of money.
The monetary system of early and high Qing (1644-1800) 
was a bimetallic system of copper cash and silver. Copper coins, 
cast by the state, were used mainly in local markets for small 
transactions, while silver ingots or eoins were imported from 
foreign countries, and used mostly in large-scale transactions and 
inter-provincial trade. In this chapter, I shall discuss how these 
two kinds of money affected the price of rice.
Copper Prices
In Qing China, the use of copper cash was characterized by 
regional diversities. When people used cash in large units, they 
put a string through the holes in the coins. This larger unit of cash 
was called a “string” {chuan). A string varied in size (i.e., number 
of coins) and value according to the custom of a given market. 
Even if two regional markets used the same number of eoins in 
their string, their strings might differ in the types of eoins used. 
Strings were composed of some legitimate coins from the state, 
some illegal coins from private mints, and even some ex-coins 
from previous dynasties; in different markets, the percentage of 
that composition also differed. The diversity of the string system 
increased the difficulty of understanding the money economy in 
the Qing.'
' For this reason, Endymion Porter Wilkinson stressed that when using 
eash to indicate price level, one has to be clear about the local habit of 
cash circulation. See Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese 
Price History (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1980), 
pp. 15-6. For more details of copper cash in the Qing, see Peng Xinwei,
53
Eighteenth-Century Inflation
Despite these variations, historians have agreed that 
China witnessed a rise of commodity prices quoted in copper cash 
in the late eighteenth century.^ Their explanations as to why this 
happened, however, are not so unified. Chen Zhaonan, for 
instance, attributed the phenomenon to an over-supply of copper 
cash, and a fall in the demand for it, caused by the use of silver 
coins and merchant bills instead.^ Adachi Keiji, while unopposed 
to the idea of inflation, objected to the notion that silver 
predominated in market activities. He argued that the role of 
copper cash as the major means of exchange was never challenged 
in rural markets. In addition, he stated that the rapid development 
of market activities in rural areas increased the demand for copper 
cash in the second half of the eighteenth century.'' Building on 
Adachi’s study, Akinobu Kuroda has showed that the Qing 
government, suffering from reduced domestic copper output and a 
surge in copper prices, failed to issue enough cash to satisfy the 
market need. As a result, debased coins from illegal mints were 
used to meet the demand. Local officials, desperate to meet coin 
production quotas, also issued debased coins. The value of copper 
cash then plummeted, pushing commodity prices up.^
Zhongguo huobi shi (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1958), pp. 
14-7; tr. as A Monetary History of China, tr. Edward Kaplan 
(Bellingham, WA: Western Washington University, 1994). With regard 
to the political theory behind copper cash, see Richard Von Glahn, 
Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 15-47.
^ See Peng, Zhongguo huobi shi, p. 824; Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese 
Price History, p. 32; Chen Zhaonan, Yongzheng Qianlong nianjian de 
yinqian bijia biandong (1723-95) (Taipei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo 
jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966), pp. 12-7; Hans Ulrich Vogel, “Chinese 
Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” Late Imperial China, 8, no. 2 
(Dec. 1987), p. 7.
^Chen, Yongzheng Qianlong nianjian de yinqian bijia biandong, pp. 
48-54.
'' Adachi Keiji, “Min Shin jidai ni okeru senkeizai no hatten,” in 
Chugoku sensei kokka to shakai tdgo, ed. Chugokushi kenkyukai (Kyoto: 
Bunrikaku, 1990), pp. 387-412.
^ Kuroda Akinobu, Chuka teikoku no kozo no sekaikeizai (Nagoya: 
Nagoya University Press, 1994), pp. 50-3.
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The inflation caused by the debasement of copper cash 
occurred in the lower Yangzi region in the last decade of the 
century. In 1791, so that the value of copper cash would not affect 
the income of soldiers in Jiangsu province, the Qianlong emperor 
allowed the Jiangsu Governor to pay the soldiers silver instead. At 
the same time, he allowed a temporary closing of the copper mint 
in the province, to elevate the value of copper cash.^
We have little data to show the trend of rice prices in the 
region at the time. A short paragraph, entitled “rice prices” (mijia), 
in the book Ltiyuan Conghua (Miscellaneous words in the Lu 
Garden) is commonly cited.’ It reads:
In Qianlong 20 (1755), a plague of locusts stripped the 
four prefectures [of Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, 
and Zhenjiang] [of vegetation] and caused famine. [As 
a result,] the price of rice rose to 35-36 cash and cases 
of death from hunger were numerous. Thereafter, 
bumper harvests occurred in successive years and the 
price gradually returned to normal: only 14-15 cash 
for a sheng^ [of rice] as the usual price. When the 
drought occurred in Qianlong 50 (1785), each sheng 
of rice rose to 56-57 cash. From then on, no matter 
whether the harvest was good or bad, the usual price 
was between 27-28 and 34-35 cash.’
The above indicates inflated rice prices in the cities of the 
Yangzi Delta from 1786 onwards. Nevertheless, without a 
complete series of rice priees, we cannot tell in which years the 
price of rice was 27-28 cash, and in which years it rose to 34-35
® Gaozong shilu, 1389/17a (QL 56.10).
’ See, for instance, Peng, Zhongguo huobi shi, p. 824 and 829 note 21; 
Chen, Yongzheng Qianlong nianjian deyinqian bijia biandong, p. 14 
* A sheng is a hundredth of a shi, or about 1 liter. See Table of Weights 
and Measures.
’ Qian Yong (1759-1844), Ltiyuan conghua (1838 edition; repr. Xuxiu 
Siku Quanshu Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., Xuxiu siku quanshu, Shanghai; 




cash. Without this data, we cannot track changes in the flow of 
grain on the Yangzi.'°
In short, while there may well have been a general 
inflation of rice prices in copper cash in the Yangzi Delta in the 
late eighteenth century, the data backing this conclusion sheds 
little light on the rice market. In the following section, I will turn 
to silver to see if I can find a reliable series of rice prices.
Silver Prices In Kuping Tael
Like copper cash, the standard for silver varied from market to 
market. In many transactions people used silver bullion, but the 
price of each ingot was based on fineness and weight. During the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the use of foreign silver 
coins spread up the coast from Guangdong to Jiangsu, but since 
the coins came from different countries, the silver standard 
remained unfixed.
However, in most government transactions and in official 
price reports, silver had to be uniformly evaluated according to the 
kuping tael unit of account. The kuping tael was a treasury tael, 
equal to approximately 37.3 grams of silver, and was theoretically 
of 1.000 fineness."
There were abundant reports of grain prices in kuping 
taels in Qing documents, when a major duty of local officials was
Recently Kuroda attempted to solve this problem by providing a series 
of rice prices in Tunxi, in southern Anhui, which he found in an account 
book of a local clan with the Jin surname. See Akinobu Kuroda, “What 
can prices tell us about the 1 b*-18* century China? - A review of 
‘Shindai Chugoku no Bukka to Keizai Hendo (Prices and Economic 
Change in Qing China)’ by Kishimoto Mio,” Chugokushigaku 13 
(December 2003), pp. 101-17. Tunxi was a regional market for 
neighboring counties, but since it was not in the Yangzi Delta, to what 
extent its economy was integrated with the delta remains in doubt. As 
well, it appears that Tunxi used a different standard of copper cash than 
the delta. For example, while rice was sold at 56-57 cash per sheng in 
Suzhou and neighboring cities, in Tunxi the price was as low as 9 cash. 
These are the problems we have to solve before we can make any 
meaningful comparison of rice prices between Tunxi and Suzhou, or 
other places.
" Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800, pp. 4-5.
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to report on prevailing eeonomie and soeial conditions, especially 
grain prices. These reports were compiled on the basis of prices 
gathered regularly from the market of the county capital, and 
submitted to the emperor.'^
The Qing court demanded a high degree of accuracy in 
these price reports, which was assured by a sophisticated price 
reporting administration. By rule, county magistrates had to report 
to their superiors (the prefects) every ten days on the market price 
of upper, medium, and lower grade rice, converting local units of 
measure to the imperial shi, and local currencies to the kupitig tael. 
From these reports, the prefects calculated average prices for each 
grade of rice on a monthly basis, and reported to provincial 
governors. Based on this price data, each provincial governor 
compiled a final price report of his province and presented it to the 
emperor in a secret memorial. The report was monthly, and under 
the name of each prefecture the governor listed the price of each 
grade of rice, as well as the amount by which the highest price 
varied from the highest price in the previous month, and their 
explanations for the price fluctuations.’^
To guarantee accuracy, the Qing government compiled 
other reports for cross-examination, put together by officials who 
were completely outside the regular system. A brigade-general 
might mention the price level in the city where he was stationed. 
Governors and other officials might report on the level of prices in 
a neighboring province. Officials traveling from Beijing to new 
posts might mention the prices they observed as they traveled. Or 
censors might be sent out from Beijing, specifically to investigate 
and report on local prices.
The success of the bureaucratic administration in the 
eighteenth century, a golden age in the Qing, was based on the 
price reporting system. Through these reports, the court in Beijing 
was able to comprehend the agricultural economy throughout the 
empire. Decisions on how much grain to take from government 
granaries and sell to famine-stricken counties were based on price 
reports. As Endymion Porter Wilkinson has noted, the price
Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 2-3. 
Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese Price History, pp. 114-23.
Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets and Trade, p. 6.
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reporting system allowed the court a much more effective use of 
the granaries for price stabilization and famine relief.'^
Local officials were quite capable of handling the tael 
conversion in their price reports.'^ It was an official unit of 
account, and they received administrative funds as well as their 
salaries in silver, in kuping taels.It is highly unlikely that they 
did not know exactly what their money could buy. Furthermore, 
the land taxes that they collected every year were registered in 
kuping taels. In actuality, many taxpayers paid copper cash, which 
the magistrates exchanged for silver, in kuping taels, in money 
shops, further proof that officials had to know the current relative 
worth of a kuping tael and copper cash.'*
Chuan Han-sheng was the first historian to use official 
price reports to show price trends in rice in Suzhou in the 
eighteenth century; based on this data, he argued for an 
eighteenth-century price revolution. While Chuan’s theory is still 
highly influential among China historians, recent findings 
suggest modifications to his views.
Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese Price History, pp. 136-7.
See Kuroda, “What can prices tell us about 16*-18* century China?”, 
p. 103.
Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 15-6.
Kung-chuan Hsiao noted that magistrate staff often extorted taxpayers 
by fixing the rate higher than it really was and pocketing the difference. 
See Kung-chuan Hsiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth 
Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 122-3.
An example of Chuan’s influence is Madeleine Zelin’s argument that 
high inflation caused the huohao guigong reform (return of meltage fees 
to the public coffers) to fail. She noted that local government finances 
had improved during the early eighteenth century because of the success 
of the huohao guigong reform, but in the later decades, since prices rose 
sharply, the budget was insufficient again. See Madeleine Zelin, The 
Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century 
Ch’ing China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), p. 
298. In addition, Philip Kuhn has argued that the rise in commodity 
prices in the late eighteenth century was one of the major causes of the 
White Lotus Rebellion between 1796 and 1805. See Philip Kuhn, 
Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and 
Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
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Inflation Or Deflation: Long-Term Price Trends 
Chuan Han-sheng’s decision to base his theory of a price 
revolution on Suzhou rice prices made good sense, as the city was 
the most important long-distance market for rice on the Yangzi. 
Based on the data he found, Chuan argued that rice prices were 
stable in the first half of the century, but began to rise at 
mid-century, and, by the last quarter of the century, were four 
times what they had been at the beginning of the century. (See 
Table 3.1, from Chuan’s study on Suzhou.) Along with 
demographic growth, Chuan saw the inflow of foreign silver as 
the major driving force for the inflationary trend of rice prices.^”
The weakness of this theory lies in the paucity of the data. 
Chuan found bountiful price data from official reports between 
1693 and 1719,^' but he based the price trend in the remaining 
years of the century on only three points of data, and only the first 
two points, from the 1748 and 1770, are prices of rice in Suzhou; 
the third point, from the year 1786, is actually the price of rice in 
Wuxi county, Changzhou prefecture. Moreover, the extra­
ordinarily high prices of rice in 1748, 1770, and 1786 were due to 
sudden grain shortages in the lower Yangzi. Therefore, a 
comparison of these prices with prices from early in the century, 
as they appear in Table 3.1, exaggerates the scale of inflation, and 
therefore, the impact of imported silver.
The price of rice in Suzhou in 1748, which was 2 taels per 
shi according to Chuan, was a high point in the inflationary trend 
in the first half of the century. Rising prices had been noticed by 
contemporaries, including the Qianlong emperor. In 1748 he 
noted: “Grain is a daily necessity of the people. However, in
Press, 1970), pp. 50-1.
Chuan, “Meizhou baiyin yu shiba shiji Zhongguo wujia gemin de 
guanxi,” pp. 475-508.
Later, in another article, Chuan supplemented the price data of rice in 
Suzhou with data from official reports between 1723 and 1735. See 
Chuan Han-sheng, “Qing Yongzheng nianjian (1723-35) de mijia,” 
1959, repr. Chuan Han-sheng, Zhongguo jingjishi luncong, 1972, vol. 2, 
pp. 521-2.




recent years, it is getting dear. How can the poor bear that?”^^ In 
the early months of the year he had demanded solutions, initiating 
extensive discussions among provincial governors. Officials 
generally attributed inflation to the rapid population growth, and 
Chuan Han-sheng added that the influx of American silver 
contributed to the problem.^'* Although there is no question that 
prices were high that year, it is necessary to put these prices in 
context to understand the long-term trend.
The high price of rice in Suzhou of 1748 was actually the 
consequence of a poor harvest coupled with a policy disaster. In 
the autumn of 1747, Suzhou and its neighboring prefectures 
reaped a poor harvest because of storms and flooding. To put more 
grain on the market, Anning, the Jiangsu Provincial Governor, 
ordered grain hoarders to sell their stock, and for reduced prices. 
According to some reports, Anning even confiscated the grain of 
hoarders who refused to participate in these reduced-price sales. 
Anning’s high-handed policy reduced grain merchants’ profits, 
discouraging them from importing rice from other provinces, 
which aggravated the grain shortage in Suzhou. The situation did 
not improve until Anning left the post in the autumn of 1748.^^ As 
a 1748 memorial by Zhejiang Governor Fang Guancheng noted.
With regard to the high price of rice in Suzhou, 
Songjiang, Hangzhou, and Huzhou, there are different 
explanations, but most [observers] attribute it to the 
rare arrival of guest merchants.^*
Yeh-chien Wang has provided a detailed survey of 
Suzhou rice prices, using relatively complete official reports from 
the First Historical Archives in Beijing, and modifying Chuan’s
This imperial edict was quoted in a memorial presented by the official 
Yang Xifii in 1748, compiled in Qingjingshi wenbian, 39/21a-25b.
Chuan Han-sheng, “Qianlong shisannian de migui wenti,” 1965, repr. 
Chuan, Zhongguo jingjishi luncong, 1972, vol. 2, pp. 547-66.
Gaozongshilu, 298/1 la-b (QL 12.9), 300/9a-b (QL 12.10), 314/33a-b 
(QL 13.5); Shiliao xunkan (Taibei: Kuofeng chubanshe, 1963), vol. 29, 
p. 563.
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 56, pp. 1116-9 (QL 13.5.19).
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conclusions.^’ Figure 3.1 shows the trends in Suzhou rice priees 
according to this data. Although Wang argued in favor of a price 
revolution, the data showed that his estimated priee increases fell 
far below Chuan’s. While Chuan argued that priees quadrupled 
between 1700 and the 1780s, Wang’s prices increased by only 50 
per cent. Moreover, Wang’s data, more elearly than Chuan’s, 
showed that prices thereafter dropped dramatically. In the last 
twelve years of the century they fell from around 1.4 taels per shi 
to between 1.4 and 1.16 taels. In 1799 the price of rice rose again, 
but the deeline from 1789 to 1798 is quite obvious.
Yeh-chien Wang noticed this decline but dismissed it, 
remarking that priee reports for those years were unreliable. He 
stated that until new data were found, there eould be no 
satisfaetory explanation for the anomaly.’** The theory of a price 
revolution was too influential; and the discovery of another new 
price series from Xiaoshan county, Zhejiang province, inereased 
his hesitancy in accepting the new data he had found.
Prices in Xiaoshan
The new price report from Xiaoshan, first cited by Tanaka Issei, 
was drawn from a reeord by the Lai lineage, and provided an 
imbroken series of grain priees from 1683 to 1802.” Despite 
being a small county in Shaoxing prefecture, Xiaoshan was close 
to Hangzhou, the largest commercial city and the provincial 
capital in Zhejiang. It seems likely that this Xiaoshan series eould 
provide an insight into rice priees in Hangzhou and perhaps even 
the Yangzi Delta.
The diserepancy between the official rice prices in 
Suzhou and the Lai lineage record in Xiaoshan is noticeable. 
Table 3.2 compares the rice prices of Xiaoshan and Suzhou, while 
Figure 3.2 portrays the priee trends in these two places. The figure 
shows that, as has been noted by Yeh-chien Wang, for most of the 
eighteenth century trends in both places moved in the same 
direction, but after the 1786 famine they diverged: the price of rice
” Wang, “Secular trends of rice prices in the Yangzi Delta,” pp. 35-68. 
ibid., p. 49.
” Tanaka Issei, “Shindai Setto sozoku no soshiki keisei ni okeru s5shi 
engeki no kino ni tsuite,” Tdydshi kenkyu 44, no. 4 (1986): 32-67.
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in Suzhou declined, while Xiaoshan prices had another peak in 
1794; and overall, Xiaoshan prices were higher than those in 
Suzhou. What happened to these two price series?
Some rice data in the Lai lineage record reflected supply 
and demand in Xiaoshan. For example, rice cost 3.5 taels per shi 
in 1785 and 1786, following a catastrophic drought in 1785 and 
resulting widespread famine in Henan, Shandong, Hubei, Anhui, 
and Jiangsu.^® Wang Huizu, a native of Xiaoshan, witnessed the 
misery on his journey from Suzhou to Beijing and left a first-hand 
account of terrible suffering: corpses lay unburied and families 
sold their sons and daughters into slavery.^' Rice went for 4,300 
copper cash per shi in Wuxi,^^ while north of the Yangzi River, 
prices were even higher. In Suqian county a 5/1/ of rice cost 10,200 
copper cash.
However, some price information in the Lai lineage 
record was mysterious. In 1794, although there were no reports of 
famine in Zhejiang, rice was sold for 3.5 taels per shi, a price as 
high as in the famine years of 1785 and 1786. Wang Huizu, 
writing in 1796, remembered the sudden jump in commodity 
prices in terms of copper cash two years earlier:
During the summer [of 1794], one dou of rice cost 
330-340 cash. In the past, when the price of rice rose 
to 150-160 cash, people would starve. Now, rice is 
often dear, but people still live happily. The reason is, 
in previous years, high prices affected only rice; but 
now, all items including fish, shrimps, vegetables, and
Gaozong shilu, 1223/16b-17a (QL 50.1), 1226/1 la-12b (QL 50.3), 
1236/29a-b (QL 50.8), 1236/29b-30b (QL 50.8); Zhupizouzhe, 
microfilm, reel no. 57, pp. 3011-5 (QL 50.8.15).
Wang Huizu, Bingta menghen lu (preface in 1796; repr. in Wang 
Longzhuan xiansheng yishu, vol. 1, [Jiangsu ju, 1889]), s/ja«g/56b-62a.
Chuan Han-sheng cited this figure, converted into silver, as one of his 
principal data. Wang Huizu stated that the conversion rate between 
copper cash to silver was about 1000 wen to 1 tael in Xiaoshan of 1786. 
Applying this rate to Wuxi, Chuan suggested that 4,300 wen equalled 
about 4.3 taels, an extremely high price at the time. See Wang, Bingta 
menghen lu, xia/Sla-, Chuan, “Meizhou baiyin yu shiba shiji Zhongguo 
wujia gemin de guanxi,” p. 483 notes.
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fruit are expensive. Therefore, both peddlers and
peasants can make a living.
Three points are made in the above account. First, the 
price of rice was 3,300-3,400 copper cash per shi. Second, the 
prices of all commodities were rising. Third, because of this 
peddlers and peasants could earn a living, and were not starving. 
Based on these facts, Lin Man-houng argued that the high price of 
rice in Xiaoshan in 1794 was not caused by crop failure, but by a 
rapid increase in the supply of silver. She pointed out that general 
inflation was consistent with the large quantities of silver flowing 
into China through the overseas trade; as a result of the influx of 
silver, the price of bullion fell, bringing about the rise of 
commodity prices in silver. According to Lin, Xiaoshan was one 
of those areas affected by increased silver.^"*
The argument concerning silver imports is impressive, 
except that Wang Huizu did not indicate a fall in the price of silver, 
nor the widespread use of silver in Xiaoshan. He noted, instead, 
that the amount of cash that was exchanged for a tael of silver had 
risen considerably between 1761 and 1792, from just under 800 to 
1,300, and that it continued to rise until, in 1794, it stood at 
1,440-1,450. Wang Huizu attributed this to the prevalence of 
adulterated copper coins.^^ Therefore it may be concluded that the 
inflation of commodity prices in Xiaoshan was driven by the 
devaluation of copper cash, and not by the increase of silver in 
circulation. The price of rice would be high for the same reason.
It is then probable that the lineage account of rice prices 
was distorted in the process of converting cash amounts to silver. 
According to the Lai lineage record, a shi of rice in Xiaoshan sold 
for 3.5 taels of silver in 1794. Converted back to copper cash at the 
rate of 1,440-1,450 cash per tael, as cited by Wang Huizu, this was 
equivalent to 5,040-5,075 cash, a price far too high to be credible, 
even despite the fall in copper cash in those years. According to 
Wang, the price was only between 3,300 and 3,400 cash that year.
Wang, Bingta menghen lu, xia/65b.
Lin, “Shijie jingji yu jindai Zhongguo nongye,” pp. 295-8. 
Wang, Bingta menghen lu, xia/51& and 65b.
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Kuroda agreed that in the last deeades the priee quotations 
in the Lai lineage record did not refer to market prices. He 
supposed that the lineage’s accountants distorted prices to avoid 
giving the impression that the lineage was saving money on ritual 
expenses. He argued that the lineage’s accountants adopted a 
fixed conversion rate between cash and tael when compiling the 
price record, instead of calculating by the actual market exchange 
rate.^^ But if the accounting manager altered the conversion rate 
arbitrarily, the record is of limited use.
Without knowing the conversion rate, it is impossible to 
calculate original market prices from this distorted record. Kuroda 
postulated that the Lai lineage might have used the fixed standard 
of 700 copper cash to a tael, known also as “70 percent 
cas\\'\qizhe qian)f^ It is true that, as shown in the study by 
Kishimoto Mio, in Fujian and the Yangzi Delta, people used a 
fixed rate of copper cash for a tael of silver. In Fujian, the amount 
was about 800 to 850 cash, while in the Delta it was 700.^* 
However, that does not mean that Xiaoshan county, in a different 
province, had the same practice. In fact, Wang Huizu noted that, 
in 1799, in the districts east of Xiaoshan city, people called the 
legal cash (zhiqian) the “90 percent cash” (jiuzhe qian), and this 
fixed conversion rate did not refer to silver and copper cash, but to 
“legal cash”, the copper cash issued by the state, and “market 
cash” (shiqian), the private cash that circulated in local markets.^®
Compared to the Lai lineage account, the reminiscences 
left by Wang Huizu are much more useful for reconstructing the 
money economy in Xiaoshan. As well as leaving a comprehensive 
record of prices, Wang gave clear explanations of the figures
Kuroda,”What can prices tell us about 16'*’-18* century China?,” p. 
109.
ibid.
Kishimoto Mio, Shindai Chugoku no bukka to keizai kendo (Tokyo: 
Kenbun Shuppan, 1997), pp. 327-63.
By this standard, 100 market cash equaled 90 legal cash. Wang 
emphasized that in the county city and its neighboring districts the 
conversion rate was 100 market cash to 95 legal cash, and that the rate 
changed depending on the market. See Wang Huizu, Menghen luyu 




quoted. He was very conscious of price differences in various 
locations, and when quoting prices, he mentioned what kind of 
money he was referring to. Table 3.3 shows the prices of copper 
cash in Xiaoshan and its nearby districts in terms of rice, kuping 
taels, and foreign silver dollars between 1786 and 1805.
The copper cash prices of rice, as shown in Table 3.3, 
were consistently high in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, but that was not necessarily due to the debasement of 
copper cash. In 1802, 1803, and 1805 (there is no data for 1804), 
Wang Huizu noted that despite good autumn harvests of rice, 
continuous rainfall in the third and fourth lunar months destroyed 
the wheat crop and escalated the prices of other grains, including 
rice. The worst season was in 1805, when the price of rice soared 
to 4,500 to 4,600 cash per shi in the third lunar month. On the 29* 
day of that month, thousands of people rushed to a local Buddhist 
temple to buy government grain at a discounted price, and sixty 
women were killed in the ensuing crush.'*'’
The debasement of copper cash occurred slowly over the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, as Wang Huizu noted in 
1792, commenting on the price changes in Xiaoshan: “Before 
1761, for each kuping tael of silver, one exchanged no more than 
780-790 cash. In 1786, the exchange rate was still less than 1,000 
[cash]. Now it is 1,300 cash.'”*’ Due to the drop in the value of 
copper cash, local officials altered the conversion rate for taxes. 
As noted earlier, though the state collected the land tax in silver, 
local officials allowed taxpayers to pay in copper cash. When the 
value of cash declined, the amount needed (to convert into silver) 
rose. When customary fees (lougui) were added, increased 
according to inflation, taxpayers faced a sudden steep rise in taxes. 
In 1792, when the conversion rate of one kuping tael was 1,300 
cash, county magistrates actually demanded 1,800-2,000 cash for 
the land tax. Besides the land tax, people in Xiaoshan had to pay 
the grain tribute tax, an additional tax collected only in the 
rice-producing provinces. By mle the tax was levied in kind, but it 
had been a common practice for taxpayers to pay cash to their 
magistrates, who then bought rice to ship to the capital. In 1792,
*” Wang, Menghen luyu, 69b-84a.
*’ Wang, Bingta menghen lu, xia/Sla.
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due to the drop in the value of copper cash, the Xiaoshan 
magistrate had to collect more cash than usual to buy rice for the 
tribute tax. When people in Xiaoshan found that they had to pay 
40 to 60 cash more for each dou of rice than they had in the 
previous year, some taxpayers sued the magistracy for corruption, 
though, as Wang remarked, to no avail.''^
The debasement of copper cash reached its height in 1794, 
when one kuping tael was made up of 1,440-1,450 cash, while the 
price of rice soared to 330-340 cash per dou. But as Wang Huizu 
noted, and has been cited earlier, famine was averted because: 
“...all items including fish, shrimps, vegetables and fruit are 
expensive.”"'^ In the surge of inflation, peddlers and peasants were 
less affected, since they asked higher prices for their goods and 
grain as well.
The price of copper cash continued low in 1795 and 1796, 
but it took an upturn in 1797, as can be seen in the changed 
conversion rate between silver dollars and copper cash in Table 
3.3.'*'* The table shows that a silver dollar went for 1,070-1,090 
cash in 1795, rose to 1,200-1,300 in 1796, and plummeted rapidly 
in 1797. Wang noted:
At the beginning of the tenth lunar month, each dollar 
of foreign silver was sold for 1,200 cash. [The price] 
decreased day by day, and within ten days, each dollar 
was sold for only 800 cash.
“*^ ibid., xia/Slh.
‘*^ ibid., xia/65b.
^ Silver dollars, called “yangqiad' or "fanyiri" (foreign silver), were 
brought to Suzhou and Hangzhou by inland merchants in the late 1770s, 
but to what extent the silver was used as means of exchange remains in 
doubt. (See Zheng G\x3.ngzM, Xingshi yibanlu [1845; reproduction of the 
1852 edition by Hangzhou: Hangzhou Guji Chubanshe, 1982], 44a.) 
Silver coins appeared in Xiaoshan around the same time, but for many 
years, as Wang Huizu noted, they were used only as marriage gifts. It 
was not until the last decade of the century, when more silver coins 
appeared, that local people preferred them to silver bullion as money to 




In 1799, a silver dollar bought only 840-845 cash. 
Although in 1800 the rate increased slightly to 870-880 cash in the 
first half of the year, it dropped again to 760-770 cash in the last 
month. In 1801 and 1802, the rate dropped as far down as 650 and 
650-660 cash respectively.'’^
Two main points can be drawn from investigation of 
Xiaoshan prices. First, the debasement of copper cash, which may 
have started in coastal China in the 1770s, or even earlier, became 
serious between 1792 and 1796. Second, beginning in 1797, the 
value of copper cash began to rise. In 1800, as shown in Table 3.3, 
the retail price for a kuping tael was 1,000 copper cash, marking a 
return to the same level as in 1786. The fluctuating conversion rate, 
as discussed earlier, was caused in part by the over-supply of 
illegal debased cash. As we shall see, the instability of imported 
silver also contributed to the fluctuation.
Silver Imports In The Napoleonic Wars
By the early fifteenth century, silver was so dominant a medium of 
exchange in China that we can speak of a “silver economy.” In 
1433, the Governor of South Zhili, Zhou Chen, commuted the 
land tax in the heavily taxed prefectures of Suzhou, Changzhou, 
and Zhenjiang to payments in silver. In 1436, officials in Beijing 
converted stipends for military officers to payment in silver. In the 
same year the land taxes for the wealthiest southern provinces, 
including South Zhili, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang, were 
commuted to silver. Besides tax payment, merchants began to use 
silver as the major medium of exchange in inter-regional trade. By 
the 1430s paper currency, which had circulated widely in the 
Yuan and early Ming, quickly fell into disuse. Though copper 
cash continued to serve for small exchanges in local markets, 
China had transited to a silver economy.'’^
The heavy demand for silver increased its price in China, 
and brought a massive influx of the metal from Japan and the New 
Continent. In the sixteenth century, China began to import silver 
from Japan, following Japanese exploitation of their own rich
ibid, xia/79a; Wang, Menghen luyu, 5a-69b. 
Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, pp. 75-6.
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silver mines/^ Chinese junks laden with silk flocked to Japanese 
ports, especially Nagasaki, to trade for silver. The trade reached 
its zenith in the early seventeenth century. Kobata Atsushi has 
estimated that the annual amount of Japanese silver taken to China 
was 200,000 kg. Seiichi Iwao’s estimate is only a little less, at 
130,000-160,000 kg^*
The Sino-Japanese trade was dealt a fatal blow in the 
early Qing; in 1661 the court banned settlement on the coast to 
isolate Ming loyalists occupying the island of Taiwan, causing a 
severe shortage of silver from Japan. This policy of coastal 
evacuation, as shown in the study by Mio Kishimoto, brought a 
sharp rise in silver prices along with a general slump in 
commodity prices. Farmers were particularly hard hit as the land 
tax, paid in silver, had to be met from the sale of their crops.'*’ In 
1684, following Qing seizure of Taiwan, the government finally 
repealed the maritime ban, but the silver trade between China and
'*’ The sharp rise in Japanese silver production was partly due to the 
gradual unification of the country by military leaders such as Oda Nobu- 
naga (1534-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), and Tokugawa 
leyasu (1542-1616); the latter two were particularly sensitive to the 
economic and political benefits of bullion mining. Perhaps even more 
important than the move toward political unification were the 
technological improvements in smelting and refining, introduced from 
abroad in the sixteenth century. See William Atwell, “Ming China and 
the emerging world economy, c. 1470-1650,” in Denis Twitchett and 
Frederick W. Mote, ed.. The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8, The 
Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 396-8; Robert LeRoy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japanese 
Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (Ph.D.diss., University of 
Michigan, 1980), pp. 23-4.
Atsushi Kobata, “The production and uses of gold and silver in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Japan,” Economic History Review, 
2”‘‘ series, 18, no. 2 (1965): 245-66; Seiichi Iwao, “Japanese foreign 
trade in the 16* and 17* centuries,” Acta Asiatica 30 (1976): 8-10.
'*’ See Nakayama Mio, “Shindai zenki Konan no beika doko”; Mio 
Nakayama, “On the fluctuation of the price of rice in the Chiang-nan 
region during the first half of the Ch’ing period, 1644-1795,” Memoirs 
of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo 37 (1979): 55-90; 
and Mio Kishimoto-Nakayama, “The Kangxi Depression and early Qing 
local markets,” Modem China 10, no. 2 (Apr 1984): 227-56.
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Japan never quite recovered due to the depletion of Japanese silver 
mines.^®
The loss of Japanese silver did not have much effect on 
the Chinese economy, which increasingly depended on silver 
from Central and South America. In 1571, the Spanish had 
colonized the Philippines and made Manila their major port for the 
Sino-Spanish trade. Every year Spanish galleons laden with New 
World silver sailed across the Pacific to Manila. Spanish 
merchants in Manila used silver to pay for silk and porcelain, 
transported from China by Fujian merchants.^' The Manila trade 
was set back in 1639-40 when the Chinese population in Manila 
was massacred, but it revived, and throughout the eighteenth 
century, according to Chuan Han-sheng, China was able to import 
a considerable amount of American silver through the Manila 
trade.^^ What changed the silver trade was China's tea trade.
Atsushi Kobata, an authority on the mining industry in pre-modem 
Japan, noted that the output of silver declined after the mid-seventeenth 
century. See Kobata, “The production and uses of gold and silver in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Japan,” p. 245.
Liang Fangzhong, “Mingdai guoji maoyi yu yin de shuchum,” 
Zhongguo shehui jingjishi jikan 6, no. 2 (Dec., 1939); repr. in Liang 
Fangzhong, Liang Fangzhong jingjishi lunwenji (Beijing: Xinhua shuju, 
1989), pp. 172-3.
In 1639, the economic situation in Manila became desperate. When 
the local government imposed new levies and taxes to make up for its 
operating shortfall, tensions between the Spanish and Chinese exploded 
into open hostility. Between November 20, 1639, and March 15, 1640, 
the better-armed Spanish killed more than 20,000 Chinese throughout 
the Philippines. As may be imagined, the massacre mined the Chinese 
commercial environment in Manila, sharply reducing the flow of silver 
from Manila to China. See William S. Atwell, “Notes on silver, foreign 
trade, and the late Ming economy,” Ch ’ing shih wen-t’i 3, no. 8 (Dec 
1973): 10-3.
Chuan indicates that the annual amount of Spanish silver shipped via 
Manila to China was normally 2-3 million pesos, though it sometimes 
reached 4 million pesos in the eighteenth century. At the equivalence of 
1 peso to 0.26 kg of silver in the eighteenth century, China imported 
between 520,000 and 780,000 kg of silver in a normal year, and 
sometimes as much as 1,040,000 kg. See Chuan Han-sheng, 
“Ming-Qing jian Meizhou baiyin de shum Zhongguo,” 1969; repr.
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In the late seventeenth eentury, tea drinking beeame a 
widespread habit across Europe, and the major tea-drinking city 
was London. K. N. Chaudhuri noted that the spread of 
tea-drinking ran parallel with the greater availability of sugar 
(from West Indian plantations) and the decline in its cost. For 
people in lower income groups, tea was appealing not only for its 
taste and energizing properties, but as a means of taking sugar.^'* 
The tea trade grew astonishingly in the eighteenth century. 
At first European trading companies paid little attention to this 
new product, buying it in small amounts from private traders. The 
Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
or VOC in Dutch, literally "United East Indies Company") 
obtained tea from Chinese junks in Batavia, while the British East 
India Company acquired its tea from individual ships in India 
returning from China. Later, when these trading companies 
became aware of the enormous potential of tea sales in Europe, 
they went directly to China for their tea. Their ships, laden with 
silver in ingots or coins, came to Guangzhou, the legal port for the 
export trade, to buy tea. Chaudhuri, using records from the British 
East India Company, has shown a five-fold growth in tea imports 
to England, from 8.9 million lb in the 1720s to 37.3 million lb in 
the 1750s. The price the company paid, mainly in silver, was high 
and still rising, from £611,000 (or 69,000 kg of silver^^) in the 
decade between 1721-30 to £1,693,000 (or 192,000 kg of silver) 
in the decade from 1751-60. And these enormous amounts of tea 
do not include tea smuggled into England to evade high duties, or 
the tea consumed in other European countries.^* The influx of 
silver so lowered its value in China that by 1763, Japan, the silver 
exporter for China for two centuries, began to import silver from 
China. Between 1763 and 1782, Japan absorbed a total of 6,374
Chuan Han-sheng, Zhongguo Jingjishi luncong, 1972, vol. 1, P- 439.
K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East 
India Company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), p. 385.
One pound sterling was equal to 0.1134 kg of silver; see the “Table of 
Currencies.”




kanme (or 24,000 kg^’) of silver from China.^* The amount was 
small, but carried great historical significance, showing that by the 
mid-eighteenth century, because of the flourishing tea trade, the 
price of silver in China was lower than in Japan.
As England imported more tea than any other country, it 
was natural that China relied on the British East India Company to 
import silver. This reliance became even more pronounced after 
the British Parliament passed the Commutation Act in 1784. 
Before the act, the high British tea duty had encouraged other 
European companies to smuggle tea into England. No one was 
sure of the true extent of tea smuggling, but illicit tea seized by 
customs officers and sensational stories by reformed smugglers 
convinced everyone that the problem of tea running was out of 
control.^® As a measure against it, the British Parliament passed 
the Commutation Act which reduced the customs duty on tea from 
119 to 12.5 per cent.“ The act not only stimulated tea exporting 
from China, it made smuggling less profitable, thus concentrating 
the tea trade in the hands of the British East India Company. H. B. 
Morse showed how the company benefited from the act from the 
following figures. Between 1776 and 1780 the total amount of tea 
exported to Europe from Guangzhou was 698,000 shi, with the 
British East India Company exporting 210,000 shi of it, or less 
than one third. After the Commutation Act, from between 1786 to
The conversion rate is 1 kanme to 3.76 kg of silver, as suggested in 
Brian Moloughney and Xia Weizhong, “Silver and the fall of the Ming: 
a reassessment,” Papers on Far Eastern History 40 (September 1989): 
78.
Yamawaki Teijiro, Nagasaki no tdjin bdeki (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
kobunkan, 1964), p. 215.
Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India 
Company, pp. 385, 392.
The Commutation Act was passed by the House of Commons on 
August 16, 1784; from August 1, 1785, all the existing duties, imposts, 
subsidies, and surtaxes were repealed, replaced by a simple duty of 12.5 
per cent on all tea sold at the company’s sales. See Earl H. Pritchard, The 
Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750-1800 (Pullman, 
Washington, 1936), p. 146; and H. B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East 
India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834 (1926-29; repr. Taibei: 
Chengwen, 1966), vol. 2, p. 116.
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1790, the total export from Guangzhou was 1,096,000 shi, and the 
British East India Company had bought 774,000 shi, or over half 
of it.^’ From that point on, disruption in China’s economy was 
certain if the company had any difficulty acquiring silver. What 
would soon prevent the British East India Company from 
obtaining European silver was war with France.
During the Napoleonic Wars British merchants still put to 
sea and sailed for China; according to H. B. Morse the British East 
India Company sent 11 ships to Canton in 1791, 16 in 1792, 18 in 
1793, 21 in 1794, 16 in 1795, 23 in 1796, 18 in 1797, 16 in 1798 
and 15 in 1799.*^ But not even British naval superiority allowed 
the company to buy enough European silver to sustain the China 
trade. As shown in Table 3.4, in 1791 and 1792, the company 
could still ship 6,532 kg and 19,596 kg of silver respectively to 
Guangzhou. But when war with France broke out in 1793, for 
three years company ships could not bring a single kilogram of 
silver to China.^^ The transport of silver resumed in 1796, but the 
quantity was very small, only 4,572 kg. In 1797, the amount of 
silver imported rose, but only to 26,684 kg. It was not until 1798, 
with the war nearly over, that normal shipments of silver from 
London resumed. That year, the company shipped 49,971 kg of 
silver to Guangzhou.
The scarcity of silver caused the British East India 
Company serious difficulties in its China trade. On March 11, 
1793, the company’s Canton treasury still held 1,138,338 taels (or 
43,029 kg) of silver.^ By June 1796 the loss of imported silver 
had reduced the amount to just 13,081 taels (or 494 kg). With such 
a small amount of capital in hand, the British East India Company 
had extreme difficulty continuing its trade. Although some credit 
had been used in the trade, specie still played an important role in 
transactions. When purchasing tea the company had to pay part of 
the price in silver, and customs duties and fees had to be paid in 
silver. In December 1796, because of the severe silver shortage, 
the Committee, the branch of the British East India Company at
ibid., p. 117.
“ ibid., pp. 119-347.
“ ibid., pp. 184, 193, 205, 256, 266, 278,294, 310 and 322. 
^ ibid., p. 205.
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Canton, urged the London office to dispatch “an ample remittance 
of bullion” with all speed. To buy Chinese goods the Committee 
even turned to barter. On February 8, 1797, the Committee 
decided to use tin and lead in lieu of silver; later that month a 
Chinese merchant was actually paid in tin and lead for his raw silk 
and Nankeens.^^ Because of the war the silver taken to China 
shrank to a trickle, making trade between Chinese and British 
merchants difficult to sustain.
The decline in imported silver also must have caused the 
price of silver in China to soar, which would be reflected in the 
silver-to-cash exchange rate, as was detected in Xiaoshan, 
Zhejiang. It also would have led to a fall in commodity prices in 
terms of silver. In this light the decline in Suzhou grain prices in 
the final decade of the eighteenth century is not a reporting error, 
but a reflection of the fluctuating value of silver. It was part of the 
price trend of the eighteenth century and should be taken into 
consideration in any description of long-term inflation.
Conclusion
The eighteenth century was a golden age in China’s market 
development. Although the silk trade between China and Japan, 
which flourished from the mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth 
centuries, had declined, the Chinese found a new product in tea 
with which to maintain commercial links with the world. Through 
the tea export, China obtained vast quantities of silver from 
European countries, especially Britain. The volume of silver taken 
to China increased hand in hand with the expansion of the 
international tea trade, especially just after the Commutation Act 
of 1784 and before the onset of the Napoleonic Wars. Chuan 
Han-sheng has suggested that increases in silver inflow justified 
the theory of inflated commodity prices quoted in silver. It is 
possible that prices escalated even faster from the 1750s to the 
1780s because of the immense expansion of the tea trade.
As China became more deeply enmeshed in the world 
economy, its own economy became more sensitive to the financial 
ups and downs of its trading partners. As a result, from 1793, 




Company had little silver to send to China, Chinese commodity 
prices quoted in silver fell sharply.
At the same time it should be noted that the Suzhou grain 
prices cited by Yeh-chien Wang fell not for 1793 but for 1788, 
when phenomenal amounts of silver were still coming into China. 
Therefore there must have been other reasons for the sharp 
downturn, even if low prices in later years were sustained by the 
declining silver import. These other reasons are to be found in 




Market Integration And 
Over-Production In The Yangzi
Grain prices are not merely a matter of fluctuations in the value of 
money. They also are affected by the relationship between supply 
and demand, in whieh demographic changes and agrieultural 
produetion are essential issues.
Many eighteenth-eentury Chinese bureaucrats had the 
impression that the population was growing. In 1748, for example, 
when the Qianlong emperor ordered all provincial governors to 
submit individual reports on why grain priees were esealating 
under his rule, the officials unanimously reported that the priee 
increase was eaused by population growth, which was itself a 
result of the enduring peaee and prosperity.'
Unlike most officials, Hong Liangji saw population 
growth as a menace to social stability. When a Junior Compiler 
(Bianxiu) in the Hanlin Aeademy at Beijing, Hong was sent to 
inspeet sehools in Guizhou province in 1792. During his short 
visit there, he wrote some essays on national affairs, and in one of 
them addressed the harm of a eontinuing imbalanee between 
population size and agricultural production. Hong warned that the 
total amount of farmland in the empire had expanded five-fold in 
the past hundred years, but the population growth had been 
twenty-fold, and he suggested the eourt begin to consider how to 
save the empire from a possible rebellion, resulting from a rise in 
grain prices and a deeline in wages. Hong did not, however, 
provide data to support his hypothesis.^
' See Chuan, “Qianlong shisannian de migui wenti,” pp. 547-66; Cheung 
Sui-wai, “Qingdai de miliang shichang guannian,” Xinya shuyuan lishi 
xuexixikan, vol. 8 (1990): 35.
^ Hong Liangji wrote the essay on population in 1793, which was later 
compiled in his “Juanshige wen jiaji” (n.d.; in Sibu beiyao: jibu, vol. 549 
[Taibei: Zhonghua shuju, 1981], repr. from Hong Liangji, Beijiangyishu, 
n.d.), 6b-8b.
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The hypothesis of a food crisis in China due to 
overpopulation, though unsupported by evidence, seemed to have 
been widely accepted among contemporary Europeans. In 1798, 
renowned classical economist Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) 
published in London his influential study. An Essay on the 
Principle of Population. Malthus had never traveled to China, nor 
does he seem to have studied China's economy in any serious way. 
Nevertheless, in this study he asserted that almost all the land in 
China had already come under tillage, and therefore the country 
was unable to support any extra population. In this light he wrote:
[It] appears . . . that the redundant population, 
necessarily occasioned by the prevalence of early 
marriages, must be repressed by occasional famines, 
and by the custom of exposing children, which, in 
times of distress, is probably more frequent than is 
ever acknowledged to Europeans.^
In 1959 Ping-ti Ho popularized the idea of a Malthusian 
Crisis and applied it to political changes in modem Chinese 
history. Following Malthus, Ho stressed that traditional Chinese 
culture lacked rational methods of birth control. Ho believed that 
the optimum population size in the Qing, as corresponding to 
agricultural output, was reached between 1750 and 1775; and 
indeed, during the last quarter of the century, some 
contemporaries like Hong Liangji were alarmed by the lowered 
standard of living. The population continued to grow 
exponentially until the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), which 
caused the deaths of more than 30 million people along the 
Yangzi valley, checked the excessive population growth. To 
support this theory. Ho provided Qing government data from 
government documents and local gazetteers. He showed that 
China’s population increased dramatically, from 143 million to 
295 million, between 1741 and 1800, and to a high of 429 million 
in 1850, on the eve of the Taiping Rebellion."' But Ho failed to 
show how the rebellion demonstrated that the population was
^ Thomas Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (1798; repr.
New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1976, 2004), pp. 31-2.
Ho, Studies on the Population of China.
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excessive, or link it clearly to the millions of deaths caused by the 
Taiping uprising.
With the population data provided by Ho, the idea of 
over-population became more popular in the writings of modem 
scholars. Dwight Perkins subscribed to this view, although he 
emphasized agricultural development in peripheral regions as the 
major contributing factor, pointing out that China had begun to 
mn out of cultivable land by the nineteenth century. Perkins 
stressed that only the Taiping Rebellion kept the rising population 
from outstripping China’s food supply.^ Similarly, Mark Elvin's 
discussion of the failure of industrialization in China focused on 
population. Elvin argued that the abundance of cheap labor made 
the invention of labor-saving machinery unnecessary. For these 
reasons the Yangzi delta fell into a “high-level equilibrium trap” 
that delayed China's industrialization.*  Philip C. C. Huang argued 
that population growth forged the structure of pre-liberation 
society, diminishing the marginal returns in agriculture, and 
shrinking productivity and income. This process, which Huang 
called “involution,” had a harmful effect on agricultural workers. 
They could not support their households on their wages; most of 
them clung to a small farm, whose produce was indispensable for 
subsistence, while also taking employment as proletarian workers. 
In this economy, increased numbers of people were tied both to 
family farming and to wage labor, unlike European proletarians 
who were completely severed from family farming. It was this 
combination of long-term semi-proletarianization with short-term 
natural or man-made calamities that made the condition of poor 
peasants in China so desperate.’
But while the theory of excessive population growth has 
become a useful tool to explain many social and economic 
changes in modem and contemporary Chinese history, recent 
studies have raised doubt over whether the actual population 
growth constituted a crisis. Bozhong Li conducted a quantitative
^ Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 26-9, 184-6.
* Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, pp. 298-315.
’ Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China, pp. 
293-9; idem. The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi 
Delta, 1350-1988 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1990), p. 12.
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study on the population increase and agricultural production in the 
Yangzi delta, or the Jiangnan region, and found that the theory of 
a population crisis was actually a romantic image that scholars 
should avoid. Li argued that the Jiangnan population actually 
grew quite slowly - at only about 0.3 per cent a year - between 20 
million in 1620 and 36 million in 1850. He stressed that the low 
growth rate was not a result of the so-called Malthusian checks 
that included wars, natural disasters, and epidemic diseases, but of 
demographic behavior. The Jiangnan people employed a wide 
range of birth control methods, including contraception, delayed 
marriage, abortion, infanticide, and sterilization.* * Would food be 
a problem with the mild annual increment of 0.3 per cent, albeit an 
increment added to an already large population? Li argued that 
Jiangnan’s agriculture developed along with this demographic 
change: first, there was an increase in the rational use of available 
agricultural resources like cultivated land, water, human labor, 
and animal labor; second, there was a rise in production, that is, in 
increasing the labor and capital invested in a given area of 
cultivated land to provide a larger yield.^ In sum, the theory of 
over-population has been exaggerated, at least in the populous 
Yangzi delta.
Echoing Li’s study, James Lee and Wang Feng disagreed 
with the Malthusian perception applied by Ping-ti Ho to the 
traditional Chinese, which held that they did nothing to control 
their population in a rational manner. On the basis of Chinese 
genealogies and household registers, Lee and Feng argued that 
Chinese marital fertility was signifieantly lower than European 
marital fertility. The low fertility was an outcome of three 
demographic mechanisms: late-starting childbearing, early- 
stopping childbearing, and long birth intervals. The theory of 
over-population in eighteenth-century China was a myth, an 
inaccurate reflection of the realities.'®
* According to Li, the cotton oil consumed by many poor people in 
Jiangnan contained a modest amount of gossypol, which has a strong 
contraceptive function. See Li, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, p. 
20.
’ ibid., pp. 3-38.
'® See James Z. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: 
Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700-2000 (Cambridge,
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Building on these recent studies, Kenneth Pomeranz has 
abandoned the theory of population pressure to explain the slow 
development of China's industrialization. Instead, he argues that 
the Yangzi delta did reach a stage of proto-industrialization in the 
early Qing, but its industrial development was disrupted by the 
depletion of timber. In order to sustain its industrial growth, the 
Yangzi delta had for a long period imported food, timber, and 
bean cakes from the middle Yangzi (Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, and 
Sichuan provinces) and Shandong. During the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, however, as many of these peripheral regions 
themselves developed industrially, such supplies ceased. Under 
these circumstances, the delta could not make the transition from 
proto-industrialization to industrialization, and, in the nineteenth 
century, the nine macro economic regions suggested by G. 
William Skinner appeared in China instead of a grand integrated 
economy. Taking Hunan as an example, Pomeranz showed that 
the province had long exported food to the Yangzi delta in return 
for industrial goods. But in the late eighteenth century, the Hunan 
hillsides were developed for agriculture, and farmers there began 
to grow peanuts, tea, and various oilseed crops. In their desire to 
trade for these crops, the lowland population began to sell their 
rice to the highlanders, reducing the amount of rice they exported 
to the Yangzi delta." But Pomeranz does not take into account the 
rice that was still widely grown in the delta.
In this chapter, I shall show that the long-distance riee 
trade actually shrank in the late eighteenth century, demonstrating 
that it was not population pressure that drove the price trend, 
though I am not opposed to the idea of rapid population growth at 
this time. What I do not accept is Pomeranz’s suggestion that the 
phenomenon was a consequence of Hunan’s industrial 
development. Instead, I shall emphasize the results of the harvest, 
especially those in the Yangzi delta, as the major factor in the 
grain market.
When dealing with the question of rice sufficiency, I shall 
avoid basing judgments on estimates of rice production divided 
by population size. This methodology, applied by many
Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
pp. 83-92.
" Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, pp. 13,22, 215,225-6,228, 246-8.
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population studies, does not show changes in rice demand as it 
ignores two basic facts. In the first place, rice was never the single 
food choice, even in central and southern China. People could eat 
cheaper food, like sweet potatoes, in times of food shortage. In 
other words, the demand for rice changed from time to time 
depending on the market conditions. In the second place, if the 
region under study was not a single market, there was not 
necessarily a correlation between the supply of food and its 
demand. In this light, I shall begin by discussing the meaning of 
rice consumption in the Yangzi delta, and then outline the extent 
of the rice market, with Suzhou as the centre.
The Choice Of A Staple Food
In the Ming and Qing, rice was not a staple food for the poor. In 
the sixteenth century, according to the scholar Tian Yiheng (fl. 
1570), poor families in the delta consumed wheat, barley, 
buckwheat, soybean, black bean, broad bean, and millet, instead 
of rice. Eighteenth-century writers also observed that only 
better-off families ate rice as a staple. In 1738, the Shandong 
Governor suggested that famine-stricken Jiangsu buy millet and 
beans from his province; Nasutu, the Governor-general of 
Liang-jiang, declined the suggestion and replied: “The people in 
Jiangnan are used to eating rice, they do not eat coarse food 
{zaliang).”'^ In a memorial sent a month later, Nasutu added that 
Shandong millet and beans could be sold only in northern Jiangsu, 
a poor region, because the eating habits of that region were similar 
to those in Shandong.Nasutu’s tone in these two memorials 
reflected a rather snobbish pride in the wealthier lifestyle of 
southern Jiangsu, as indicated by its people’s daily rice 
consumption.
Consumption habits are important in determining the 
amount of rice traded in the Ming-Qing period. When Chuan and 
Kraus reckoned that Taicang faced a grain deficit because much 
of its land was given to cotton, that was only half the story.The
’^Tian Yiheng, Liu qing riza, (1573; repr. Jiangsu: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1992), p. 482.
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 54, pp. 2351-4 (QL 3.9.21). 
ibid., pp. 2423-30 (QL 3.10.12).
Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch ’ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 64-5.
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other half, implied in Nasutu’s memorial above, was that people 
in the Yangzi delta eash-eropping areas were generally rich and 
therefore ate rice instead of coarser foods. Abe Takeo made this 
point tersely in his study on the grain supply in the Qing, noting 
that when we consider the common desire to eat higher quality 
food, the supply of rice, which was a status food, was really not 
enough.'^
Furthermore, certain varieties of rice were considered 
higher quality than others. According to Shen Chiran (1745-1816), 
a Hangzhou scholar, people in the wealthiest prefectures of the 
Lake Tai basin, including Hangzhou, Jiazhou, Huzhou of 
Zhejiang, and Suzhou of Jiangsu, considered the rice grown in the 
middle Yangzi, known as xian, not just inferior but inedible. They 
ate only local rice, or geng, which cost more but was better in taste 
and texture. In order to have local rice all year round, people in 
these prefectures removed its husk, stored it in ceramic urns, and 
buried the urns in the twelfth lunar month. The rice preserved in 
this way was called “rice hulled in the winter” {dongchongmi)}^ 
This account indicates that choices based on price and quality 
must be considered in any discussion of trade patterns, just as 
urbanization and cropping are.
Shen’s account allows us to depict the long-distance rice 
trade on the Yangzi in the eighteenth century. The rice grown in 
the delta was superior to that grown in other parts of the Yangzi 
valley. The local people considered it particularly tasty, but it was 
so expensive that only the wealthy could afford it. Ordinary 
people ate the xian grown in the middle Yangzi valley. Many rich 
people in the Yangzi delta regarded xian as inedible, but its retail 
price was usually cheaper even after long-distance transport. It is 
reasonable to assume that the size of the long-distance market 
depended on the price difference between geng and xian. When
Abe, “Beikoku jukyu no kenkyu”, p. 493.
Shen Chiran, Hanye congtan (xu dated 1808; comp, in Youmanlou 
congshu, n.p., 1924; repr. Jiangsu: Guangling guji keyinshe, 1986),
3/15a. That the local geng cost more than xian is also shown by 
Norimatsu Akifumi. According to his statistics, the retail price of xian, 
using Suzhou as an example, was usually 0.3 to 0.4 tael of silver per shi 
cheaper than the local geng. See Norimatsu, “Yozeiki ni okeru beikiku 
ryutsu to beika hendo,” pp. 158-62.
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the price difference was large, the long-distance trade on the 
Yangzi was prosperous; when it was small, the trade shrank.
Suzhou As The Central Rice Market
Yeh-chien Wang observed that the five macro-regions in central 
and southern China—consisting of the lower Yangzi (or the delta), 
the middle Yangzi (inclusive of Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, and 
Sichuan Provinces), the Lianghuai region (northern and southern 
territories of the lower Huai River), Fujian Province, and 
Guangdong Province—were integrated into a single rice market, 
with Suzhou prefecture as its centre.'*
The city of Suzhou is almost as old as Rome, but 
low-lying plains and marshy lowlands made up the bulk of the 
prefecture in the first millennium. Only in the twelfth century did 
official initiative and local entrepreneurship transform the 
landscape into rich agricultural land, giving rise to the adage: 
“When Suzhou and Huzhou ripen, the empire has enough.” 
According to Shiba Yoshinobu, agricultural development in 
Suzhou corresponded to political development in the Song. In 
1127, when Jurchen conquest of north China forced the Song 
court to move south to Hangzhou, the court secured the Huai 
River as its foremost northern border in the east, but regarded the 
Yangzi River as its second northern frontier. The three biggest 
military garrisons along the Yangzi at that time were E‘zhou, 
Jiankang (Nanjing in the Ming and Qing), and Hangzhou. Since 
the grain tax was insufficient to feed soldiers in these garrisons, 
the Song government had to buy riee on the market. Hangzhou, 
the Southern Song capital, imported rice from neighboring 
prefectures, especially Suzhou, Xiuzhou, and Huzhou.^"
The grain trade on the Yangzi began to decline in the 
latter half of the thirteenth century, when military skirmishes in 
the middle and lower Yangzi Valley disrupted the flow of traffic. 
Then in 1276 Hangzhou fell to Mongol invaders, and the resulting
Wang, “Food supply and grain prices in the Yangzi delta in the 
eighteenth century,” pp. 445-6
Michael Marme, Suzhou: Where the Goods of All the Provinces 
Converge (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 2.
Shiba Yoshinobu, Sodai keizaishi no kenkyu (Tokyo: Kazama Shobo, 
1968), pp. 154-67.
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decline in Hangzhou's urban population reduced its need for 
long-distance grain. Under the Yuan, the new capital was 
established at Beijing, far from the Yangzi; other than the grain 
tribute, the grain trade between the two regions was minimal.
Beginning in the late sixteenth century, as Kawakatsu 
Mamoru has pointed out, the grain trade revived and flourished on 
the Yangzi. As a result of commercial development, the Yangzi 
delta now suffered a chronic shortage of local grain and needed to 
import much grain from upstream. This long-distance grain 
market expanded to include rice from Jiangxi, Hunan, and 
Hubei.The central rice market now became Suzhou. Unlike 
Southern Song Hangzhou or early Ming Nanjing, Suzhou was not 
a political capital but a commercial emporium; a place of silk and 
tea. Importing grain from upstream on the Yangzi, and raw cotton 
from North China via the canal, Suzhou exported finished goods 
and luxury products in all directions, particularly to Beijing and 
other cities. Merchants from its neighboring prefecture, Huizhou, 
were well positioned to tap into this rising economy. They 
sojourned in large numbers in Suzhou, buying silk along the 
Yangzi River and the Grand Canal. They also were involved 
directly with overseas commerce.^^
Although Yeh-chien Wang asserted that with Suzhou as 
its centre, the five macro-regions in central and southern China 
were integrated into a single rice market, he did notice that 
Guangdong was less integrated in the Yangzi rice market. He 
showed that the correlation coefficient of rice prices was 0.7 
between Suzhou and each of the prefectures of Hangzhou, 
Quanzhou, Hanyang, and Huaian, but only 0.4 between Suzhou 
and Guangdong. (See Map 4.)^^ This phenomenon fits Chen 
Chunsheng’s observation that the Lingnan region (of Guangdong 
Province and Guangxi Province) formed another integrated rice 
market in the eighteenth century. Chen argued that with the city of 
Guangzhou as its distribution centre, Guangdong imported rice 
from Fujian, Jiangxi, and Hunan, but most of all from Guangxi,
Kawakatsu Mamoru, Min Shin Konan ndgyo keizaishi kenkyii (Tokyo: 
Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1992), pp. 206-19.
^^Marme, Suzhou, pp. 38-9, 147 and 197.
Wang, “Food supply and grain prices in the Yangzi delta in the 
eighteenth century,” Table 6 (p. 450).
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via the West River (or Xi River). Chen estimated that trade on the 
West River reached 3 million shi of husked rice annually.
If that is true, then the rice trade probably was organized 
in two large macro-regional, integrated markets, both taking 
shape in the eighteenth century, with Suzhou and Guangzhou as 
their hubs.
Located midway between Suzhou and Guangzhou, 
Quanzhou in Fujian could import rice from both markets. Wang 
argued that Quanzhou imported rice mainly from Taiwan. He did 
not estimate the volume of the rice trade between Guangdong and 
Quanzhou, but indicated that Quanzhou and its nearby prefecture, 
Zhangzhou, annually imported 1 million shi of husked rice from 
Taiwan, but only between 200,000 to 700,000 shi from Suzhou.^^ 
These figures imply that between the two large macro-regional 
rice markets, there was a third integrated rice market which 
encompassed Zhangzhou-Quanzhou and Taiwan; but judging 
from the trade amounts, this market, with its centre at 
Zhangzhou-Quanzhou, was relatively small.
Compared to Guangxi and Guangdong, the rice trade in 
the Yangzi valley, at about 10 million shi annually, was much 
larger. According to Chuan and Kraus, this huge amount of rice 
was first transported to Suzhou, and then redistributed to other 
rice-deficit prefectures within Jiangsu province, as well as to the 
two neighboring coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian.^^ Rice 
shipped downriver to Suzhou eame from as far west as Chongqing, 
with Hankou town in Hanyang prefecture as the most important 
distribution centre on the route. Every autumn, merchants from 
the Yangzi delta came to Hankou to buy rice from local brokers, 
who had gotten it from rice-growing regions in Hubei, Hunan, and 
even Sichuan.^’ The merchants shipped this rice down the Yangzi
Chen Chunsheng, Shichangjizhi yu shehui bianqian: shiba shiji 
Guangdong mijia fenxi (Guangdong: Zhongshan daxue, 1992), pp. 45-6.
Yeh-chien Wang, “The food supply in eighteenth-century Fukien,” 
Late Imperial China 1, no. 2 (Dec., 1986): 90-5.
Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch 'ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 60-3.
Hunan Governor Zhao Shenqiao wrote in 1709 that rice merchants 
from Jiangsu and Zhejiang came to Hankou because the Hunan rice 
exported to these provinces came through Hankou. This and other 
official documents by Zhao Shenqiao were later compiled in the Zhao
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River to the town of Fengqiao, 7 li (4 kilometers) west of Suzhou 
eity.
A 1743 memorial by the Suzhou Governor Chen Dashou 
noted Fengqiao’s importanee:
I humbly observe that Suzhou, as the centre of all 
directions, relies on sojourning merchants for more 
than half of the rice it consumes... For this reason, 
along the riverbanks of the Fengqiao town, [the tasks 
of] unloading rice from junks and putting it into 
warehouses (zhan) are conducted every day.^*
Chen depicted a busy scene on the riverbanks, where 
traveling merchants sought local buyers or transported rice to 
other regions. The cities of the Yangzi delta in Jiangsu, no doubt, 
were among the most important buyers, but substantial amounts 
of rice were sent to Zhejiang and Fujian as well.
The Rice Trade Between Suzhou And Zhejiang 
Although Zhejiang province is bordered by the three Yangzi 
provinces of Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu, it only obtained grain 
from Jiangsu. Transport between Jiangxi and Zhejiang would 
have been over mountain trails.^^ Between Zhejiang and Anhui 
rivers provided transport, but led to wealthy and rice-deficient 
Huizhou, which had to be supplied via Zhejiang. (See Map 5).^“
Gongyigong zizhi guanshu (n.d.; repr. 1850), 6/75a-77b. In 1755, the 
Governor-general of Hunan and Hubei also remarked that Hankou was 
the major market for rice from Hunan and Sichuan. See Lufu zouzhe, 
microfilm, reel no. 50, pp. 1291-2 (QL 20.12.17). Other memorials 
which show Hankou as an important rice market in the middle Yangzi 
include Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 56, pp. 1727-30 (QL 14.2.28), 
reel no. 56, pp. 2877-9 (QL 22.2.26).
^^Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 49, p. 2039 (QL 8.3.3).
The trails were all about 70 to 80 li (39-45 kilometers) long. See Lufu 
zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, pp. 2092-3 (QL 27.11.16).
According to a memorial by a Censor in 1730, rivers linked Anhui to 
Jiangxi and Zhejiang. Anhui imported rice from these two provinces. 
See GZD-YZ, vol. 16, p. 57 (YZ 8.3.26).
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Only Jiangsu had the surplus and the transport to sell rice to 
Zhejiang.^’
Jiangsu was linked to Zhejiang by the sea coast and by 
rivers. But to curb piracy it had since the early Qing been 
government policy that, junks on the coast could carry no more 
than 50 shi of rice for their own consumption,^^ so Zhejiang was 
unable to import much rice from Jiangsu by sea. The export ban 
was sometimes lifted in times of famine, as happened in 1751 
after Zhejiang Governor Yonggui made a special request.But 
the coastal prefectures of eastern Zhejiang, such as Shaoxing and 
Ningbo, were not poor, themselves being major trading centres,^'* 
and a 1748 memorial claimed that they still produced their own 
rice, and were usually quite self-sufficient in it.^^ Looking at the 
map, it seems that, should they have needed it, Shaoxing and 
Ningbo could have gotten rice from Fengqiao via Hangzhou by 
canal. In reality, this rarely happened, since the route was long and 
arduous. Even when these prefectures needed rice in famine years, 
they requested temporary permission for sea transport. In the 
drought year of 1751, Zhejiang’s Governor Yonggui sought 
temporary permission for the sea transport of rice,^^ noting that it 
was cheaper to import rice by sea than via the inland waterways.^’
Western Zhejiang imported rice mainly from Fengqiao. 
The rice was sent to western Zhejiang by either the Shao River or 
the Grand Canal, primarily to the three highly commercialized 
prefectures of Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou. During the Ming 
and Qing, their population had grown rich from the production of 
silk, some of which was exported from Guangzhou and some 
woven into cloth at Suzhou.^** Being wealthy, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, 
and Huzhou purchased rice, mostly xian, from Suzhou. Evidence
GZD-YZ, vol. 16, p. 57 (YZ 8.3.26); Gaozongshilu, 215/25a (QL 9.4). 
“ Shengzu shilu, 232/8b-9a (KX 47).
Gaozong shilu, 393/18a-b (QL 16.6).
^'^Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 56, pp. 947-50 (c. QL 13). 
^Ubid.,pp. 1270-6 (QL 13.7).
Gaozong shilu, 393/18a-b (QL 16.6).
GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 661 (QL 16.9.14).
[YongzhengJ Zhupiyuzhi, 41/52a (YZ 6.7.6); Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, 
reel no. 56, pp. 947-50 (c.QL 13); GZD-QL, vol. 30, pp. 492-3 (QL 
33.4.29).
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for the prosperity of this rice trade is provided by the growth of 
secondary rice markets, such as the towns of Pingwang, Nanxun, 
and Chang’an, which lay along the canal south of Fengqiao. Rice 
shipped from Fengqiao to western Zhejiang was first transported 
southward to Pingwang, where a portion was unloaded to sell in 
nearby Jiaxing prefecture. The rest was either transported west to 
Huzhou prefecture via Nanxun or south to Hangzhou prefecture 
via Chang’an.^’
Official memorials show that the quantities of rice 
transported from Fengqiao to western Zhejiang were very large, 
even when the harvest in Zhejiang was good. In a memorial of the 
seventh lunar month of 1751, when Zhejiang suffered from 
drought and poor harvests, Yonggui, the Zhejiang Governor, said 
that even in good harvest years, Zhejiang imported 2 to 3 million 
shi of rice from Fengqiao.'*® In the difficult year of 1751, 239,000 
shi of rice was shipped from Fengqiao to western Zhejiang in a 
single month.'* ‘ In the fourth lunar month of the next year, the 
amount reached 100,000 shi every day.'*^
Thus Suzhou, as the central rice market along the Yangzi, 
provided rice not only for southern Jiangsu, but also for western 
Zhejiang. In contrast, there was no consistent flow of rice from 
Suzhou to Fujian, as I shall show in the following section.
The Rice Trade Between Suzhou And Fujian 
In Fujian province the prefectures of Fuzhou, Zhangzhou, and 
Quanzhou on the coast, and Tingzhou in the interior, suffered 
from chronic rice shortages due to the high population density. 
(See Map 6.) Yeh-chien Wang has estimated that 9 to 10 million 
people lived in the twelve prefectures of Fujian at mid-century, 
with half of them in the above four prefectures.'*^ Besides
Both Liu Shiji and Fan Shuzhi trace the development of these towns in 
the Ming-Qing period. See Liu, Ming-Qing shidai Jiangnan shizhen 
yanjiu, pp. 66-7; and Fan Shuzhi, Ming-Qing Jiangnan shizhen tanwei 
(Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1990), pp. 296-9 (Pingwang town), 
pp. 432-51 (Nanxun town) and pp. 402-4 (Chang‘an town).
'**’ GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 142 (QL 16.7.13).
'" GZD-QL, vol. 2,p. 31 (QL 16.11.23).
'*^ GZD-QL, vol. 2, p. 744 (QL 17.4.22).
“*^ Wang, “The food supply in eighteenth-century Fukien,” pp. 81-7.
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population density, the “desire to eat higher quality food” was 
especially prevalent in those urbanized prefectures, contributing 
to the rice shortage.
It is true that many Fujianese were too poor to eat rice. 
The Acting Jiangsu Governor, Yaerhashan, wrote in 1749: “With 
regard to the sweet potatoes in Fujian province, 60 to 70 per cent 
of the poor people rely on them for food. Each catty costs only 2 to 
3 wen [of copper cash].” In 1751, another Fujian Governor, Pan 
Siju, stated: “The poor families in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou have 
mostly sweet potatoes as their daily staple. Therefore, 60 to 70 per 
cent of [their] hilly land [is used] to grow sweet potatoes.” In 1752, 
Chen Hongmou, who had in that year taken over as governor of 
Fujian, said in his memorial: “Now, sweet potatoes and other 
zaliang are bountifully harvested everywhere. They are cheap and 
filling. Poor people are glad to buy them for their meal.”^‘*
Fuzhou, the provincial capital, on the other hand, and the 
two coastal, commercialized prefectures of Zhangzhou and 
Quanzhou, had a higher living standard than other Fujian 
prefectures, and their people could afford to eat more rice.''^ Still, 
it was difficult for Fujian to import rice from the north through the 
interior. Jiangxi to the northwest, a well-known rice-producing 
province, was separated from Fujian by mountains. There were no 
suitable rivers, not even the Min, which could be used to transport 
grain from Jiangxi through the mountain range to the affluent 
cities of Fujian’s coast. The rice trade between Fujian and the two 
provinces to the north was for this reason limited to very small 
amounts, mostly carried overland by small-scale peddlers.''^
^Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 56, pp. 1809-15 (QL 14.4.25); 
GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 743 (QL 16.9.21); GZD-QL, vol. 4, p. 182 (QL 
17.10.28). Yeh-chien Wang also observed the widespread consumption 
of sweet potato in Fujian; see his “The food supply in eighteenth-century 
Fukien,” p. 89.
Tingzhou was a mountainous prefecture in westernmost Fujian. 
Although Yeh-chien Wang suggested that it had rice shortages, 
information on its rice trade is rare, suggesting that such trade was 
insignificant.
GZD-YZ, vol. 7, p. 446 (YZ 5.2.10), vol. 7, p. 907 (YZ 19.4.6); vol. 14, 
p. 200 (YZ 21.4.16), vol. 14, p. 205 (YZ 21.4.16).
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Furthermore, despite being a coastal province, the ban on 
maritime trade meant Fujian could not import much rice from 
Zhejiang or Jiangsu by sea; illegal rice transport between Fujian 
and the northern provinces was minimal due to the difficulties of 
navigation. Before the advent of the steamship, sea traffic was 
dependent on the prevailing wind. Junks could sail south from 
Suzhou to Fujian from the autumn on, but Fujian needed rice in 
the spring. The most severe grain shortages occurred in the second 
and third lunar months. From the early eighteenth century, Fujian 
officials regularly held reduced-price sales in Zhangzhou and 
Quanzhou to relieve shortages during these two months.'*’ By the 
fourth lunar month, the internal grain supply in the province came 
into effect with the wheat harvest.'*’* The first crop of rice was 
harvested in the sixth lunar month, and the second crop of rice in 
the ninth lunar month.'*’ All of Fujian’s major rice-growing 
areas—including Jianning, Yanping, Shaowu, and Taiwan—grew 
rice for the second crop.^“ By the time the northeastern prevailing 
wind blew, in the tenth lunar month, rice markets in Fujian were 
plentifully supplied with domestic rice, and had no need of 
northern rice.
The discordance between the prevailing wind and the 
market cycle is shown in the following case. In Fujian in 1726, 
rice prices were still high in the fifth lunar month; in Zhangzhou 
and Quanzhou prefectures, rice cost from 2.1 to 2.3 taels of silver 
per shi.^' The rice shortage (and resultant high price) was caused
'*’ GZD-YZ, vol. 7, p. 138 (YZ 4.12.20). See also [Yongzheng] Zhupi 
45/11 la (YZ 4.12.20).
'*’* Like sweet potatoes, wheat was not a preferred food, but an important 
coarse food (or zaliang) for the poor. Its extensive cultivation is shown 
by frequent memorials of its harvests. See GZD-QL, vol. 2, p. 868 (QL 
17.5.2), p. 876 (QL 17.5.2); vol. 7, p. 907 (QL 19.4.6); vol. 10, p. 853 
(QL 20.3.5); vol. 64, p. 148 (QL 52.4.26).
'*’ GZD-YZ. vol. 11, p. 690 (YZ 6.11.5); GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 438 (QL 
16.8.18); vol. 3, p. 299 (QL 17.7.4); vol. 18, p. 541 (QL 28.7.22); vol. 21, 
pp. 55-6 (QL 29.6.7); vol. 34, pp. 693-4 (QL 39.2.29); vol. 52, p. 156 
(QL 47.6.19); vol. 56, p. 131 (QL 48.5.12).
GZD-YZ, vol. 8, p. 303 (YZ 5.6.4); GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 438 (QL 
16.8.18); vol. 18, p. 541 (QL 28.7.22); vol. 21, pp. 55-6 (QL 29.6.7); vol. 
52, p. 156 (QL 47.6.19); vol. 56, p. 131 (QL 48.5.12).
GZD-YZ, vol. 5, p. 890 (YZ 4.5.4).
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by the heavy drain of rice to neighboring Chaozhou in Guangdong 
province, where the rice harvest that year had been decimated by 
floods.^^ High prices spread from Chaozhou to Zhangzhou and 
Quanzhou, and on to Fuzhou. According to an official memorial, 
in the fifth lunar month more than 40,000 people from Zhangzhou 
and Quanzhou came to Fuzhou every day to purchase rice.^^
The imperial government acceded to Fujian Governor 
Mao Wenquan’s request to have 150,000 shi of rice transported 
over the mountains fi’om Jiangxi to Fujian.^"* At other times of the 
year this shipment could have come by sea, shipping the rice 
down the Yangzi River to Suzhou and then Shanghai, and 
transferring it to ocean-going vessels bound for Xiamen, the 
Fujian port. But the prevailing wind did not favor such a shipment, 
so Mao decided to use the under-developed land route instead, 
and asked the Jiangxi government to bring 150,000 shi of rice to 
the border between the two provinces.^^
Gao Qizhuo, the Governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, 
stated that the idea of transporting so much rice on a mountain 
trail some 70 li (39 kilometers) long was foolhardy. Gao 
emphasized the amount of labor and manpower needed for the 
project; a porter could only carry 7 dou (0.7 shi) of rice, so 
214,000 porters would have to be hired to carry 150,000 shi of 
rice.^® Although such transport was expensive and slow, in the 
face of famine the Yongzheng emperor approved it^’
Early in the sixth lunar month, the food shortage in Fujian 
worsened as it began to seem unlikely the province would have a 
good harvest for its own first crop, the weather being too dry for 
the rice plants to ripen.^^ At this critical juncture, Gao Qizhuo 
suggested transferring 70,000 shi of unhusked rice from the
Chen, Shichangjizhiyu shehui bianqian, p. 202. See also GZD-YZ, 
vol. 5, p. 754 (YZ 4.3.26), p. 892 (YZ 4.5.4).
” GZD-YZ, vol. 6, p. 46 (YZ 4.5.20).
To begin with, Mao only asked for 100,000 shi of rice. The Yong­
zheng emperor not only permitted this amount, he added 50,000 shi to it. 
See GZD-YZ, vol. 6, p. 12 (YZ 4.5.14); Shizong shilu, 44/24a (YZ 4.5). 
GZD-YZ, vol. 6, p. 12 (YZ 4.5.14). 
ibid., p. 302 (YZ 4.7.18).
^Ubid., p. 394 (YZ 4.8.1).
^^ibid.,-p. 208 (YZ 4.6.22).
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Zhejiang government granaries by sea.^^ But Gao’s idea of sea 
transport was just as unrealistic as Mao’s idea of land transport, 
since the wind was from the south, unfavorable to a shipment 
from north to south; the Zhejiang rice could not even begin its 
journey for at least another two months.
Then, in the last twelve days of the sixth lunar month, a 
continuous heavy rain in Fujian saved the rice crop. Governor 
Mao Wenquan claimed that the rain was the answer to his sincere 
prayers.^® The harvest was good, and prices plummeted by the 
middle of the seventh lunar month, long before rice from Zhejiang 
was actually transported to Fujian. In Zhangzhou and Quanzhou 
prefectures, the retail price of each shi of rice had reached a peak 
of 3.9-4.0 taels; the price now returned to the normal level of 
1.7-1.9 taels. The price of rice dropped sharply in Fuzhou, too: 
fresh rice there sold for just 1.5-1.6 taels per shi!'^ The famine in 
Fujian was over; starvation had been averted without help from 
Jiangxi or Zhejiang.
The first sea shipment of Zhejiang rice, 30,000 shi of 
unhusked rice, finally reached the port of Xiamen early in the 
ninth lunar month.*^ The rice from Jiangxi that came by way of 
mountain trails was even slower: by the second day of the ninth 
lunar month, only a little more than 10,000 shi had reached 
Fujian.“
The inter-provincial rice trade responded slowly to 
market changes in Fujian. Unlike western Zhejiang, Fujian had no 
close trade links with the provinces north of it, with connections to 
Jiangsu particularly weak. Tingzhou prefecture in the west did 
import rice from Jiangxi via mountain trails, but only in small 
amounts. Fujian also imported rice from Southeast Asian 
countries, sometimes up to 100,000 shi a year,*’"' but this was not a
^'^ibid.,^. 177 (YZ 4.6.19). 
“ ibid., p. 208 (YZ 4.6.22).
ibid., p. 301 (YZ 4.7.16). 
“ ibid., p. 521 (YZ 4.9.2).
54
'ibid.
Qing government documents record that rice imported into Fujian 
from Southeast Asian countries was approximately 90,000 shi in 1752, 
80,000 shi in 1754, 123,000 shi in 1755, and 92,000 shi in 1756. See 
Wang, “The food supply in eighteenth-century Fukien,” p. 92.
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regular practice. Instead the urban population in Fujian 
consumed mostly the province’s own rice supply. As Yeh-chien 
Wang has documented, Fuzhou, on the lower reaches of the Min 
River, received a great deal of rice from the upper Min valley, 
including Jianning, Yanping, and Shaowu prefectures; while the 
other two prefectures with heavy demands, Zhangzhou and 
Quanzhou, imported rice from Taiwan.®*
Thus most of the rice exported from the middle Yangzi 
valley went to southern Jiangsu and western Zhejiang. Eastern 
Zhejiang and Fujian only traded with this rice market when their 
own harvests were extremely poor.
Poor Harvests And Their Impact On Trade, 1700-1755 
There is a consensus among scholars that in the eighteenth century 
the Yangzi delta had to import a sizable amount of rice from the 
middle reaches of the valley to support its urban population. 
Han-sheng Chuan and Richard A. Kraus estimated the normal 
annual trade at 9-14 million shi, obtaining this figure by multi­
plying the non-agricultural population by per capita consumption 
of rice, and then subtracting the amount of rice likely to be 
supplied by local farms.®’ Using this method, Yeh-chien Wang 
ascertained that in the latter years of the century the delta needed 
to import 11-16 million shi annually.®* These scholars considered 
rice to be the subsistence food in the Yangzi, and therefore did not 
take into account consumption choices between rice and sweet
®^ A 1765 memorial stated that the Southeast Asian rice import was 
particularly high between 1754 and 1758, ranging from 90,000 to 
120,000 shi annually, but sharply declined after 1758. By 1765, the 
amount was insignificant. The memorial gave two reasons for the 
decline. First, poor rice harvests in Southeast Asia led to higher prices 
for the grain. Second, Fujian merchants had imported grain from abroad 
to get imperial degrees, which, once awarded, gave the merchants little 
incentive for further trade. See GZD-QL, vol. 25, pp. 812-4 (QL 
30.8.24).
®® Wang, "The food supply in eighteenth-century Fukien,” pp. 90-1.
®’ Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch ’ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 60-5.
®* Yeh-chien Wang, “Food supply and grain prices in the Yangtze delta 
in the eighteenth century,” in his Collected Essays in the Economic 
History of Qing China (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2003), vol. 3, p. 
330.
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potatoes, or even between geng riee and xian rice. The major 
weakness of their studies, however, was the assumption that the 
high degree of urbanization in the delta made it necessary to 
import a sizable amount of rice. Abe Takeo and Wu Chengming 
went directly to the government documents to understand the rice 
trade; but since they also were preoccupied with the common idea 
of the “sizable minimum import of rice”, they used the year 
173^1—in which Hankou exported 5 million shi of rice to the delta 
in six months—^to determine the average trade volume on the 
Yangzi. Takeo estimated 5-10 million shi as the annual trade 
volume, while Wu suggested 15 million shi.^'^ As a matter of fact, 
the year 1734, as will be discussed below, was an exceptionally 
good trading year.
The size of the rice trade varied from year to year, but for 
the sake of easy comparison I will divide the analysis in two, with 
1755 as the middle line. When the assumption of a high minimum 
trade volume due to population pressure is set aside, a completely 
different picture of the “Jiangnan economy” emerges, as we shall 
see.
The volume of the rice trade, in my opinion, was 
determined mostly by the price of rice. And, as many writers have 
pointed out, the price of rice was affected by seasonal cycles. In 
the Yangzi delta, where spring wheat and autumn rice were the 
two major crops, wheat was harvested in the fourth lunar month 
and rice between the sixth and the tenth.’® If the rice harvest was 
poor, rice prices would soar until the wheat harvest in the fourth 
lunar month of the following year.
Poor harvests were frequent in the first half of the early 
eighteenth century. In 1724, flooding from storms in both Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang resulted in poor autumn harvests.’' The food
Abe, “Beikoku jukyu no kenkyu,” p. 509; Wu, Zhongguo ziben zhuyi 
yu guonei shichang, pp. 256-7.
Two kinds of rice, early ripening and late ripening, were grown in the 
delta, but the latter harvest was far more important. Early-ripening rice 
was harvested from the sixth through the eighth lunar month, depending 
on district, while the late ripening rice, in general, was harvested 
between the ninth and the tenth lunar month. See Wang, “Food supply 
and grain prices in the Yangzi delta in the eighteenth century,” p. 439.
” GZD-YZ, vol. 3, p. 254 (YZ 2.9.28).
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situation improved after a good wheat harvest in 1725, but a 
prolonged period of eontinuous rain, whieh is very harmful to rice 
near harvest time, struck these two provinces again in the autumn 
of 1726. The result was another poor harvest and high prices for 
rice.
The years of shortages and rising prices in the Yangzi 
delta stimulated the long-distance rice trade, especially between 
the sixth lunar month of any given year and the fourth lunar month 
of the following year. In the eleventh lunar month of 1724, the 
Governor of Sichuan wrote that after the autumn harvest 10 to 20 
boats, each carrying 1,000 to 2,000 shi of rice, sailed east every 
day.’^
The harvests from 1727 to 1731 went unnoticed in the 
archival records. From 1732 to 1755, however, poor harvests 
caused by either flood or drought occurred repeatedly in Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang. The rice trade along the Yangzi flourished. In the 
seventh lunar month of 1734, the Governor-general of Hunan and 
Hubei wrote:
Your servant thinks that Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
merchants have shipped [from Hankou] over 5 million 
shi of rice. In the meantime, [however] rice prices in 
Hunan and Hubei are still low.’^
Five million shi was no small amount, and it seems likely 
that even more rice was subsequently traded, given that the price 
remained low. However, trade only reached this level when delta 
harvests were poor.
When trade increased, rice merchants became more 
aggressive. Previously, merchants waited in Hankou for rice boats 
from Hunan; now many merchants went to Hunan to buy directly 
from the boats. In 1739, the Hunan Administration Commissioner 
gave a vivid account of the proceedings:
I was also told that along the Heng River and Xiang 
River, the practice of “crafty shopkeepers (puhu) 
purchasing rice by jumping onto the boats” prevails.
'’^ibid.,p. 399 (YZ 2.11.2).
[Yongzheng] Zhupi yuzhi, 54/86b (YZ 12.7.8).
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As soon as they discover that boats are anchoring at 
the river banks, either they, relying on their own 
strength, “jump to purchase”, or they hire shameless 
ruffians to do so. Even when the boats are still at a 
distance of some ten feet from the bank, they stand on 
the edges of other boats, and use bamboo poles to 
jump over so that they can buy the rice they need. In 
other cases, they sail in small boats to block the way in 
order to make their purchase. The consequence is that 
weak people wait at riverbanks with no opportunity to 
buy rice, and the powerful people can buy up the rice 
to hoard it. The villagers (xiangmin), seeing this 
competition to purchase [their rice], raise its price and 
refuse to sell it at a low price.’''
The demand created by poor harvests in the delta brought 
prosperity to Hunan rice farmers and merchants.
People also grew wealthy in the regions where food was 
scarce. Rice speculation was rampant in the delta. In two 1744 
memorials, the Anhui Governor and the Zhejiang Administration 
Commissioner condemned the practice in their provinces. Many 
wealthy merchants amassed vast quantities of rice and pawned it, 
as a way of hoarding the rice, keeping it out of circulation, and 
driving up the price even higher. With the proceeds from the 
pawnshops, the merchants bought even more rice. These 
merchants were making profits of up to 400 and 500 per cent.’^ 
Such rampant speculation alarmed the Qing government, 
and in 1744 the Qianlong emperor permitted the Anhui governor 
to impose a ban on rice speculation in his province’s pawnshops.” 
In 1745, the Board of Revenue demanded that all provincial 
governors investigate rice pawning and hoarding in their 
provinces and suggest ways to end it. In Suzhou City, however.
Hunan shengli cheng’an (Changsha, 1820), 34/46a-b.
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, pp. 146-8 (QL 9.3.7); Zhupi 
zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 2344-6 (QL 9.4.26); Gaozong shilu,
215/23b-24b. See Chapter Five for more about rice pawning and how the 
local and imperial governments dealt with it.
From a censor’s memorial. See Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, pp. 
203-5 (QL 9.5.27).
” Gaozong shilu, 215/23b-24b.
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the Jiangsu Governor Chen Dashou opposed such government 
control. He claimed that prohibiting rice pawning would be worse 
than useless; it would only force all the hoarders to move their rice 
out of Suzhou.^*
The prohibition would not be imposed in Jiangsu for 
another two years, when, in 1747, in reply to a request from 
Censor Tang Pin, the Qianlong emperor banned rice pawning in 
all provinces.^’ The replacement of the dissenting Chen Dashou, 
Anning, now imposed the ban after a poor local harvest in the 
same year. In consequence, the grain shortage worsened. Famine 
was induced also in Zhejiang in 1747, when Governor Chang’an 
imposed a similar ban in Hangzhou, and drove up grain prices. 
According to a 1748 memorial by Fang Guancheng, Chang’an’s 
successor, there were twenty-four private warehouses (zhanfeng) 
for rice storage in Hangzhou, where 200,000 shi of rice were 
always kept; but once the ban was imposed, all that rice was taken 
elsewhere. Worse still, merchants no longer brought rice to 
Hangzhou. The price of rice in Hangzhou, and throughout 
Zhejiang, skyrocketed. Thus the high price of rice in both Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang in 1748 was due more to the imperial court’s anxiety 
about rice speculation than to the speculation itself.
After 1748, when the delta shortages ceased, the 
long-distance rice trade declined.**” Then drought struck Zhejiang 
again in 1751, and large amounts of rice were once again exported 
from the middle Yangzi to the shortage area. In only the first six 
months of 1751 Sichuan exported 231,000 shi of rice.*' In the 
seventh and eighth lunar months, a total of 800,000 shi of rice
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 2718-21 (QL 10.1.8). Part of 
the content of this memorial was compiled later in Qingjingshi wenbian, 
under the name of Chen Dashou: “Fu buyi jin mitun he chenggong shu”. 
See Qingjingshi wenbian, 26/58a-59a.
Gaozongshilu, 286/24a-25a.
Jiangsu reaped a bumper crop of rice in the autumn of 1748. See 
Gaozong shilu, 320/24a-25b (QL 13.7). Then in 1749, “the price levels 
between Jiangxi-Huguang and Jiangnan-Zhejiang were equal. Rice trade 
was little,” wrote the Governor-general of Liangjiang. See GZD-QL, vol. 
3,p. 94 (QL 17.5.2).
GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 200 (QL 16.7.21).
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reached Suzhou, bound for Zhejiang.'^^ Between the first day of 
the ninth lunar month and the eighth day of the tenth lunar month 
of 1751, Zhejiang rice merchants bought another 239,000 shi in 
Suzhou.*^ This increase in the rice trade was also recorded by the 
Hushu Customs, the last customs station down the Yangzi River 
before Suzhou (see Map 4), which reported that from mid-1751 to 
mid-1752 its tax revenue increased by 110,000 taels, mainly from 
the duty on rice.*''
In autumn 1752, the Yangzi delta produced bumper 
crops.*^ Then in 1755 most of Jiangsu and parts of Zhejiang were 
flooded.*^ The damage to the rice crop seems to have prompted 
Sichuan alone to export 200,000 shi of rice to southern Jiangsu in 
the last three months of 1755.*’
In sum, there were two general periods of prosperity for 
the long-distance rice trade in the first half of the century, from 
1724 to 1727, and from 1732 to 1755. Both coincided with 
shortages in the delta and lasted only a total of sixteen years. After 
1755, the situation changed dramatically.
Bumper Harvests And Over-Production, 1756-1800 
After 1755 bumper harvests became more frequent in the delta, 
and the long-distance rice trade increasingly dormant. Bozhong Li 
suggests that the widespread use of bean-cakes as fertilizer
*’ From the seventh lunar month to the 21st day of the eighth lunar 
month, 700,000 shi of husked rice (mi) and 200,000 shi of unhusked rice 
(gu) left Hushu Customs for Zhejiang. See GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 466 (QL 
16.8.21).
GZD-QL, vol. 2, pp. 31-2 (QL 16.11.23).
*'* GZD-QL, vol. 4, p. 76 (QL 17.10.6).
*^ In the fiscal year from mid-1752 to mid-1753, the Hushu Customs 
recorded a decrease in its tax income. The Jiangsu Governor attributed 
this to the bountiful harvest in the Yangzi delta: “1 observe that the 
harvests in Suzhou, Songjiang, and Zhejiang were really bountiful. The 
prices of rice were low, [and therefore,] little rice was shipped by ‘guest 
merchants’ from Jiangxi and Huguang.” See GZD-QL, vol. 8, p. 84 (QL 
19.4.22).
Gaozong shilu, 493/9a-b (QL 20.7), 497/28a-b (QL 20.9), 498/9a-b 
(QL 20.10), 499/37a-b (QL 20.10).
*’ GZD-QL, vol. 13, p. 504 (QL 21.1.19).
97
Market Integration and Over-Production
increased rice yields; but such a process would have been gradual 
and would not explain the sudden good harvests.** **
Bumper harvests in the delta began in the autumn of 1756, 
when Jiangsu and Zhejiang had abundant rice harvests, and “few 
[merchants] came to Hunan and Hubei to purchase rice.”*’ Similar 
reports were frequent in the last four decades of the century. In 
1767, the delta yielded another bumper crop, and in the eleventh 
lunar month an imperial commissioner reported:
For several months, rainfall and sunshine have come 
at good times [for the growth of crops]. On my journey 
I discovered that the rice crop being harvested is 
exceptionally bountiful for recent years. In Songjiang 
prefecture, top-quality rice is [now sold at] 12 to 13 
cash per sheng [i.e., 0.01 shi]. It is rumoured that this 
price is even lower than that in Jiangxi, Hunan, and 
Hubei. Suzhou prefecture is crowded with people, [but 
the price of rice] is less than 14 or 15 cash per sheng.
[The rice prices] in other prefectures such as 
Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Jiangning are roughly the
90
same.
That the price of rice in populous Jiangsu was lower than 
in Hunan and Hubei was corroborated by the Jiujiang Customs in 
northern Jiangxi. The Jiujiang Customs levied duty based on the 
size of the boat, not the value of the goods it carried. Boats passing 
through customs mostly carried rice from Hunan and Sichuan.’' 
In 1768, Jiujiang Customs stated that Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, and 
Hubei had had poor harvests, resulting in a sharp increase in their 
rice prices, and that since the rice trade along the Yangzi River 
had become unprofitable, the customs revenue had decreased by 
about 45,000 taels.
In 1772 and 1773, the lower Yangzi provinces of Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang again reaped bountiful harvests. For these two years.
** Li, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, pp. 112-32. 
^^GZD-QL, vol. 15, p. 660 (QL 21.10.2).
” GZD-QL, vol. 27, pp. 713-4 (QL 32.11.27).
” Xu Tan, “Qingdai qianqi de Jiujiang Guan jiqi shangpin liutong,” 
dang’an, 1999.1:86-91.
GZD-QL, vol. 30, pp. 153-5 (QL 33.3.22).
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although the Sichuan government prohibited merchants from 
shipping rice out of the western province, the lower Yangzi had no 
rice shortages.^^
The rice trade prospered again in early 1777, but only 
temporarily.’"' In the seventh lunar month of that year, the Yangzi 
delta had another abundant harvest, which again caused the 
long-distance trade between Suzhou and the middle Yangzi to 
grind to a halt. According to a Hushu Customs report, rice prices 
in the delta were lower than those in Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and 
Sichuan; during the fiscal year between the ninth lunar months of 
1777 and 1778, Hushu Customs revenue from rice dropped by 
115,000 taels of silver.’^
In early 1779, the governors of both Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
reported a revival in the long-distance rice trade,’* which peaked 
after a poor harvest in the delta in autumn 1785.” We must not, 
however, exaggerate the prosperity of the rice trade in these seven 
years. First of all, the Yangzi delta reaped extremely bountiful 
harvests in 1782 and 1783, which decreased its need for outside 
rice.’** Second, although the delta had a poor harvest in 1785, its 
rice imports from the middle Yangzi between the eighth lunar 
month of 1785 to the fourth lunar month of 1786 totaled only 
about 1 million s/j/.”
Then, beginning in 1788, the delta had bumper harvests 
for several consecutive years. In 1789 the Hushu Customs annual 
report stated: “In the last fiscal year [from mid-1788 to mid-1789],
Gaozong shilu, 917/16b-17b (QL 37.9), 938/33b-34b (QL 38.7).
In the first four months of 1 111 more than 2 million shi of rice were 
shipped to Suzhou. See GZD-QL, vol. 37, pp. 822-3 (QL 42.2.24); vol. 
38, pp. 538-9 (QL 42.5.6).
GZD-QL, vol. 44, pp. 812-4 (QL 43.9.17).
GZD-QL, vol. 47, pp. 1-2 (QL 44.2.27); vol. 47, pp. 62-3 (QL 44.3.3). 
” Gaozong shilu, 1236/29a-31a (QL 50.8).
’* GZD-QL, vol. 56, p. 616 (QL 48.6.28); vol. 57 (QL 48.9.24).
”ln 1785, Hunan itself had a poor harvest and had to import rice from 
Sichuan and Jiangxi. Sichuan and Jiangxi therefore became the major 
exporting provinces for the delta. See Lufit zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 51, 
pp. 1569-72 (QL 50.9.9), reel no. 51, pp. 1592-3 (QL 50.9.13); Zhupi 
zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 57, pp. 3097-9 (QL 50.10.13); Lujit zouzhe, 
microfilm, reel no. 51, pp. 1643-4 (QL 50.11.9); Zhupi zouzhe, 
microfilm, reel no. 57, pp. 3239-40 (QL 51.4.16).
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the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang had bumper harvests, and 
so their rice price is low.”‘°° Later in the same year, a Zhejiang 
official reported; “This year, both early and late harvests in 
Zhejiang are extremely good. Grain prices are also very low.”'”' 
In 1793, the Qianlong emperor stated that: “Jiangsu has had 
bumper harvests for several years.”'”^
The long-distance rice trade was so reduced that by 1788 
the surplus was felt in Hunan. According to the Hunan Governor, 
farmers suffered greatly because for years they had not been able 
to sell their abundant rice harvests in the saturated market. To tide 
them over, the governor suggested that the Hunan government 
purchase their rice.'”^ The Qianlong emperor permitted this, and 
encouraged the provincial governments of Hubei, Anhui, and 
Jiangxi to buy Hunan rice as well.'”^ But these three provinces 
showed little interest in doing so. The Hubei Governor argued that 
the imperial government’s reimbursement would not even pay for 
transporting the rice, while Jiangxi and Anhui agreed that Hunan 
rice would cost more than their own rice after transportation costs 
were included.'”^
Thus, in 1788, Hunan, Hubei, and Sichuan rice was 
unmarketable in the Yangzi delta. The Jiujiang Customs reported;
In past years, six to seven thousand [rice] boats [from 
Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei] passed the Jiujiang 
Customs house during the summer and autumn. This 
year (1788), only several tens of rice boats came to the 
customs.'””
The long-distance rice trade from Sichuan to Jiangsu had virtually 
halted.
The rice trade from Jiangxi to Jiangsu was also quite 
small in 1788. Only a few private rice boats reached the Hushu
GZD-QL, vol. 72, p. 171 (QL 54.5*.ll).
GZD-QL, vol. 73, p. 555 (QL 54.9.28)
Gaozong shilu, 1437/16a (QL 58.9).
GZD-QL, vol. 70, pp. 714-5 (QL 53.12.22).
Gaozong shilu, 1318/34a (QL 53.12).
GZD-QL, vol. 70, pp. 760-1 (QL 53.12.27), 791-2 (QL 54.1.3); vol. 
71, p. 184 (QL 54.2.6).
GZD-QL, vol. 71, p. 142 (QL 54.1.29).
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Customs in the fiscal year 1788-89.'°^ Both customs houses 
attributed the drastic decline to relatively poor harvests in the 
middle Yangzi regions such as Jingzhou in Hubei province, and to 
good harvests in the delta.'®*
The decline of the rice trade persisted due to good 
harvests in the Yangzi delta. In the sixth lunar month of 1792, the 
Governor-general of Huguang stated that:
In recent years, since the downstream [regions] 
inclusive of Jiangnan, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang 
had good harvests for successive years, grain prices 
[in these regions] have fallen to a similar level as those 
in Sichuan. When transportation fees are added, 
[merchants] trading [rice from Sichuan to the above 
downstream regions] often lost their capital. For this 
reason, few [rice] boats traveled to and fro [between 
Sichuan and the downstream regions].
The long-distance rice trade, according to Fuying, the 
Superintendent of Jiujiang Customs, revived briefly in 1792, with 
the Jiujiang Customs reporting an increase of 7,777 merchants’ 
boats of all kinds passing through that year."® Then in 1793 
Fuying stated that 11,094 fewer merchant boats of all kinds 
passed through customs than had in 1792; and in 1794 the number 
had dropped by another 6,135 boats. In the eleventh lunar month 
of the year he explained that:
Grain [produced] in Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei used 
to be transported to and sold in Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
This year, the price [of rice] in the middle [Yangzi] 
was the same as in the lower [Yangzi]. Sojourning
GZD-QL, vol. 72, p. 171 (QL 54.5*. 11).
'®*GZD-0i,vol. 71,p. 142 (QL 52.1.29); vol. 72, p. 171 (QL 54.5*.ll). 
'®® Gaozong shilu. 1412/33b-34a (QL 57.9).
"® Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 20, pp. 1862-6 (QL 59.11.26). 
Fujing did not state the actual number of merchant boats passing Jiujiang 
Customs in each fiscal year, only that their number was 6,135 fewer in 
1794 than in 1793, 17,229 fewer than in 1792, and 9,452 fewer than in 
1791. The last two figures show that 1792 was a good year compared to 
1791 because the number of boats increased by 7,777.
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merchants can make no profit. Therefore, there is little 
trade. Although Jiangxi had a good harvest, few of its 
rice boats passed through customs.'"
In the twelfth lunar month, he wrote that owing to 
reductions in the rice and timber trade, tax revenues that year were 
158,200 taels less than in 1792."^
The long-distance rice trade along the Yangzi River was 
still dormant in 1795. Explaining the deficit of tax revenues, the 
Superintendent of the Hushu Customs wrote: “Prices of rice in all 
regions [of the middle Yangzi] were equal to those in Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang. Merchants were unable to make a profit and trade 
stopped as a consequence.”"^
The long-distance rice trade revived after 1795, when the 
abundant harvests and bumper crops ended; trade still depended 
on the demand for rice in the delta. In 1814, drought in Anhui and 
Zhejiang caused a severe grain shortage, which encouraged 
speculation. A Censor wrote that an Anhui merchant had hoarded 
more than a million shi of rice in 28 warehouses in the major 
market towns in his province. Hoarding in Zhejiang was so 
rampant that local officials felt the need to reiterate the law 
against it.""* The scarcity of rice in Anhui and Zhejiang drove up 
the price in neighboring provinces. As a result, as Nakamura Jihei 
has proved, large quantities of rice were transported from Hunan 
to Nanjing (called Jiangning in the Qing; see Map 4), causing a 
new boom in the rice trade along the Yangzi River.
In short, the long-distance rice trade declined due to 
bumper harvests in the latter half of the century, especially from 
1788 to 1795. The bumper harvests in the Yangzi delta fed the 
people of Jiangsu and Zhejiang cheaply; they needed little rice 
from the middle Yangzi provinces. As a result, the long-distance 
lice trade dwindled to a trickle.
ibid.
Gaozong shilu, 1467/6a (QL 59.12).
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 20, pp. 1922-4 (QL 60.3.13). 
Jiaqingshilu, 295/4a-b (JQ 19.8), 295/8a-9a (JQ 19.8).
Nakamura Jihei, “Shindai Koko kome ryutsu no ichi men: Nankin no 
Konan kaikan yori mita,” Shakai keizai shigaku 18, no. 3 (1952): 272.
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In view of the above, it makes sense that Hunan’s rice 
export changed from one year to the next, depending upon the rice 
harvests in the delta. In the following section, I shall discuss 
Hunan's role in the long-distance rice trade.
Hunan’s Rice Export
Hunan had been the major rice-producing province as early as the 
seventeenth century, according to Fujii Horoshi, who cited a late 
Ming proverb: “\^en Huguang has a bountiful harvest, the 
Empire has enough.” Ming government documents also 
recorded Hunan’s role as a rice supplier for the delta. In 1640, 
when the delta suffered from drought, Suzhou Governor Huang 
Xixian, prohibiting blockades of rice boats from other provinces, 
said: “In Suzhou, rice production is insufficient to meet local 
demand. Zhejiang relies on rice from Jiangxi and Huguang, and 
Suhzou also considers it a life-saving medicine (xuming zhi 
gao).”"’
The development of Hunan as the major rice supplier for 
the empire, according to Yamamoto Susumu, was a consequence 
of agricultural expansion in the Yangzi valley from the twelfth 
century onwards. During the Southern Song dynasty, the Chinese 
had begun to convert the land bordering Lake Tai in the delta into 
paddies. In later centuries, paddy fields extended to the middle 
reaches of the Yangzi."* The expansion, according to Shigeta 
Atsushi, accelerated in the sixteenth century when many farmers 
migrated from the delta to Hunan to evade heavy taxes. By the 
eighteenth century, the vast region that encompassed the fertile 
plain bordering Lake Dongting and the alluvial plains along the 
middle and lower reaches of the Xiang River in Hunan had 
emerged as the most important rice farming and export district in 
China. (See Map 7.)"“
Fujii, “Shinan shonin no kenkyu,” 36.1, p. 25.
Huang Xixian, Fu Wu xiliie (1640), l/18a-19a.
Yamamoto Susumu, Shindai no shijd kdzo to keizai seisaku 
(Nagoya-shi: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2002), p. 23.
Shigeta Atsushi, Shindai shakai keizaishi kenkyu (T5ky6; Iwanami 
shoten, 1975), pp. 3-6.
Yamamoto, Shindai no shijd kdzo to keizai seisaku, pp. 24-34. Bin 
Wong also found that in mid-century large export markets emerged in
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The central market for the export trade was Xiangtan 
county. A 1709 memorial by Hunan Governor Zhao Shenqiao 
highlighted the county as the major rice market, with big wharves 
and shops.A 1728 memorial by another governor, Wang 
Guodong, vividly described the market in Xiangtan:
I saw that a thousand junks gathered like clouds, 
merchants from all directions formed clusters 
covering several //, the market was piled with goods 
for trading, and the dwellings there were packed 
together like the teeth of a comb.'^'
Xiangtan, south of the Yangzi on its tributary, the Xiang River, 
grew with the trade to become the largest rice market in the 
province. It was to Xiangtan that merchants from Hankou in 
Hubei province came, to buy rice for the Yangzi delta.
With Xiangtan as the focal point, the Dongting Lake 
basin and the Xiang River lowlands comprised the principal rice 
export zone in Hunan in the eighteenth century. Hengyang 
county, south of Xiangtan, was the second largest rice market in
the counties bordering Dongting Lake. See R. Bin Wong, “The political 
economy of food supplies in Qing China,” (Ph.D. diss.. Harvard 
University, 1983), pp. 159-62.
Zhao Gongyigong zizhi guanshu, 6/75a-77b.
[YongzhengJ Zhupiyuzhi, 17/79b (YZ 6). Xiangtan's predominance 
in Hunan’s rice export trade did not end until it was replaced by 
Changsha in the early twentieth century. See Wong Wing-ho, “Shichang 
yu guojia: Hunan sheng Xiangtan yu Changsha migu shichang ge’an 
yanjiu, 1894-1919” (Ph.D. diss., Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, 2001), pp. 338-9.
Evelyn S. Rawski, Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of 
South China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1972), pp. 101-32. See also Shigeta Atsushi, Shindai shakai keizaishi 
kenkyu, p. 14.
The counties inside this zone, along with Xiangtan, were: Changsha, 
Hengyang, Shanhua, Xiangyin, Yiyang, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, Baling, 
Linxiang, Huarong, Wuling, Taoyuan, Longyang, Yuanjiang, Lizhou, 
and Anxiang (see Map 7). In a 1753 memorial, the Provincial 
Administration Commissioner of Hunan stated that the rice trade took 
place in these counties, see Hunan shengli c/zeng’an (1820), 23/2 lb.
104
Market Integration and Over-Production
Hunan.Whenever there was a great demand for rice in the delta, 
merchants travelled to Xiangtan and Hengyang, or even the 
smaller markets on the Xiang River, for rice. The rice was 
transferred to larger boats at Hankou, and then sent downriver to 
the delta.
In the second half of the century, Hunan’s rice export 
trade became much less prosperous. In a study of the rice trade 
from Hunan to Nanjing, Nakamura Jihei showed that Hunan rice 
merchants formed a guild in Jiangning, and even built a wharf 
there for their rice boats. They laid down regulations to manage 
the wharf, inscribed the rules of embarkation on a stone tablet, and, 
to house the tablet, had a small stone temple built to the God of 
Fortune. The guild, the wharf, and the temple represented the 
Hunan rice merchants’ commercial interests in Nanjing until 1775 
when, for unknown reasons, the temple was destroyed; thereafter, 
fewer Hunan rice boats called at Nanjing. Nakamura suggested 
that trade between Hunan and Nanjing declined until 1814, when 
Nanjing suffered from famine. In that year many Hunan rice boats 
called again at Nanjing, and a new group of Hunan merchants 
repaired the wharf in Nanjing.'^^
Nakamura’s description of interrupted trade from 1775 to 
1814 corroborated the overall decline in exports from Hunan 
during this period. Moreover, noting that Nanjing’s grain needs 
were satisfied easily by its neighbouring provinces of Anhui and
There is less information in the Gazetteer of Hengyang County about 
its eighteenth-century rice market, but a nineteenth-century gazetteer, 
the Hengyang xiamhi (Gazetteer of Hengyang County), stated that 
Hengyang was less prosperous in the rice trade than Xiangtan, and that 
the volume of rice exported from Hengyang was only 70 per cent of that 
from Xiangtan. (See Hengyangxianzhi, 1872, 11/lO.la.) Hengyang, the 
province’s second largest rice market during the eighteenth and into the 
nineteenth century, was replaced by the Changsha rice market by the late 
nineteenth century. According to Bin Wong, this probably was due in 
part to the introduction of steamboats, which could not navigate the 
Xiang River as far upstream as Hengyang. See Wong, “The political 
economy of food supplies in Qing China,’’ p. 327.
Zhao Gongyigong zizhi guanshu, 6/75a-77b.
Nakamura, “Shindai Koko kome ryutsu no ichi men,” p. 270.
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Jiangxi, he concluded that Nanjing only needed rice from Hunan 
in times of poor harvests.'^*
Like Nakamura, Kitamura Hiroano subscribed to the 
view that the rice trade declined in the last few decades of the 
eighteenth century, but he attributed this to social and economic 
developments in Hunan, or the supply side of the trade, rather than 
to the drop in demand in the delta. Kitamura found that Wuxi 
county in Jiangsu stopped importing Hunan rice around 1752, and 
Nanjing followed suit in 1775. He used these two cases to show 
that the Hunan rice trade along the Yangzi valley declined in the 
late eighteenth century. Turning to conditions in Hunan, he 
attributed their shrinking rice export to greater local demand as a 
consequence of population growth and a rising living standard.
Nakamura, however, dated the decline several years 
earlier than it actually set in. The reason Wuxi did not import rice 
from Hunan in 1751 was that Hunan rice went to other markets in 
the delta in that year.‘^° As to his argument on the high demand 
for rice within Hunan, his sole example was Yongzhou, the 
southernmost prefecture in Hunan, which, because of its
ibid., p. 272.
Kitamura Hironao, “Shindai no shohin shijo ni tsuite,” Keizaigaku 
zasshi 28, nos. 3-4 (1953): 1-22. Kitamura’s view was echoed in a study 
by Kenneth Pomeranz, though Pomeranz provided no new information. 
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, pp. 246-8.
The flow of the rice trade was disrupted in 1751. In normal years most 
rice from the middle Yangzi was unloaded first in parts of Jiangsu, such 
as Nanjing and Wuxi, which would absorb a certain amount of Hunan 
rice in this way. The majority of this imported rice was then shipped to 
Fengqiao town, where Zhejiang merchants bought rice for their province. 
In 1751, because of famine in Zhejiang, this trade pattern changed. In the 
seventh lunar month of that year, in response to the high price of rice in 
Zhejiang, Governor Yonggui of Zhejiang requested an exemption of the 
duty on rice imports to Zhejiang, to encourage more rice to flow into the 
province. The state immediately granted his request. The exemption of 
duty in Zhejiang, along with high prices for rice in that province, meant 
that most of the rice being shipped from the middle Yangzi eastwards 
went straight to Zhejiang without stopping at Jiangsu. Wuxi and Jinkui, 
the two counties in Jiangsu, could therefore import no rice from Hunan 
that year. See GZD-QL, vol. 1, p. 142 (QL 16.7.13), p. 301 (QL 16.7.29), 
p. 466 (QL 16.7.13), p. 571 (QL 16.9.5), and p. 575 (QL 16.9.5).
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remoteness, was only weakly linked to the rest of Hunan. 
Within Yongzhou prefecture, Qiyang county was in the best 
position to develop an inter-regional trade because it was 
upstream of the Xiang River. That trade, nevertheless, consisted 
primarily of pine logs being sent downriver, which, because of the 
current, was much easier than taking rice upstream.According 
to Hunan officials’ reports in 1709 and 1753, some merchants 
from Hengyang and Changsha to the north did take rice to Qiyang, 
but only in small amounts, as transporting bulky products 
upstream on the Xiang River was so hazardous.'” It was more 
likely that Qiyang exported rice to these cities in the late 
eighteenth century. The 1828 Yongzhou fuzhi (Gazetteer of 
Yongzhou Prefecture) stated:
Qiyang is known for its rice production. According to 
elders, twenty or thirty years ago the amount of its rice 
taken to Xiangtan and Hankou was generally more 
than a hundred thousand shi annually.'”
A large part of Yongzhou prefecture was agriculturally under­
developed even in the nineteenth century. In Jianghua county, for 
instance, half of the territory was still inhabited by the Yao hill tribe in 
the Tongzhi reign (1862-74). The land was hilly, and its inhabitants, both 
Yaos and Hans, used the primitive method of slash-and-bum farming on 
what little flat land there was. See Jianghua xianzhi (1870), 10/7a.
Nineteenth-century gazetteers stated that one of Qiyang’s major 
trades was the export of pine wood, and many Qiyang families made 
their fortune out of the timber trade. With the expansion of rice 
cultivation in Qiyang the local supply of pine trees dwindled, and 
Qiyang merchants explored the upstream region of the Xiang River, like 
Jianghua, for more wood. (See Qiyang xianzhi, 1870,22/7b, Jianghua 
xianzhi, 1870, 10/7b.) It is possible that this timber trade began in the 
eighteenth century.
Zhao Gongyigongzizhi guanshu (n.d.; repr. 1850), 6/75a-77b; Hunan 
shengli cheng ’an (1820), 5b-6a.
The rice trade between Qiyang and Xiangtan did not continue to 
flourish like this in the nineteenth century. According to the Yongzhou 
Juzhi, the declining rice export trade was a result of population growth. 
See Yongzhou fuzhi (1828) 5a/18b. The same passage was also seen in 
Qiyang xianzhi (1870), 22/7a.
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If this is true, there was no shortage of rice in Hunan, even as its 
export was grinding to a halt.
Circumstantial evidence also suggests that Hunan had a 
surplus rather than a shortage. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 show price 
data for the first-grade rice of Hanyang prefecture, Hubei 
province, between 1739 and 1798, indicating prices in Hankou (in 
Hanyang), the biggest rice market in Hunan and Hubei.The 
data show that except for two short periods—in 1779 and from 
1785-86—the price of rice was stable at around 1.5 taels per shi. 
Prices did rise sharply in 1779 and 1785-86, when rice cost more 
than 2 taels per shi, but these prices were due to drought.Local 
gazetteers recorded starvation in both Changsha and Hengyang 
during those years, and, in the famine of 1779, a spread of disease 
in other counties. The drought was even more severe in 1785. No 
rain fell on Hunan at all between the fourth and the seventh 
months. When another drought occurred the following year, many 
people in Daozhou had nothing to eat but bark and grass.It was 
due to the accidents of weather and consequent famine that prices 
rose, not an underlying trend that increased demand.
The grain storage figures also indicated a rice surplus in 
Himan. Since the beginning of the Qing dynasty, Hunan, like 
other provinces, had established ever-normal granaries in the 
county cities, whose function was to keep the price of grain stable. 
Every year during seasonal high prices for rice, magistrates sold a 
portion of their reserves on the market at a discount; when the rice 
shortage ended, the magistrates used the proceeds to replenish the 
granaries. In this way, the ever-normal granaries reported an 
annual reserve.'^* In the early phase of the establishment of the
In 1709, Hunan Governor Zhao Shenqiao stated that the rice 
transported from Hankou to Jiangsu and Zhejiang was mostly from 
Hunan. Zhao Gongyigong zizhi guanshu (n.d.; repr. 1850), 6/75a-77b.
See the charts in Zhongguo jin wubainian hanlao fenbu tuji, comp. 
Zhongyang qixiangju qixiangke kexue yanjiuyuan (Beijing: Ditu 
chubanshe, 1981), pp. 160-4.
Hunan tongzhi (1885), 244/26b-27b.
Hunan tongzhi (1757), 39. See also Pierre-Etienne Will, “Part II: 
Stmctural problems,” in Will and Wong with Lee, eds.. Nourish the 
People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650-1850, pp. 
103-93. The subject of granary operation is also discussed in Chapter
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ever-normal granaries, the eourt encouraged provincial 
governments to expand their granary reserves. But in 1748, after 
receiving several complaints from officials that these government 
purchases had pushed up already-high grain prices, the court 
determined to set a maximum limit for the stock in each province. 
Under this quota system, Hunan was required to maintain 700,000 
shi of rice in granary reserves.'^® However, as Zhong Yongning 
noted, the Hunan government never followed this guideline. In 
the second half of the century, it continued to buy a great deal of 
rice from local markets, in amounts much larger than the amount 
office sold out.'"'”
The granary reserve in Hunan expanded considerably 
during the second half of the century. In 1753, though the quota 
was still 700,000 shi, Hunan ever-normal granaries had 
accumulated reserves totaling 1,163,000 shi}^' The expansion of 
the reserves was caused for the most part by purchases made by 
the government at times of bumper crops in order to help the rice 
cultivators. In 1755, for example, after the autumn harvest, Hunan 
Governor Chen Hongmou found that the grain harvest was so 
finitful that it outstripped demand, and as a consequence, 
producers were forced to sell at non-compensatory prices or could 
not sell at all. Chen ordered Hunan county magistrates to buy an 
imlimited amount of rice from local producers until the price rose 
to the normal level. Repeated government purchases brought 
the reserves up to 1,504,000 shi in 1789.’"^ Against these figures, 
however, the amount of rice disbursed to stabilize prices, except 
during the rice-shortage years of 1779 and 1785-86, were quite
Five.
Hunan tongzhi (1757), 39/18a. See also Hunan tongzhi (1885), 55/7b.
Zhong Yongning, “Shiba shiji de Xiangmi shuchu yu Qing zhengfu 
de liangshi tiaokong zhengce,” Zhongguo shehui jingjishiyanjiu, 1993.4, 
p. 66.
GZD-QL, vol. 6, pp. 901-2 (QL 18.11.29).
William T. Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite 
Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 164. See also Chen Hongmou 
(1696-1771), Peiyuantang oucun gao (wenxi) (1837), 37/lb-2b.
GZD-QL, vol. 74, pp. 30-1 (QL 54.11.5).
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stable. Since government stock increased without a concom­
itant increase in disbursement, the impression is not of 
government speculation on rising prices, but the government 
holding more grain in times of surplus.
Furthermore, the reserves increased most drastically in 
counties in the rice-export zone, and less so in remote counties. In 
Changsha county, between 1748 and 1810, the reserves rose from 
10,000 to 70,000 But in the remote county of Chaling
reserves increased only from 8,000 shi in 1748 to 10,900 shi in 
1759, and in Qingquan itself from 16,000 shi in 1748 to 29,000 shi 
in 1760, and then 45,000 5/2/in 1801.‘"*^Bin Wong, who first drew 
attention to the Hunan rice storage figures, also found that 
reserves in the Hunan ever-normal granaries increased in the later 
years of the eighteenth century, and the trend of increasing 
reserves is the opposite of the trend for disbursal.
Bin Wong found a similar state of affairs in community 
granaries {she cang). By the 1740s and 1750s, most of Hunan had 
community granaries. Unlike ever-normal granaries in the county 
seats, community granaries were small and scattered throughout 
the rural areas. Community granaries were also run by civilians 
instead of officials; they lent grain instead of selling it; and they 
solicited contributions of grain from the gentry and wealthy 
commoners instead of buying it.''** In return, the grain donors 
were awarded imperial examination degrees, which was an honor. 
But according to Bin Wong the rural granaries in Hunan were 
never adequately stocked. In 1754, Governor Hu Baoquan feared 
that reserves had declined because of the granary’s outstanding
'‘'^The relevant figures were: 133,000 shi in 1768, 108,000 in 1773, 
104,000 in 1777,451,000 in 1778,401,000 in 1779,402,000 in 1787, 
and 175,000 in 1789. GZQ-QL, vol. 32, pp. 575-6 (QL 33.11.24); vol. 33, 
pp. 355-6 (QL 38.11.10); vol. 41, pp. 54-5 (QL 42.11.18); vol. 45, pp. 
683-4 (QL 43.11); vol. 48, pp. 302-3 (QL 44.11.9); vol. 66, p. 309 (QL 
52.11.15); vol. 74, pp. 30-1 (QL 54.11.5).
Hunan tongzhi (1757), 40/la; Changsha xianzhi (1810), 9/42a. 
Hunan tongzhi (1757), 40/2a-b; Chaling xianzhi (1790), 10/3b; 
Qingquan xianzhi (1869), 4/4a.
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loans, but the main problem was the lack of contributions of grain. 
While Hu’s successor, Governor Chen Hongmou, was able to 
collect on many outstanding loans in 1756, he could not convince 
people to give more of their harvests. Between 1757 and 1780, 
despite rapid population growth, there were no new grain 
contributions in the province. Then, from 1781 onwards, Hunan 
people suddenly seemed to become generous. In 1781 Governor 
Liu Tang called for contributions and set a target of 120,000 shi of 
grain. Surprisingly, many people responded enthusiastically. 
Within two years, out of forty-five departments and counties in 
the province, fifteen surpassed their assigned targets, thirteen met 
their targets, and only seventeen fell short. In 1785 the Governor 
reported that he had collected 224,400 shi, so much that he called 
a halt to contributions.*'*®
At this point there was so much grain in both ever-normal 
and community granaries in Hunan that the provincial 
government had to lend grain to the military. Bin Wong has 
pointed out that reduced-price sales to the public dropped from 
218,681 to 60,231 shi between 1748 and 1786, as military 
disbursals increased from 59,307 to 96,548 5/zi.'^°In 1790, the 
Hunan government ordered both ever-normal and community 
granaries to send grain to military troops. This was the first time 
that community granary reserves had been used for purposes other 
than loans to local people.'^'
Bin Wong argues that the decline in granary use in Hunan 
during the last two decades of the century, despite increased 
reserves in both ever-normal and community granaries, was a 
result of official choice. He suggested that the intensive grain 
mobilization in the late 1770s and early 1780s placed an 
additional burden on granary managers and officials, in that they 
had to manage and monitor such large amounts of grain. The 
rejection of regular official monitoring at the turn of the century 
lifted this bureaucratic burden off the shoulders of local officials 
and placed it onto local leaders, giving them more social
ibid., pp. 245-82. The name of the Hunan Governor in 1781 was not 
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responsibility.'^^ It is noteworthy that these events coincided with 
a growing role of merchants in the management of city affairs, 
usually through guilds and charity organizations.'^^
But if we also look at the development of the 
long-distance riee trade on the Yangzi River, the picture changes. 
From 1780 onwards, as we have seen, bumper harvests in the 
delta made Hunan’s rice export trade much less prosperous than in 
previous decades. It is likely that the shrinking market proved a 
hardship to Hunan rice farmers, peasants who looked to their local 
officials for help. This was followed by an official call for grain 
contributions to community granaries, which when finally 
answered was of such extraordinary success that the governor had 
to call a halt. The plummeting grain prices enabled many of 
Hunan’s wealthy to earn imperial examination degrees in return 
for their contribution, much more easily than they would have 
done in a high-priced market. And in addition to community 
granaries, the ever-normal granaries also began to absorb an 
excess of local rice, as the Hunan government stopped grain 
disbursal and substantially inereased reserves, espeeially within 
the rice export zone. It is not clear how successful these measures 
were. What we do know is that Hunan officials felt overloaded by 
a surplus, and took steps to alleviate it. Besides halting the grain 
contribution, they transferred a portion of their reserves to the 
military.
On balance, the evidence provided by Kitamura is weak; 
there is much stronger evidence for a surplus of rice than for a 
growing demand in Hunan. The rice surplus altered the routine 
management of the ever-normal granaries: instead of selling the 
grain at a low price, the granaries bought much of the local grain. 
In this regard, Qing officials were still actively intervening in the 
grain flow, and the ever-normal granaries continued to function 
well in the late eighteenth century.
ibid, p. 286. Bin Wong goes into more detail to introduce this theory 
in his book. See Will and Wong, ed.. Nourish the People.
See William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese 
City, 7796-7559 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1984); 
Elisabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah 
Hospital, Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989)
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Conclusion
The investigation in this chapter clears up our questions about 
price trends of Suzhou rice in the eighteenth century. As indicated 
in Figure 3.1, the price of rice fell after 1786 and did not rebound 
until 1799. Chapter Three showed that the fall of rice prices 
between 1793 and 1798 was caused by a decline in imported 
silver; this chapter showed that due to a poor harvest in 1785 the 
price of rice was extremely high in 1786, but returned to normal in 
1787, at the end of the famine. In 1788 the price continued to drop 
in the wake of successive bumper harvests in the Yangzi delta. 
Although these abundant harvests came to an end in about 1795, 
the price of rice in Suzhou remained low because the silver 
shortage had already set in and influenced prices until 1799. In a 
nutshell, the fall in rice prices in Suzhou in the last dozen years of 
the eighteenth century was caused by the dual factors of silver 
shortages and bumper rice harvests in the delta.
Once we perceive that the decline of the long-distance 
rice trade on the Yangzi River was a result of bumper harvests in 
the delta, we can re-think the idea of a unified market in the 
eighteenth century. Modem scholarship assumes that the delta 
was so commercialized that it was unable to grow enough rice for 
its own subsistence, but that argument is weakened in that the 
volume of trade on the Yangzi was determined by the size of 
harvests in the delta. Even during the last decade of the century, as 
a result of bumper harvests, Jiangsu and Zhejiang were able to 
provide cheap and plentiful rice for their population for fairly long 
periods of time, and for this reason the flow of rice from the 
middle Yangzi slowed to a trickle. It makes little sense to assume 
that the decline of the long-distance rice trade on the Yangzi was 
caused by a growing demand for rice in Hunan itself During this 
period, especially between 1788 and 1795, rice producers in 
Hunan faced an extremely unpredictable exporting market. Their 
problem was not shortage, but over-production, and it is 
unreasonable to attribute the phenomenon to agricultural 
improvements, like the introduction of bean-cakes as fertilizer, 
since the long-distance rice trade recovered as soon as bumper 
harvests in the delta ceased, in the early nineteenth century.
If the Yangzi delta was able to provide sufficient cheap 
local rice for its population, then it cannot be considered to have
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been over-populated. In the eighteenth century, the population 
grew rapidly in the delta, but not to the extent that food shortages 
were inevitable.
The reality was that the Yangzi valley and nearby regions 
were still segmented, and that transportation costs could still be 
prohibitive unless price differentials between regions were 
exaggerated by food shortages. We may choose to think of the 
trading networks of eighteenth-century China as a prototype 
integrated market, but that does not mean that the integrated 
market extended to all provinces to which Yangzi rice was 
brought or that the market was necessarily integrated in the same 
provinces in any one year.
Yet to be considered is the role of the government in the 
evolution of the grain market. That subject covers both 




The Role Of Government 
In The Rice Trade
Did the sporadically integrated rice market, as presented in the 
previous chapter, reflect the failure of state intervention? 
Historians often view state and market as dichotomous, assuming 
that a self-regulating market can only emerge in the absence of 
state intervention. Using this supposition, Han-sheng Chuan and 
Richard A. Kraus explained the formation of a self-regulating rice 
market on the Yangzi by arguing that the three government 
methods of price stabilization—the rice tribute, the ever-normal 
granaries {changping cang), and direct official purchase and 
disbursement of grain—did not have to be used actively to be 
effective. The state did not intend to exclude merchants from the 
food market. It applied price stabilization tools only to inhibit 
speculators from making excessive profits in times of famine.'
Helen Dunstan, in her study on grain reserves, 
demonstrated a shift from state welfare activism to a more 
market-oriented approach in the mid-eighteenth century. She 
showed that the Yongzheng and early Qianlong periods were 
characterized by intense interventionism, with the government 
expanding its operation of ever-normal granaries and punishing 
hoarders. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, 
although interventionist policies and institutions remained in 
operation they were no longer being guided, elaborated, and 
developed by active imperial direction. Some high officials even 
adopted a market approach to a food crisis; because of their 
advocacy, in 1748 the Qianlong emperor ordered ever-normal 
granaries to revert to their old storage quotas, cutting back on 
stocking targets. This imperial order marked the decline of active 
intervention in the grain trade, and signified the emergence of a 
rudimentary economic liberalism in China.^
’ Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch ’ing Rice Markets and Trade, pp. 28-39.
^ Helen Dunstan, State or Merchant?: Political Economy and Political 
Process in 1740s China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London:
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This chapter will show that the negative impact of 
ever-normal granaries on the market was small. The major threat 
to a self-regulating rice market actually came from 
inter-provincial blockage of trade, mainly through provincial 
governments trying to keep grain prices low in their own 
jurisdictions. This chapter also argues that it was the central 
government that broke these provincial blockades and 
successfully upheld the principle of free trade along the Yangzi 
valley in the eighteenth century.
"Nourishing The People"
The Qing grain policy was based on traditional political 
philosophy, in which, as Bin Wong has pointed out, "nourishing 
the people" (yangmin) was paramount. This concept originated in 
Guanzi, a Han dynasty collection of materials written over several 
centuries about the way to achieve political stability, which said: 
"If the people lack sufficient [food], [the prince’s] orders will be 
scorned. If the people suffer hardships, his orders will not be 
carried out."^ In other words, rulers needed to guarantee the food 
supply to avoid social unrest. This political philosophy dominated 
the grain policy in traditional dynasties, including the Qing."* The 
Qing government believed that it had an obligation to protect the 
people from starvation. The question was how that goal could be 
achieved.
The Qing government recognized that market forces 
could stabilize prices on their own, but feared that speculators 
would de-stabilize them. This belief led to an ambivalent grain 
policy: on the one hand, the govenunent encouraged
inter-regional grain trade; on the other, it tried to punish 
speculators.^ Hoarding was illegal; Qing law stated that people
Harvard University Asia Center, 2006); see also Dunstan, Conflicting 
Counsels, pp. 8-9, 247-64, 327-33.
^ W. Allyn Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical 
Essays from Early China, A Study and Translation (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), vol. 1, p. 142.
Wong, “Chinese traditions of grain storage,” pp. 1-3.
^ An essay from Zhang Qian, an early nineteenth-century Anhui scholar, 
echoes this opinion. Zhang categorized “merchants” as itinerant traders 
(xingshang) or resident traders (zuogu). Itinerant traders were regarded
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who hoarded grain would be punished and their grain 
confiscated.^
Despite the law, some local officials considered the ban 
unrealistic and were cautious about punishing hoarders. In the 
famine of 1742 and 1743, Chen Hongmou (1696-1771), the 
Governor of Jiangxi province, rejected the use of punishment to 
compel the rich to sell their grain, seeking instead to persuade 
wealthy households to display their magnanimity by selling their 
grain to the needy. Chen was not here showing a partiality for the 
rich. He disliked hoarders, condemning them as greedy exploiters. 
Nevertheless, he understood that coerced sales were not a good 
way to increase the food supply; on the contrary, such measures 
had a tendency to backfire, and exacerbate rather than resolve the 
crisis.^ In the 1740s, in fact, coerced sales worsened a famine in 
the lower Yangzi.
By the 1740s, probably because of the boom in the rice 
trade, Zhejiang officials wrote that wealthy merchants were 
hoarding rice in pawnshops.^ In 1744, the Anhui Governor Fan 
Can described the situation as follows:
[In Anhui,] a kind of speculators pawn [their grain] so 
as to avoid being referred to as hoarders. They first 
agree upon the interest to be charged by wealthy 
households or pawnshops, and when they have
as good merchants. Trading from one place to another, they contributed 
to ‘"hutong youwu" (exchanging between places that have and those that 
have not). Resident traders were considered immoral: they paid no travel 
costs, but amassed grain they bought from itinerant traders, and would 
not sell it until its price had risen to an exorbitant level. They were 
condemned for greed, and for profiting at the expense of the poor. See 
Zhang Qian, “Beihuang tonglun” (n.d.; in Qingjingshi wenbiari), 
39/9a-14b. Zhang Qian obtained his jinshi degree in 1811.
* In the Qinding Da Qing huidiati shili (Precedents and regulations 
supplementing the Collected statutes), there was a category of “strict 
prohibition of hoarding and grain-wine brewing” {yanjin tunji zaoqu), 
which recorded several imperial orders against hoarding, and against 
using grain to make alcohol. See Qinding Da Qing huidian shili, 
191/25b-32a.
’ See Rowe, Saving the World, pp. 180-1.
** Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, pp. 146-8 (QL 9.3.7).
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received money from the mortgage, they purchase 
[more rice] and pawn [it]. [In this way,] with only one 
to two hundred taels of silver [as capital], they can 
pawn up to a thousand shi [of rice]. If they have four to 
five hundred taels, they can mortgage a few thousand 
shi. Despite their meagre capital, their turnover can be 
quite substantial.®
This memorial shows that, instead of putting rice in warehouses, 
storing rice in pawnshops became a widespread practice for Anhui 
hoarders. Pawning rice was popular for two reasons: first, 
pawning was legal while hoarding was not; and second, pawning 
gave speculators a way to raise money to buy even more grain.
In an attempt to stamp out this version of hoarding the 
Governor of Anhui declared that nobody could pawn more than 
50 shi of rice.'° It is not clear whether this measure worked, but at 
least the governor had drawn the central government’s attention to 
the practice of pawning. The governor’s measure received some 
support at court, and in the same year the Board of Revenue 
ordered officials in the lower Yangzi to investigate such practices 
in their own jurisdictions and suggest a solution." This order 
reveals that the Qing government now considered rice pawning 
another form of hoarding, and therefore illegal.
Chen Dashou, who had become the Governor of Jiangsu 
in 1741, defended the hoarders.'^ In a 1745 memorial he argued 
that some price fluctuation was natural:
At the autumn harvest, there are many sellers in the 
market, and the price will of necessity be low. But in 
the interim between the first and second harvests, the 
farmers have no stocks of grain to sell, and the price 
invariably rises. That the price should be low at one 
time and high at another, sometimes falling and
® Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 2344-6 (QL 9.4.26). This 
memorial was also recorded, but briefly, in Gaozong shilu, 215/23b-24b.
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 2344-6 (QL 9.4.26).
" ibid., pp. 2718-21 (QL 10.1.8).
" Chen worked as Anhui Governor from 1739 to 1741, and Suzhou 
Governor from 1741 to 1746.
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sometimes rising, is a normal phenomenon and does 
not arise entirely from hoarding.
Chen admitted that rice hoarding existed, but pointed out 
that it was only short-term because;
Rice is not like other goods, which can be stored for 
several years. All the grain stocked up by rich 
households is generally put on sale before the 
following year’s autumn harvest; there is definitely no 
holding over into the next year. This means that what 
is harvested in one year in fact supplies that year’s 
needs.
According to Chen, therefore, rice hoarders who engaged 
in high speculation did not exist. Rice could not be stored for a 
long period of time, so it was in the interest of hoarders to off-load 
on the short term. Moreover, these merchants contributed greatly 
to local grain markets, and therefore should not be obstructed by 
the government. Chen said:
As for the grain sold by the population, those 
shopkeepers whose capital is limited already sell as 
soon as they have bought, realizing but the tiniest of 
profits with which to keep themselves alive. There are, 
however, recurrent cases of those merchants whose 
capital is somewhat substantial accumulating stocks 
through minor purchases and awaiting a good price. 
Although this is the working of the merchant’s 
profit-seeking heart, once the price is high, the rice is 
sold, and thus remains available for consumption 
within the local area. The market does not run short of 
rice; the market price is kept from rising even higher.
[Italics mine.]
He warned that this normal circulation of rice would be 




Since merchants care only for profit, [if the law 
against hoarding is enforced] they will pile their 
stocks onto boats, and transport it [to sell] elsewhere.'^
Helen Dunstan cited Chen’s views as an example of a 
rudimentary form of economic liberalism. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that his opinion about a self-regulating market was a 
minority voice.His anxiety about the loss of grain if hoarding 
was disallowed became more widely shared in the government 
after a series of administrative disasters in local grain policy. In 
1747 and 1748, when both the Jiangsu and Zhejiang governors 
prohibited hoarding, the consequences were exactly as Chen had 
predicted, and both provinces were depleted of grain as merchants 
took it elsewhere to sell. (See Chapter Three and Chapter Four.) In 
later decades, although the law remained on the books, it was 
rarely enforced, and the practice of pawning grain continued 
unchecked. In 1757, grain merchants in Zhaowen county, Suzhou, 
petitioned the government against local pawnshops, complaining 
of the pawnshops’ additional charges, apart from ordinary interest, 
at the time of redemption. The Governor proclaimed the 
additional charges to be illegal and erected a large stone tablet, 
inscribed to that effect, in the county.'*’ In this proclamation, the 
Governor forbade the pawnshops to colleet additional charges, but 
not the interest on the pawning of grain. In this way, the Governor 
openly accepted rice pawning.
The implicit suspension of the ban on hoarding did not 
mean that the Qing government abandoned its attempts to control
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 2718-21 (QL 10.1.8). See 
Helen Dunstan’s translation in Conflicting Counsels, p. 277.
Helen Dunstan, Conflicting Counsels, pp. 259-61.
Chen Hongmou supported a self-regulating market when he was the 
Jiangxi Governor between 1741 and 1743. But when he later worked in 
Shaanxi, a much poorer province, he intervened in the market. In both 
1747 and 1748, when Shaanxi had poor harvests, he prohibited the 
export of grain, which was chiefly millet, to neighboring provinces. See 
Rowe, Saving the World, p. 178.
“Jinzhi xiangdian kesuo chuzhan qianwen shi shike” (1757; comp, in 
Jiangsu sheng Ming-Qing yilai beike ziliao xuanii [Jiangsu: Sanlian 
shudian, 1959]), pp. 651-2.
120
Role of Government
the grain market. But the government came to rely more on other 
measures, such as reduced-price sales (pingtiao), to stabilize the 
price of grain.
Reduced-Price Sales
As we have seen, when grain shortages occurred, local officials 
put government grain on the market at a discount to bring the 
market price down. If this grain came from the diversion or 
retention of the grain tribute, magistrates had to remit the proceeds 
of the sale to the Board of Revenue. If the grain was taken from 
the ever-normal granaries, the magistrates had to use the proceeds 
to replenish the granaries later.'’After the reduced-price sales, 
magistrates had to purchase, on the market, the same amount of 
grain that they had sold. They usually bought in harvest seasons, 
when grain was cheaper.
The success of government control of the market 
depended on the amount of capital it was willing to input. If the 
government sold its grain to the public at a very low price, it could 
defeat speculators and stabilize grain prices, but at a huge loss of 
revenue. Pierre-Etienne Will has claimed that the reduced-price 
sales in the second half of the eighteenth century were ineffective, 
in that the government only allowed sales to be minimally below 
current prices; such sales could not check inflation.'" In the first 
forty years of the century, magistrates had been free to decide for 
themselves on the sale price, and might sell government rice quite 
cheaply to needy people. Fujian magistrates often sold rice at such 
low prices that the income from the sales was too small to buy 
back the same amount of rice at the autumn harvest.'®
” QindingDa Qing huidian shili, 189/17a-23a. Ever-normal granaries 
in the Yangzi delta were required to sell 30 per cent of their reserves each 
year, an amount set in Jiangnan in 1695. See QindingDa Qing huidian 
shili, 189/17a-b. In years of extremely poor harvests, amounts were 
larger. Pierre-Etienne Will has provided a detailed account of the 
management of the ever-normal granaries; see his “Part II: Stmctural 
problems,” in Will and Wong with Lee, ed.. Nourish the People, pp. 
103-93.
Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China, pp. 
183-4.
'® Gao Qizhuo, the Governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang,
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The Qing government did not set a rule on price reduction 
until Jiangsu Governor Zhang Qu presented a proposal in 1739, in 
which he attributed the heavy deficit in granary reserves to the 
chronic practice of selling government grain too cheaply.^® He 
suggested that only a narrow margin should be allowed between 
the official price and the market price, proposing that for each shi 
of unhusked grain {gu), price reductions not exceed 0.05 taels 
normally, and 0.1 taels in times of extremely high prices.^’ The 
Qing court immediately accepted Zhang’s proposal, which 
deprived magistrates of the right to decide the selling price, and 
ordered that it be implemented in all provinces.^^
The 1739 rule undoubtedly guaranteed the ever-normal 
granaries self-financing status, but such meagre reductions in the 
sales could hardly benefit the poor, as Yue Jun, Provincial 
Governor of Jiangxi, pointed out a year later. He emphasized that 
the new rule permitted only a small reduction, and because that 
reduction was calculated in unhusked grain, the savings in husked 
grain were only half as much. That is to say, for each shi of husked 
grain, the actual reductions were only 0.025 taels in normal years 
and 0.05 taels in periods of extremely high prices. Yue Jun argued 
that since poor people could only afford to buy a little grain, their 
savings were nonexistent. If they paid in copper cash, they 
actually lost on the conversion rate between copper and silver as 
set by the sub-bureaucrats in charge of the operation.^^
condemned the Fujian magistrates who cared only about pleasing the 
people, and ignored the huge losses in granary reserves. See [Yongzheng] 
Zhupiyuzhi, 45.84b (YZ 4.7.18). This memorial is also found in Qingshi 
gao (repr. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976-77), p. 3556.
In 1739, Jiangsu governor Zhang Qu wrote that the large reductions in 
the reduced-price sales in his province had caused not only a great loss 
of granary reserves, but also undermined the function of the sales. Ac­
cording to him, if the government rice was sold at a very low price, it 
would be sold out within a short time, leaving local officials with no rice 
to fend off grain speculators. See Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 54, 
pp. 2809-13 (QL 4.8.15).
Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China, pp. 
183-4. See also Gaozong shilu, 169/7b (QL 7.6).
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 54, pp. 3164-6 (QL 5.6.13).
ibid., reel no. 54.3164-6 (QL 5.6.13).
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Even the Qianlong emperor agreed that the new rule was 
inappropriate. In 1742, he claimed that the government should not 
sacrifice the poor in the fight against hoarders. He said:
If we forbid greater reduction of the price of rice 
simply because of the speculation of evil people, then 
the poor people would have to wail over their hunger 
and still find it hard to survive. How can we do that!^‘*
To revise the current rules he called for suggestions from the 
provincial authorities.^^
Thus encouraged, some officials responded. Censor Zhao 
Qingli suggested greater price reductions in bad years. Li Qingzhi, 
the Vice Supervisor of the Household (Shao Zhanshi), suggested 
resuming the former practice of allowing local officials to decide 
on the sale price. Two officials proposed uncoupling the link 
between the price of government grain and market prices. In 1743, 
Zhang Zhao, Minister of the Board of Punishment, suggested that 
when setting the selling price, the government should consider 
only the original purchasing cost, while Shen Qiyuan, the 
Provincial Administration Commissioner of Zhili province, 
proposed that the selling price should equal the purchase price.^’ 
Although the emperor’s edict had made a point of his 
benevolence to the poor, he criticized the latter suggestions as 
being “unworkable in the extreme” (butong zhiji), since they 
would not allow magistrates to restock their granaries when grain 
prices kept rising.^*
Despite much opposition, the rules proposed by Zhang 
Qu remained in effect.^’ The only amendment was that, in times of 
serious famine, the imperial government would grant greater
Gaozong shilu, 169/8a (QL 7.6).
ibid., 169/8b-9a (QL 7.6). See also Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in 
Eighteenth-Century China, pp. 184-5.
Qian Chenqun, “Qing jian tiaojia jie zizhong shu” (1743; in Qing 
jingshi wenbian, 40/12b.
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 49, pp. 2236-9 (QL 8.6.8). 
ibid.
Hubuzeli (1864; repr. Taipei: Chengwen shuju, 1966), 16/13b.
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reductions by special imperial favour {te But such special 
imperial favours were rarely granted. The only occasions were the 
reductions in Zhili in 1743,^' Gansu in 1759, Jehol in 1763, 
Shandong in 1783, and Anhui in 1786. Wang Qingyun 
(1798-1862), the clearest writer on Qing dynasty administrative 
history, after documenting the few cases listed above, implicitly 
criticized the Qing emperors for being so miserly towards the 
needy.^^
The ineffectiveness of reduced-price sales was also 
documented in many memorials that depicted merchants as their 
main customers. In 1745, the Governor of Shengjing District 
criticized the reduced-price sales in Fengtian province as being a 
mere formality (xuying gushi). He noted that when a 
reduced-price sale occurred, the magistrate simply advised 
wealthy local merchants and speculators to buy up the 
government grain secretly, which enabled the magistrate to save 
labour costs and make a huge private profit.^^ In the same year, the 
Governor-general of Liangjiang condemned the widespread 
collaboration between yamen sub-bureaucrats and rice shop 
owners.^'* In 1747, a censor wrote that it took only about ten days 
before half of the government grain sold in a reduced-price sale 
flowed into the rice shops. In the same year, a Zhejiang magistrate 
was impeached for selling 1,930 shi of rice from his ever-normal 
granaries directly to a rice shop.^^
That local rice merchants were the best customers of the 
reduced-price sales was ironic but inevitable. Unlike the poor.
Wang Qingyun, Shiquyuji (n.d.; repr. Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1985), 
p. \%5\ anA Hubu zeli, 16/13b.
See Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China, p. 
185.
Wang Qingyun, Shiquyuji, p. 186.
Gaozong shilu, 243/16a (QL 10.6).
Yun Jishan, the Governor-general of Liangjiang stated: “The clerks 
impeded [the reduced-price sales] for their own benefit. They 
collaborated with rice shops and speculated in government grain. 
Numerous kinds of cunning malpractices and hundreds of clever 
swindles are found.” See Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 
2846-7 (QL 10.6.6).
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 56, pp. 720-4 (QL 12.10.13).
124
Role of Government
merchants could afford to buy grain in large enough quantities to 
feel that they had made a bargain. Although the savings on each 
shi was small, it added up, and was considerable on large 
purchases. Ordinary people still bought grain from the 
ever-normal granaries, but through merchants as middlemen. 
Purchasing rice from merchants was much more convenient than 
negotiating the complexities of the official bureaucracy for what 
amounted to a miniscule discount.
In short, the reduced-price sales were a failure because of 
insufficient government backing. The Qing government was 
unwilling to allow the reduced price to be low enough that 
ordinary people, buying in small amounts, could realize a savings, 
and get relief from high grain prices.
The reduced-price sales may, however, have been more 
significant in terms of inter-provincial trade than in the retail 
market. In the following section I shall show that whenever 
provincial governments in the middle Yangzi valley enforced a 
grain embargo, the inter-provincial grain transfer (xiebo), 
followed by a reduced-price sale, became a way for the delta 
population to acquire grain in times of famine.
Central Versus Provincial Government In The Grain Trade 
Yet another area where the central government played a role was 
in inter-provincial grain circulation. Again, the net results of the 
policy were ambiguous, for although the Qing court favored the 
free flow of grain in the provinces, provincial governments might 
not. When grain was plentiful, there was no conflict of interest, 
but when shortages caused prices to rise, local officials acted to 
prevent drains on domestic rice and protect their own urban 
population. Their main preoccupation was to keep grain prices 
low within their own jurisdictions, even when it meant setting up 
artificial barriers to dam the flow of grain out of their provinces.
Such barriers were easy to erect. The bulk of the grain 
traveled down the Yangzi and the rice trade was concentrated in 
several large cities that lay along the Yangzi or its tributaries, such 
as Wucheng in Jiangxi, Changsha in Hunan, and Hankou in Hubei. 
As soon as local officials blocked the export of grain at the major 
piers, long-distance trade was interrupted. The export ban of 1708 
is a good case in point. In that year the lower Yangzi region.
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especially Jiangning, had a poor autumn harvest due to persistent 
rainfall. By the fifth lunar month, prices were rising. In normal 
years this seasonal price fluctuation would easily have been 
stabilized by the grain trade from the middle Yangzi, but this was 
not a normal year, and trade was interrupted. According to Cao 
Yin, Director of the Jiangning Imperial Silk Manufacturing, all the 
provinces (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui) that supplied 
Jiangning had banned their grain export. While Anhui later 
relaxed its ban, the other provinces did not. The export ban in the 
middle Yangzi drove up grain prices not only in Jiangning, but in 
the whole lower Yangzi region. In the sixth lunar month, Li Xu, 
the Director of the Suzhou Imperial Silk Manufacturing, wrote 
that grain prices were soaring in Suzhou as well. To break through 
the blockade, Li Xu and Cao Yin jointly invited a salt merchant to 
transport rice from Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei to Suzhou and 
Jiangning. The salt merchant bought the rice, but in the seventh 
lunar month he was still barred from leaving with it. In the eighth 
lunar month, with the export ban still in effect, Anhui, which had 
allowed its grain to be sent to the lower Yangzi, also had grain 
shortages. The middle Yangzi export ban was not repealed until 
the ninth lunar month, and then grain prices began to fall in the 
lower Yangzi.^^ Thus, even when the harvest was poor in the delta 
region, an export ban in the provinces up-river could disrupt 
long-distance trade.
Grain smuggling existed during blockades, but only on a 
small scale unless powerful local families and officials protected 
the smugglers. Many officials refused to help smugglers because 
they dared not undermine their provincial governor’s policy. If an 
official allowed smuggling, he had to be prepared to openly 
confront his governor, as happened in the 1708 case discussed 
above. In the sixth lunar month, after the Governor of Hunan, 
Zhao Shenqiao, halted grain export from Hunan, Provincial 
Administration Commissioner Dong Zhaozuo, though 
subordinate to him, secretly allowed a number of merchants’ grain
Kangxichao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian, vol. 2, p. 40 (KX 47.5.18), 
p. 48 (KX 47.5.25), p. 59 (KX 47.5), p. 102 (KX 47.6), p. 127 (KX 47.7), 




boats to leave Hunan. In revenge Zhao issued a public 
proclamation that the poor could buy rice at a discount from the 
Provincial Administrative Commissioner’s office; and a mob 
went to Dong’s yamen demanding reduced-price sales. This 
event must have damaged Dong’s reputation; immediately 
afterwards he was removed from office. So although it was legal 
to do so, few officials would have helped grain merchants if it 
meant going against the governor of their province.
It is not clear when Hunan and Hubei relaxed the export 
ban, but they must have done so by the sixth lunar month of the 
following year. On the first of that month, Zhao Shenqiao wrote 
that rice boats had been leaving Hunan one at a time for the lower 
Yangzi.^* He had probably permitted grain to be exported again 
because the famine had ended. Two months earlier, the price of 
rice in Jiangning had already returned to normal.Since the 
demand for rice from the lower Yangzi had been greatly reduced, 
there was no more need for the ban. Furthermore, at the end of the 
fifth lunar month the Kangxi emperor had issued an edict to the 
Governors of Hunan and Hubei, reminding them to allow grain 
boats to depart from their provinces, so as to guarantee the food 
supply in Jiangsu and Zhejiang.'*®
An edict from the throne was the most effective way of 
breaking a provincial blockade. Like the Kangxi emperor, the 
Yongzheng emperor stressed the importance of the free circulation
Although Dong had permitted grain boats to leave Changsha, he had 
broken no law. Allowing grain boats to go to famine-stricken provinces 
went along with the notion of free circulation of grain the court favoured. 
But Zhao took offense, regarding Dong’s actions as a criticism of his 
own policy. Zhao’s revenge backfired. The Provincial Administration 
Commissioner encouraged the mob in his yamen to get rice from the 
county magistrate in charge of the local ever-normal granary. When the 
mob stormed the magistrate’s office the magistrate escaped and rushed 
into the Governor’s office. The mob followed him, damaging the office. 
The Governor finally persuaded them to leave by ordering the granaries 
to open immediately. See Zhao Gongyigong [Shenqiao] tenggao (1892; 
repr. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1975), 16b/30a.
Kangxichao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian, vol. 2, p. 470 (KX 48.6.1). 
” ibid., p. 395 (KX 48.4.2). 
ibid., p. 470 (KX 48.6.1).
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of grain. In 1723, shortly after succeeding to the throne, he 
rebuked the Governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, Yang 
Zongren, for blocking the grain trade at Hankou.'*' He said:
Rice and salt are the daily necessities of the commoner.
You should let traders put them into circulation. In this 
way, prices will be normalized and people will not 
suffer... [However,] you disregard the wider interest 
{bu 'an dati) and disappoint my trust in you.''^
The Yongzheng emperor ended by ordering Yang 
Zongren to reopen the Hankou grain trade immediately."*^ The 
imperial edict assured the free flow of rice along the Yangzi from 
1724 to 1727, during a severe rice shortage in the delta. As a result, 
the long-distance rice trade became extremely prosperous in the 
Yangzi during this period (see Chapter Four, above).
But imperial edicts against export bans were not always 
forthcoming. In 1732 both the Hubei and Hunan provincial 
governments, panicked by skyrocketing grain prices, banned the 
export of grain to the lower Yangzi. In the second lunar month of 
1732, Maizhu, Governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, wrote that 
to make sure that grain did not vanish from Hubei, he planned to 
halt all kinds of boats carrying rice, and prevent them from leaving 
Hankou."** In the twelfth lunar month of the same year, to stabilize 
rice prices in Changsha, Hunan Governor Zhao Hong’en also 
prohibited grain exports.*^ The embargo in these two provinces 
paralyzed commercial grain transport between the middle and 
lower Yangzi in 1732; but this time the Yongzheng emperor did 
not order the ban to be lifted.
Without pressure from the throne, the lower Yangzi could 
only import rice from Hubei and Hunan in times of embargo by an 
inter-provincial grain transfer through the ever-normal granaries.
"*’ It is not clear when in 1723 the ban was imposed, but according to a 
memorial it was blocked in the tenth lunar month. See GZD-YZ, vol. 1, p. 
910 (YZ 1.10).
"*^ [Yongzheng] Zhupiyuzhi, 2/38a-b (YZ 1.10.16).
"*^ ibid.
** GZD-YZ, vol. 19, p. 482 (YZ 10.2.22). 
ibid., vol. 20, p. 877 (YZ 10.12.4).
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Yamamoto Susumu pointed out that the inter-provincial grain 
transfer was used to get government grain moving between 
provinces as early as 1689, and became more common in the 
1720s.''^ Its impact was more significant in 1732 when free trade 
had ground to a halt. While forbidding grain to leave Hubei and 
Hunan, both Maizhu and Zhao Hong’en agreed that the Jiangsu 
provincial government, with advance notice, could send official 
buyers to the two provinces to purchase rice directly from 
ever-normal granaries at a price negotiated among themselves. 
Zhao did not state how much grain the Hunan government could 
transfer to Jiangsu, but Maizhu indicated that the Hubei 
government was prepared to transfer 100,000 to 200,000 shi of 
rice.''’ These amounts were obviously small scale, but they were 
all to be delivered to the Jiangsu government from the middle 
Yangzi.
Since imperial intervention could affect the free 
circulation of grain, as it did in the 1720s and 1730s, the question 
has to be asked how this intervention was exercised. Imperial 
policies on grain, as we will see below, were intertwined with 
other policies, and were even dependent upon an emperor’s 
whims.
In 1731 fighting between government troops and tribes in 
southwest China had intensified. The court had ordered Sichuan 
province to supply grain to the military. This gave the province 
good grounds for a local export ban on grain, to avoid speculation 
and a grain shortage. When Hunan and Hubei complained of a 
shortfall of grain because of the Sichuan ban, the emperor allowed 
them to impose similar export bans in their own provinces, albeit 
only temporarily. In 1733, when Qing troops had overcome 
resistance in the southwest, the emperor ordered Sichuan to lift the 
ban immediately."* Once Sichuan reopened trade, Hunan and
According to Yamamoto, the inter-provincial grain transfer was viable 
in the 1720s because rice-producing provinces, owing to the encour­
agement of the Yongzheng emperor, had stored sizable amounts of grain 
in their ever-normal granaries. See his “Shindai zenki no heiseri 
seisaku”.
GZD-YZ, vol. 19, p. 482 (YZ 10.2.22).
Shizu shilu, 127/lb-2a(YZ 11.1).
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Hubei lifted their bans.'*’ Within the first six months of 1734, five 
million shi of rice were transported from Hankou to the lower 
Yangzi provinces.^®
When the Qianlong emperor came to the throne, he 
continued his father’s practice of ordering local officials to allow 
grain to move freely whenever a famine occurred, but such efforts 
were awkward to enforce.^' In 1739, realizing that Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, and Anhui had reaped poor harvests, the Qianlong 
emperor transmitted a decree to Hunan and Hubei, reminding 
these two rice-producing provinces not to block grain transport.^^ 
In 1748, in response to a complaint about many rice-producing 
districts along the Yangzi valley, the Board of Revenue ordered all 
officials in the valley immediately to remove all barriers to trade.^^ 
When Zhejiang had grain shortages in 1751, the emperor 
"reminded" the Jiangsu provincial government to permit grain 
boats to leave for Zhejiang/'' In 1755 the lower Yangzi had poor 
harvests again, and, after receiving a report that grain flows had 
been halted, the emperor decreed that the governments of Sichuan, 
Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi immediately lift their export bans. The 
tone of the decrees indicated his anger.^^ In 1778, he reprimanded 
the Governor-general of Hunan and Hubei and the Governor of 
Hubei for the ban in Hankou.^^ In the great famine of 1785, the 
emperor had to repeatedly demand a free flow of rice along the 
Yangzi River. That year the lower Yangzi, in addition to Hunan
GZD-YZ, vol. 21, p. 115 (YZ 11.2.10).
[Yongzheng] Zhupiyuzhi, 54/86b (YZ 12.7.8).
In 1737, the second year of his reign, the central government 
proclaimed a penalty for provincial officials who interfered with the free 
flow of grain. Punishments ranged from a salary cuts to demotions. See 
Gaozong shilu, 49/2b-3a (QL 2.9). These punishments, however, were 
rarely applied.
Gaozong shilu, 82/4b-5a (QL 3.12).
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 56, pp. 1079-80 (QL 13.5.4); 
Gaozong shilu, 314/12b (QL 13.5), 314/36b (QL 13.5).
Gaozong shilu, 395/28a-b (QL 16.7); see also GZD-QL, vol. ftp. 466 
(QL 16.8.21).
GZD-QL, vol. 13, p. 71 (QL 20.11.23); Gaozong shilu, 502/10a-b (QL 
20.12).
GZD-QL, vol. 44, pp. 383-5 (QL 43.7.29).
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and Hubei, suffered serious drought. Along the valley, Sichuan 
and Jiangxi became the major rice-supplying provinces. In the 
eighth and ninth lunar months alone, the emperor sent at least six 
decrees to different governors in the Yangzi, demanding a free 
grain trade.^^
Though clumsy, these repeated imperial decrees managed 
to maintain free inter-provincial grain circulation in each major 
famine year of the Qianlong reign. In the famine year 1785, for 
example, with close surveillance from the throne, the grain trade 
flourished. Within the eighth and ninth lunar months, Jiangxi 
exported a total of 98,400 shi of rice to Hubei and 147,000 shi of 
rice to the lower Yangzi.^* Sichuan’s export was even more 
substantial. According to a memorial in the middle of the ninth 
lunar month, around seven or eight boats, each carrying 400 to 
500 shi of rice, left the province for downriver every day.^’
While the edicts of the Qianlong emperor were effective, 
there was no unified institution to guarantee the free flow of grain. 
Local officials always wanted to hold onto their grain, especially 
in famine years. The central government had to be vigilant, 
ordering the removal of such trade barriers whenever they were 
imposed.
The effectiveness of the emperor’s ad hoc measures, of 
course, depended on the authority of the central government. In 
the eighteenth century the powerful Kangxi, Yongzheng, and 
Qianlong emperors maintained a free grain flow within the Qing 
Empire. The prosperity of the inter-provincial rice trade along the 
Yangzi valley was a result of this vigorous imperial intervention.
” Gaozong shilu, 1236/29a-30b (QL 50.8); 1237/13a-14b (QL 50.8), 
1237/21a-b (QL 50.8); 1238/19a-20b (QL 50.9); 1239/1 la-12a (QL 
50.9); Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 57, pp. 3078-82 (QL 50.9.13).
Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 51, pp. 1592-3 (QL 50.10.13).
Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 57, pp. 3083-4 (QL 50.9.16). Further 
evidence indicates that Sichuan exported more than 610,000 shi of rice 
to other provinces in the second half of 1785. See Lufu zouzhe, 
microfilm, reel no. 51, pp. 1681-3 (QL 50.12.11); Zhupi zouzhe, 





It is common for historians to view economic development in the 
Qing as a battle between market forces and state intervention. This 
is not groundless. In the great surge of market growth, the early 
Qing government put the lofty Confucian ideal of “nourish the 
people” into action, disallowing grain hoarding and establishing 
an empire-wide granary system. Through reduced-price sales, the 
government intended to relieve its people from violent price 
fluctuations.
Although the reduced-priee sale was a social service, its 
management followed market operation. In the Qianlong period, 
local officials were allowed to sell the grain for only slightly 
below market price, to guarantee that they could buy back the 
same amount of replacement grain with the proceeds. The general 
public saved so little money at the reduced-price sales that the 
inconvenience of buying rice through the official bureaucracy was 
not worth the savings. Some of the government grain flowed to 
consumers through rice merchants, who were the only people who 
could afford to buy in bulk and in this way realize a savings, and 
who then made a profit from re-selling the grain. It is not 
surprising that Gao Wangling, reviewing the ever-normal granary 
administration, concluded that state intervention in the food 
market had failed utterly.^®
But, as Karl Polanyi stressed,, long-distance trade did not 
occur naturally, and was hardly possible without state 
intervention.*’' In the Qing, state intervention was instrumental in 
the functioning of the long-distance grain trade. Provincial 
governments, especially in the middle reaches of the Yangzi valley, 
were inclined to hold onto their grain, keeping their own regional 
grain prices low with export bans. But as long as the central 
government was powerful enough to implement it, the free flow of 
grain was maintained.
“ Gao Wangling, Huozhe de chuantong: Shiba shiji Zhongguo de jingji 
fazhan he zhengfu zhengce (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 
1995), pp. 157-64.
Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 60-3.
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Conclusion:
The Sporadically Integrated Market, 
A Primordial Stage In 
Market Development In China
The conclusions of this book stand in opposition to the model of 
Jiangnan economy prevailing in the literature. That model 
assumes that in the early eighteenth century "proto-industrial" 
development in the Yangzi delta had displaced agriculture and 
created in that region a deficit in food, resulting in yearly and 
sizable importations of rice from the middle Yangzi valley. The 
model also assumes that through the exchange between industrial 
goods from the delta and agricultural goods from its peripheral 
regions, a unified national market gradually emerged. To many 
historians, these two developments demonstrate that China, like 
other countries at that time, had been on the path to capitalism.'
The obvious question follows: why did capitalism, or a 
capitalistic mode of production, not fully emerge? Historians have 
provided different explanations, such as an impairment of 
domestic household industries in light of the massive import of 
western industrial goods, an absence of technological break­
through in China, the delta's difficulty in importing the natural 
resources, especially rice and timber, necessary for sustaining its 
industrial growth, and so on.^ Instead of taking issue with these
' Vladimir I. Lenin argued that these two developments led to the 
emergence of capitalism in Russia during the nineteenth century. 
According to him, the growth of a home market enlarged commodity 
circulation, and stimulated commodity production, which led to the 
development of a large-scale machine industry, and equally important, 
the divorcement of an ever-growing part of the population from 
agriculture, i.e., the growth of the industrial population at the expense of 
the agricultural population in nineteenth-century Russia. See Vladimir I. 
Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1956), pp. 606-60.
^ See Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, ed., Zhongguo ziben zhuyi de 
mengya (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1985), p. 731; Elvin, Ths Pattern of
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answers, this study has sought to demonstrate that the two afore­
said assumptions on which the question is based are exag­
gerations.
It is beyond doubt that the Yangzi delta led industrial 
development in late imperial China. From 1500 onwards, its 
flourishing silk export brought an influx of silver from Japan and 
Manila; and the delta became the centre of market development in 
its home market. In return for silver, silk cloth, and other 
industrial products, neighboring regions sent their rice or other 
local produce to the delta. The home market expanded quickly and 
sustained the growth of the weaving industry, even though its silk 
export gradually declined in the mid-seventeenth century. As a 
result of this industrial and commercial development, the 
non-agricultural population grew in the delta. Accompanied by 
this growth was a flourishing rice import from the middle Yangzi 
valley in the eighteenth century.
But as we have seen, the delta was still agriculturally rich 
in the eighteenth century, so rich that it was able to provide 
enough rice for its own growing population whenever it reaped a 
bumper harvest. The question of whether the delta bumper 
harvests were a new development is worth investigating. Bozhong 
Li argued that rice yields rose quickly in the early and mid-Qing 
due to a more rational use of agricultural resources like cultivated 
land and water, human labor, and animal labor, and by more 
intensive production; that is, by increasing the amount of labor 
and capital invested in a given area of cultivated land.^ While I do 
not oppose the idea of a general agricultural development, 
especially in the late eighteenth century, I am cautious about 
attributing what we see in this study to this factor. The process of 
agricultural development would likely be gradual and consistent, 
but the good years in the lower Yangzi—in 1756-57, 1767-68, 
1772-73, 1777-78, and 1782-83—were sudden and intermittent 
(although there was a sustained period of good harvests between 
1788 and 1795). What this shows is that, even in the last decade of
the Chinese Past, pp. 285-319; Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, pp. 
246-51,289-90.
^ a. Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620-1850, pp. 10-1, and 
more elaborations in pp. 57-97.
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the eighteenth eentury, the lower Yangzi was able to feed its own 
population through local rice production. I do not argue that the 
region no longer needed to import rice. As a matter of fact, in 
many other years in the second half of the century and also after 
1795, the lower Yangzi continued to import a large amount of rice 
from the middle Yangzi. But the key to the pattern of the rice trade 
was weather, and the lower Yangzi climate in the second half of 
the century was better for growing rice than it had been in the first 
half; as a result, the flow of rice from the middle Yangzi slowed to 
a trickle.
Once we suppose that the size of the rice trade in the 
Yangzi depended on the harvest in the delta, we can rethink the 
difficulties of rice farming in the middle Yangzi region. Instead of 
meeting a demand from a stable and growing non-agricultural 
population in the delta, middle-Yangzi farmers faced a very 
variable demand, one that changed from year to year depending 
upon the vagaries of the weather. Rice farming in the middle 
Yangzi was risky. Although farmers were able to make big profits 
when the delta suffered front drought, flood, or famine, they could 
lose all of their capital in a year when the delta had a bumper crop 
of rice.
The good years between 1788 and 1795 in the delta must 
have been difficult ones for the middle-Yangzi farmers. 
Interestingly, I have found no private or official report of social 
unrest due to a grain surplus in the region. This may not indicate a 
total absence of such unrest, but it is certain that the problem was 
not severe enough to arouse the central government's attention. 
But how did the middle-Yangzi farmers manage in these years? 
Bin Wong, who first drew attention to the Hunan rice storage 
figures, found that reserves in the Hunan government granaries, or 
ever-normal granaries, increased in the last two decades of the 
century; and the trend of increasing reserves is, of course, the 
opposite of the trend for disbursal. Wong argued that the decline 
in granary use in Hunan, despite increased reserves, was the result 
of an official decision, suggesting that the intensive grain 
mobilization of the late 1770s and early 1780s had overburdened 
the granary managers and officials, who had to monitor such large 
amounts of grain. The rejection of regular official monitoring at 
the turn of the century lifted this bureaucratic burden off the
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shoulders of local officials and placed it onto local leaders, 
encouraging them to establish civilian granaries, known as 
“community granaries” in their own communities.''
I suggest an alternative answer to the phenomenon: In the 
last years of the century, especially between 1788 and 1795, in 
order to absorb an excess of local rice, Hunan officials halted 
grain disbursal while substantially increasing grain reserves. If 
this is true, then Qing officials were still actively intervening in 
the grain flow, and the ever-normal granaries continued to 
function well into the late eighteenth century. In the last decade of 
the eighteenth century, the major problem for Hunan farmers was 
still how to sell their excess rice when there was a bumper harvest 
in the delta.
In this light, the question of industrialization in the 
Yangzi delta is worth rethinking. I would suggest that the current 
model of Jiangnan economy, which assumes that high industrial 
growth in the delta caused an extraordinarily prosperous 
long-distance rice trade, is exaggerated, and we must be cautious 
about applying the concept of market integration to the subject of 
economic exchange. Before historians can speak with confidence 
of an integrated national market, we have to examine the actual 
flow of goods. The reality was that though the Yangzi Valley 
formed a high-level integrated market throughout the eighteenth 
century, the trade volume of rice varied greatly from year to year. 
In addition to this, the market was also regional in scope. Fujian 
and Guangdong had their own rice-supplying districts and needed 
no rice from the Yangzi. Nor was much Yangzi rice sold to 
northern China. It is true that a flourishing economic exchange 
between central and northern China was formed, with the Grand 
Canal as the major transport route, but throughout the eighteenth 
century merchants carried little rice to the north. Apart from the 
high transport costs on the Canal, the northern expansion of the 
Yangzi rice market was obstructed by the grain tribute transport, 
which made Beijing, the largest consumption area, a closed 
market to commercial rice from the south. A minor alternative to
'' R. Bin Wong, “The political economy of food supplies in Qing China,” 
pp. 273-86. See also Wong’s work in Will and Wong with Lee, ed.. 
Nourish the People, pp. 75-98.
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this would be to choose to think of this as a sporadically integrated 
market, indicating that China was at an early stage of market 
development.
One may argue that state policies prevented the formation 
of an integrated national market. This is true in some respects, 
especially in that the regular distribution of tribute rice in Beijing 
discouraged rice merchants from the south, even though the Grand 
Canal facilitated the transport of rice.
At the same time, however, the emergence of a relatively 
prosperous long-distance trade, especially in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, was equally a result of state intervention. 
While classical economists have considered that free trade comes 
from non-intervention, Karl Polanyi has demonstrated that 
obstacles to long-distance trade included arbitrary trade barriers 
set by local bullies or officials, and that removal of such barriers 
was hardly possible without state intervention.^ In the eighteenth 
century, local governments, who feared escalating grain prices in 
their own provinces, often attempted to impose export bans when 
the harvest was poor. Free rice trade on the Yangzi was 
maintained thanks to repeated orders from the central government, 
who upheld the principle of “hutong youwu” (exchange between 
places that have and those that have not).
In sum, China was in its primordial stage in market 
development in the eighteenth century. The market in rice, the 
single most important commodity, was sporadically integrated. 
But this does not imply that the market would have become more 
integrated or would have expanded nationally in the next century. 
While many new technological developments—like the intro­
duction of steam engines, telegraphs, and railways—reduced 
transport costs and contributed to an advanced market 
development in many countries, in the nineteenth century China 
lacked the strong imperial government which had in the previous 
century been able to maintain free inter-provincial trade.
^ Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 60-3
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A Comparison of the Rice Prices in Suzhou and Beijing
Year Suzhou Beijing (old rice)
1729 1.20 taels/s/iz 1.03 taels/5/2/
1730 1.20 taels/.s/2/ 1.20 taels/5/2/
1743 1.60 taels/5/2/ 1.37 taels/5/2/
1751 1.93 taels/5/22 1.65 taels/5/2/
1761 1.82 taels/5/22 1.68 taels/5/2/
Sources:
The price data in Suzhou is for second-grade rice and 
is cited from Yeh-chien Wang, “Secular trends of rice 
prices in the Yangzi delta, 1638-1935,” Table 1.1.
The price data of the "old rice" in Beijing was 
recorded in the following government documents:
1. Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 528 and 540-1.
2. Gongzhong liangjiadan, Zhili province, microfilm, reel 
no. 1.
3. Zhupi zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 55, pp. 1672-5; reel no. 
56, pp. 2415-20.
4. Lufu zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 50, p.l926.
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Table 2.1
Schedule of Grain Tribute Transport
Origin of grain 
tribute boats
Deadline to leave 
waterside depot 
(end of the...)
Deadline to cross 





Shandong lunar month lunar month
Henan 1®’ lunar month lunar month
Jiangbei* 12“^ lunar month 4“*’ lunar month
Jiangnan** lunar month 5* lunar month
Zhejiang 2"“* lunar month 6* lunar month
Jiangxi 2"** lunar month b**" limar month
Huguang 2"“* lunar month 6* lunar month
Source: Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 262.
Notes:
As seen in the Caoyun quanshu, there was no regulation concerning the 
departure time of Yangzi grain boats from their irrespective waterside 
depots, but a regulation stipulated that the tranfer of grain tribute from 
magistrates to bannermen had to be completed within the twelfth lunar 
month; and another regulation required the bannermen to depart the 
waterside depots immediately after they had collected all their grain 
tribute. See Caoyun quanshu (1736), p. 256.
* “Jiangbei” refers to the regions of the Jiangsu and Anhui provinces 
located in the north of the Yangzi river.
** “Jiangnan” refers to the regions of the Jiangsu and Anhui provinces 
located in the south of the Yangzi river.
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Table 2.2













Sources: Caoyun quanshu (1736), pp. 545 and 548; Zhupi 
zouzhe, microfilm, reel no. 54, pp. 1520-2; Gaozong shilu: 
40/3a-4a; Ming-Qing dang’an: A199-77; Qinding hubu 
Caoyun quanshu {\166),juan 65.
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Table 2.3
Tribute Grain Retained in or 
Diverted to Provinces (By Year)




1708 230,000 Jiangsu (100,000)
Zhejiang (80,000)
Anhui (50,000)
1710 300,000 Fujian (300.000)
1719 430,000 Jiangsu (330,000)
Anhui (100,000)
1723 200,000 Shandong (200,000)
1725 300,000 Zhili (300,000)
1726 125,000 Fujian (100,000)
Zhili (25,000)
1728 100,000 Fujian (100,000)




1733 900,000 Jiangsu (700,000)
Zhejiang (100,000)
Shandong (100,000)
1734 300,000 Jiangsu (200,000)
Shandong (100,000)
1737 300,000 Zhili (300,000)
1739 200,000 Jiangsu (200,000)
1742 1,582,000 Jiangsu (860,000)
Anhui (582,000)*
Shandong (140,000)












1745 150,000 Jiangsu (100,000)
Anhui (50,000)
1751 300,000 Zhejiang (300,000)
1753 200,000 Zhili (200,000)
1755 300,000 Jiangsu (300,000)
1756 150,000 Jiangsu (100,000)
Zhejiang (50,000)
1757 450,000 Henan (250,000)
Jiangsu (150,000)
Anhui (50,000)
1759 800,000 Zhili (800.000)





1762 500,000 Zhili (500,000)
1763 150,000 Zhili (150,000)
1764 200,000 Jiangsu (100,000)
Zhejiang (100,000)
1778 250,000 Shandong (150,000)
Henan (100,000)
1782 90,000 Zhili (90,000)
1784 200,000 Jiangsu (100,000)
Zhejiang (100,000)
1790 320,000 Shandong (320,000)
1792 700,000 Zhili (300,000)
Henan (200,000)
Shandong (200,000)
1798 804,000 Shandong (677,000)
Henan (127,000)
1800 60,000 Jiangsu (40,000)
Hubei (20,000)
Sources: The data is taken from Yang Xifu, Caoyun zeli 
zuan,\l-^\ QindingHubu caoyun quanshu {\166),juan 69- 
70, and scattered figures recorded in the following edicts 
and memorials: GZD-YZ: vol. 7, p. 60 (YZ 4.12.4), vol. 11, 
p. 690 (YZ 6.11.5), vol. 18, p. 4 (YZ 9.4.9), vol. 21, p. 126 
(YZ 11.2.13), vol.22, p. 168 (YZ 11.9.28); Lufu zouzhe,
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microfilm, reel no 3, pp. 34-8 (YZ 12); GZD-QL; vol. 1, p. 
661 (QL 16.9.14).
Note:
* In 1742, the Qianlong emperor ordered Anhui 
government to retain all of its tribute grain tax for famine 
relief (See Yang Xifu, Caoyun zeli zuan, 18/67b-68a.) 
According to Tavle 2.1, the annual quota of grain tribute 
tax levied in Anhui was 582,000 shi.
** In 1761, Henan was allowed to retain all of its grain 
tribute tax in local province. (See Yang Xifu, Caoyun zeli 
zMflw, 18/67b-68a.) As also seen in Table 2.1, the annual 
quota of grain tribute tax levied in Henan was 175,000 shi.
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Table 2.4
Tribute Grain Retained in or 
Diverted to Provinces in the Eighteenth Century 
(By Province)











Source: From Table 2.3.
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Table 3.1


















Source: Chuan Han-sheng, “Meizhou baiyin yu shiba shiji 
Zhongguo wujia gemin de guanxi,” vol. 2, pp. 483-4.
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Table 3.2
Price Series of Suzhou and 
Xiaoshan, 1781-1800
























Sources: The “Suzhou series” is drawn from Yeh-chien 
Wang, “Secular trends of rice prices in the Yangzi delta, 
1638-1935,” Table 1.1. The Xiaoshan series is drawn from 
Tanaka Issei, “Shindai Setto s5zoku no soshiki keisei ni 
okeru soshi engeki no kind ni tsuite,” Table 4 (pp. 47-50).
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Table 3.3
Prices in Xiaoshan, 1786-1805
Year Prices of each 
shi of rice (in 
legal cash)
Exchange rate 
of each kuping 
tael of silver 
(in legal cash)
Exchange rate 
of each dollar 
of foreign silver 
(in legal cash)
1786 n.a. lOOO(-) n.a.
1792 2800-3100 1300 lOOO(-)
1793 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1794 3300-3400 1440-1450 n.a.
1795 n.a. n.a. 1070-1090
1796 n.a. n.a. 1200-1300
1797 n.a. 1020-1030 800-1200
1798 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1799 n.a. n.a. 840-845
1800 n.a. 1000 760-880
1801 n.a. 900 650
1802 2600-3200 n.a. 650-660
1803 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1804 3000 n.a. n.a.
1805 3000-4600 n.a. n.a.




Silver Shipped to Guangzhou by the 
British East India Company

















Source: H.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India 
Company Trading to China, 1635-1834, vol. 2, pp. 119, 




Prices of First-Grade Rice in Hanyang, 1739-1798
Year Hanyang Year Hanyang Year Hanyang
1739 1.1 1759 1.28 1779 2.2
1740 1.1 1760 1.34 1780 1.51
1741 1.05 1761 1.49 1781 1.49
1742 1.23 1762 1.49 1782 1.56
1743 1.31 1763 1.38 1783 1.57
1744 1.1 1764 1.44 1784 1.75
1745 1.05 1765 1.59 1785 2.21
1746 1.15 1766 1.51 1786 2.1
1747 1.28 1767 1.43 1787 1.95
1748 1.36 1768 1.44 1788 1.67
1749 1.36 1769 1.47 1789 NIL
1750 1.26 1770 1.5 1790 NIL
1751 1.52 1771 1.34 1791 NIL
1752 1.72 1772 1.32 1792 1.56
1753 1.46 1773 1.34 1793 1.53
1754 1.43 1774 1.49 1794 1.49
1755 1.48 1775 1.59 1795 1.43
1756 1.71 1776 1.55 1796 1.44
1757 1.44 1777 1.37 1797 1.48
1758 1.3 1778 1.89 1798 1.56
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